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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO  
AGAM-P (M) (17 May 68) FOR OT RD 67X200

29 May 1968

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation SHENANDOAH II, 1st  
Infantry Division, Period 29 September - 19 November 1967 (U)

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in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appro-  
priate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current  
operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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
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3  
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO 96345

AVDRLTT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1) (U)

THRU: Commanding General  
II Field Force Vietnam  
APO 96266

TO: Commander  
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
ATTN: MAC J343  
APO 96222

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation SHENANDOAH II was a reconnaissance in force operation and a road clearing operation conducted in two phases. References: Map, Vietnam, Sheets 6231 I, 6231 II, 6331 III, 6331 IV, 6232 I, 6332 I, 6332 II, 6332 III, 6332 IV.

2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: Phase I: 290800H Sep - 262400H Oct 67. Phase II: 290001H Oct - 191935H Nov 67.

3. (C) LOCATION: SHENANDOAH II was conducted in two phases. Phase I was conducted west of Highway 13 from Ben Cat to Chon Thanh in the Long Nguyen base area. Phase II was conducted in the rubber and jungle areas surrounding Loc Ninh. The areas of operation are shown at Annex B.

4. (C) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: Operation SHENANDOAH II was a 1st Infantry Division controlled operation.

5. (C) REPORTING OFFICER: The reporting officer is Major General Keith L. Ware, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division. A list of commanders is shown at Annex A.

6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

Phase I (29 Sep - 28 Oct 67)

<u>1st Brigade</u>	<u>2d Brigade</u>	<u>3d Brigade</u>
1-26 Inf	2-16 Inf	2-2 Inf (Mech) (-)
1-28 Inf	2-18 Inf	1-16 Inf
1-2 Inf	TASK FORCE STEEL	1-18 Inf
1-4 Cav (-)	1-7 Arty (DS)	2-28 Inf
1-5 Arty (DS)		B/2-34 Armor
6-15 Arty (DS)		2-33 Arty (DS)

7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery: See Annex C.

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7

AVDBLTT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1)(U)

b. USAF:

(1) Tactical Air: Tactical Air was used extensively throughout Operation SHENANDOAH for close support, landing zone preparatory fires, and the destruction of base camps. Preplanned air strikes were employed on a daily basis in areas scheduled to be reconnoitered. Those air strikes were planned to be expended just prior to the arrival of the ground forces in the objective area. Preplanned air strikes were also scheduled to destroy base camps discovered by ground forces during reconnaissance in force operations and by aerial reconnaissance units. All landing zones scheduled for aerial assault by infantry battalions were elaborately "prepped" with bombs, napalm and CBU. The fact that no ships were lost or casualties sustained during these aerial assaults testifies to the effectiveness of the tactical air and the soundness of the practice. Tactical air was used extensively in a close support role both day and night for all contacts sustained during the operation. The Battle of Loc Ninh is an example of the use and effectiveness of close air support at night. When anti-aircraft positions were identified by the F-4's and gunships, bombs were effectively used to destroy these positions. At Loc Ninh, repeated strikes, using CBU, were run parallel to the runway on the east side in the rubber when the VC attempted to use that avenue of approach to the District Headquarters. Each time a unit came in contact, as in the case of the 1-18 Infantry on 29 and 30 October, airstrikes were used simultaneously with artillery to block the VC from retreating and to destroy those that tried to escape. In one instance, during the 1-18 Infantry contact on 30 October, the artillery was used to block the VC from the rear and airstrikes were brought in between the artillery blocking fires and the friendly forces. Tactical air was also used to protect the flanks of units while in contact. It is always the objective of the 1st Infantry Division to use weapons of massive destruction, such as tactical air, as close to the point of contact as possible, in conjunction with other means of destruction to effectively destroy the VC once he has been located by ground forces.

The following is a resume of the sorties flown and ordnance expended during Operation SHENANDOAH II:

	<u>PHASE I</u>	<u>PHASE II</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Preplanned	744 sorties	462 sorties	1,206 sorties
Immediate	689 sorties	339 sorties	1,028 sorties
	1,433 sorties	801 sorties	2,234 sorties
Ordnance	1,902.92 tons	873.74 tons	2,776.66 tons

(2) B-52 Strikes: There were 11 B-52 strikes conducted during Phase I and 12 during Phase II. Strikes were delivered based upon intelligence and their impact on the scheme of maneuver. The B-52 strike is extremely effective in opening jungle areas habitually used by the VC. Due to the extensive construction of base camp complexes found during Phase I, the B-52 strike offered one practical method of destroying them. Some base camps extended over three to four grid squares requiring more than one B-52 strike to effectively destroy them. The value of B-52 strikes cannot be over emphasized. A list of targets and the results obtained are included as Annex D.

c. Army Aviation - See Annex E.

2  
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AVDBLTT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1)(U)

(1) Aviation units supporting Operation SHENANDOAH:

- (a) 1st Aviation Battalion
- (b) 11th Aviation Battalion
- (c) 222d Aviation Battalion
- (d) 269th Aviation Battalion
- (e) 214th Aviation Battalion

(2) Statistics for airmobile operations during Phase I:

	Date	Unit Moved	Nr of R/M Aircraft	Sorties	Passengers
(a)	29 Sep	1-28 Inf	25	75	450
		1-16 Inf	20	60	360
(b)	1 Oct	1-16 Inf	25	75	450
(c)	2 Oct	2-28 Inf	25	75	450
(d)	4 Oct	1-18 Inf	15	75	450
(e)	8 Oct	2-28 Inf	25	75	450
(f)	10 Oct	1-28 Inf	25	75	450
		1-2 Inf	25	75	450
(g)	13 Oct	1-18 Inf	25	75	450
		1-16 Inf	25	75	450
(h)	15 Oct	1-18 Inf	10	50	300
(i)	17 Oct	C/2-28 Inf	10	20	120
		D/1-16 Inf	10	20	120
(j)	18 Oct	1-2 Inf	20	65	210
		1-16 Inf	20	45	270
		2-18 Inf	20	60	360
(k)	19 Oct	1-28 Inf	10	70	420
(l)	21 Oct	1-16 Inf	20	70	420
(m)	23 Oct	1-26 Inf	20	70	420
(n)	28 Oct	1-2 Inf	20	70	420
		1-26 Inf	20	75	450
		1-18 Inf	20	60	360
	TOTALS	22 Units	425	1,425	8,280

3 CONFIDENTIAL

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AVDELT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RGS: MAC J3-32) (K-1)(U)

(3) Statistics for airmobile operations during Phase II:

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Unit Moved</u>	<u>Nr of R/W Aircraft</u>	<u>Sortias</u>	<u>Passengers</u>
(a)	29 Oct	1-16 Inf	20	65	210
		1-26 Inf	20	20	120
		1-18 Inf	20	80	480
(b)	31 Oct	1-28 Inf	20	75	450
		1-2 Inf	20	75	450
(c)	2 Nov	1-26 Inf	20	75	450
		2-12 Inf	20	80	480
(d)	6 Nov	1-26 Inf	20	75	450
(e)	7 Nov	1-18 Inf	10	75	450
		2-12 Inf	20	80	480
(f)	10 Nov	1-16 Inf	20	75	450
(g)	11 Nov	1-28 Inf	20	75	450
(h)	16 Nov	1-16 Inf	10	75	450
(i)	19 Nov	2-18 Inf	20	75	450
	<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>14 Units</u>	<u>260</u>	<u>1,000</u>	<u>5,820</u>

(4) CH-47 Support - Phase I.

- (a) Average aircraft per day - 8.5.
- (b) Total troops moved - 23,000.
- (c) Tons of equipment and supplies moved - 7,900.

(5) CH-47 Support - Phase II.

- (a) Average aircraft per day - 8.
- (b) Total troops moved - 16,000.
- (c) Tons of equipment and supplies moved - 5,800.

8. (U) INTELLIGENCE: See Annex F.

9. (C) MISSION:

a. Phase I: 1st Infantry Division conducts operations commencing 29 September 1967 to locate and destroy the 271st VC Regiment; to capture or destroy militarily significant installations, equipment, and supplies; to open access Route 240 from Ben Cat to vic XT653493 and clear jungle approximately 100 meters to the flanks of the road.

b. Phase II: 1st Infantry Division conducts operations commencing 29 October 1967 to locate and destroy the 272d and 273d VC Regiments and capture or destroy militarily significant installations, equipment and supplies in the rubber and jungle area surrounding Loc Ninh.

4 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7  
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AVDBLTT  
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (A-1) (U) 12 April 1968

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Phase I: 1st Infantry Division employs the 1st Brigade in AO SHENANDOLAH North to locate and destroy the 271st VC Regiment commencing 29 September 1967; 3d Brigade in AO SHENANDOLAH South to locate and destroy VC/AVNA units and installations, clear and repair Route 240 from Ben Cat to vicinity XT653493 commencing 30 September.

b. Phase II: 1st Infantry Division employs 3d Brigade initially on 29 October 1967, then 1st Brigade on 30 October 1967 to locate and destroy the 272d and 273d VC Regiments in the vicinity of Loc Ninh commencing 29 October 1967.

11. (C) EXECUTION:

PHASE I (29 September - 28 October)

a. 29 Sep - The 1st Brigade initiated Operation SHENANDOLAH II by moving the 1-2 Infantry from CAISSON II (XT792513) to field position vicinity XT740540.

The 1-28 Infantry conducted an air assault into a field position vicinity XT728602 at 1000 hours.

The 1-16 Infantry moved overland from vicinity XT790466 to Lai Khe.

The 1-26 Infantry located at Phuoc Vinh became the Division RRF.

The 1-4 Cavalry (-) secured Fire Support Patrol Base CAISSON III South (XT790555) and CAISSON II (XT792513).

b. 30 Sep: 1st Brigade - the Brigade tactical CP moved from Phuoc Vinh to CAISSON III S (XT790555).

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT737541. At 1055H vicinity XT742545 Co D made contact with 2 VC. VC broke contact immediately.

The 1-26 Infantry moved via F/W from Phuoc Vinh to Quan Loi and became OPCON 3d Brigade.

3d Brigade - The 3d Brigade began Operation SHENANDOLAH by moving the 2-2 Infantry (Mech)(-) and elements of the 1st Engr Bn from Lai Khe to vicinity XT723356 and commencing RIF, jungle clearing, and road repair operations.

The 1-18 Infantry moved via F/W from Quan Loi to Phuoc Vinh and became OPCON to the 1st Brigade.

c. 1 Oct - 1st Bde - The 1-2 Inf conducted operations northwest of their field position. At 1032H, Co B, working with a combat tracker team, was hit by two command detonated devices vicinity XT712539, causing 2 WHA. The VC withdrew into a suspected base camp area. Three airstrikes and artillery were put into the area.

The 1-4 Cav (-) continued security of FSPB CAISSON III South (XT790555) and CAISSON II (XT792513).

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (Mech)(-) continued RIF, jungle clearing and road repair operations along Route 240 vicinity XT725355. Some Flows cleared 160 acres.

5 CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-TT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: IAC J3-32) (K-1) (U)

The 1-16 Infantry Battalion conducted an air assault vicinity XT701444 and established FSPB LORRAINE I (XT710432).

d. 2 Oct - 1st Bde - The 1-28 Inf established a new NDP vicinity XT721585. The 1-2 Inf established a NDP vicinity XT718537. At 0905H a Reconnaissance platoon outpost received M-79 fire. At 0955H Co C reported movement while searching the area from which the fire had been received. Co C fired into the area with small arms. At 1105H Co B located 1 VC KIA and 1 VC WIA vicinity XT718537. Two AK-47 weapons were captured. The wounded VC was evacuated. At 0220H the 1-2 Inf NDP vicinity XT738543 received 15 82mm mortar rounds from the southwest. Counter mortar was fired and Spooky and LFT supported. There were 8 US WIA.

3d Bde - The 2-28 Infantry conducted an air assault vicinity XT715485. At 1235H Co B located 5 tons of unpolished rice vicinity XT710481.

The 2-2 Inf (-) continued RIF, jungle clearing and road repair along Route 240 vicinity XT725355. At 0805H a Rome Plow hit a mine vicinity XT718393 causing no casualties or damage. The Rome Plows cleared 70 acres. The 1-16 Inf secured FSPB LORRAINE I and conducted RIF operations. At 1156H Co D received small arms fire from vicinity XT692437. A search of the area revealed a base camp and 19 VC suspects. 2 US were WIA and the suspects were evacuated.

e. 3 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry Battalion conducted RIF operations vicinity XT721585. At 1004H vicinity XT723578 Co D located and destroyed an underwater footbridge.

The 1-2 Inf conducted RIF operations vicinity XT718537. At 1610H vicinity XT713544 a patrol from Co C engaged 1 VC with negative results.

The 1-4 Cav (-) continued to secure FSPB CAISSON III South (XT790555) and CAISSON II (XT792513).

3d Brigade - 2-2 Infantry (-) continued RIF, jungle clearing and road repair along Route 240 vicinity XT725355. Rome Plows cleared 70 acres of jungle.

The 1-16 Inf secured FSPB LORRAINE I and conducted RIF operations. At 1255H vicinity XT735466 Co B located and destroyed 2 bunkers. At 1150H vicinity XT659414 an AO received 1 round of small arms fire through the aircraft window. Arty fired into the area resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 4 military structures destroyed, 1 large tin building destroyed and 4 water buffaloes destroyed. At 1845 vicinity XT704445 the Reconnaissance Platoon made contact with 4 VC. Arty fired blocking fires and a LFT expended into the area. Contact was broken at 1853H. Results were 1 VC KIA (BC) and negative US casualties. Equipment captured: 1 set of webgear, 2 pr blue pajamas, 10 days supply of food, 3 AK-47 magazines and 300 rounds of ammunition.

The 2-28 Inf located and destroyed 5.5 tons of rice vicinity XT710481.

f. 4 Oct - 1st Brigade - The Reconnaissance Platoon and C Co, 1-2 Infantry, departed their NDP vicinity XT718537 at 0735H. At 0745H contact was made with an unknown size VC force vicinity XT712537. Artillery and mortars supported the contact and a light fire team was airborne at 0808H. The first airstrike was put in at 0835H. The Reconnaissance Platoon and C Co closed back into the NDP by 1040H. A total of ten airstrikes were completed as of 1206H.



9

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVDB-IT

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1) (U) 12 April 1968

US casualties were 3 KIA and 27 KLA. There were 12 VC KIA (BC) and 3 VC KIA (POSS).

The 1-18 Infantry moved from Phuoc Vinh to Chon Thanh and conducted an air assault into an LZ vicinity XT692541. A large VC base camp was located 500 meters west of the LZ consisting of bunkers and tents. 7 airstrikes vicinity XT687542 resulted in 19 VC KIA (BC).

The 1-4 Cavalry (-) secured FSPB CAISSON III South (XT790555) and CAISSON II (XT792513).

CAISSON II was disestablished and CAISSON IV established vicinity XT778542.

3d Brigade - The 2-28 Infantry Battalion conducted RIF operations vicinity XT700477 and extracted to Lai Khe and assumed RRF mission.

The 2-2 Inf (-) continued RIF, jungle clearing, and road repair along Route 240 vicinity XT725355. Rome Flows cleared 95 acres of jungle.

The 1-16 Inf secured FSPB LORRAINE I (XT709432) and conducted RIF operations.

g. 5 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT698534. At 1050H Company B located and destroyed 12 bunkers with overhead cover vicinity XT685540. At 1510H vicinity XT694543 Co C local security elements made contact with an estimated VC squad resulting in 1 US KIA. VC losses unknown. VC broke contact immediately.

The 2-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT719538. At 1130H vicinity XT724575 the Reconnaissance Platoon received small arms fire while searching a base camp. 2 VC in the open and 1 VC in the bunker were sighted. Fire was returned with small arms, M-79 and hand grenades resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC).

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT719538. At 1007H vicinity XT713543 an ambush force from the Reconnaissance Platoon killed 2 VC and 4 VC (POSS). At 1015H vicinity XT714542 the platoon received sniper fire. Fire was returned with small arms and M-79 and artillery was fired into suspected locations.

The 1-4 Cavalry (-) continued to secure FSPB CAISSON III South (XT790444) and CAISSON IV (XT778546). CAISSON IV was disestablished and CAISSON V established vicinity XT736540.

3d Brigade - The 2-28 Infantry conducted security operations at Lai Khe and was the Division RRF. At 1324H Company C moved to CAISSON V.

The 2-2 Infantry (-) continued RIF, jungle clearing and road repair along Route 240 vicinity XT725355. Rome Flows cleared 100 acres of jungle.

The 1-16 Infantry secured FSPB LORRAINE I and conducted RIF operations. At 0835H Company C moved to a new NDP vicinity XT690437. At 1205H vicinity XT690437 Co C received approximately 12 M-79 rounds and 100 rounds of small arms fire.

7 **CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1) (U)

12 April 1968

h. 6 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT698534. At 1435H vicinity XT698534 5 60mm mortar rounds landed inside the NDP. The counter mortar program was fired and an airstrike resulted in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 4 bunkers destroyed. At 1855H vicinity XT699537 an AP engaged an unknown number of VC. The VC returned fire with at least two heavy machineguns, small arms and 3 claymores. The AP maneuvered back to the NDP under heavy automatic weapon and small arms fire. US casualties were 2 WHA and 1 MIA. A Spooky, LFT, and dust-off were requested but could not get airborne due to bad weather. At 1916H the NDP began receiving 60mm and 82mm mortar fire. The firing stopped at 1913H and started again at 1926H and stopped at 1933H. An estimated 75 rounds of 82mm mortars were received. As of 1928H four batteries were firing in support. At 1952H the Battalion received heavy automatic weapons fire on the south side of the perimeter. Fire was returned with small arms and M-79. Firing ceased at 1954H. At 1955H a patrol was sent out to the location of contact to search for the missing man. Spooky began dropping flares at 2020H. The patrol came under mortar and small arms fire during the entire mission and was unable to locate the missing man. At 2050H an AP from Co C made contact while returning to NDP resulting in 1 US WHA. At 2120H 1 VC body was pulled into the perimeter. The VC was dressed in fatigues and had 1 Chinese Communist carbine, a large amount of ammunition, North Vietnamese money and postage stamps. At 2114H automatic weapons fire was received on the east side of the perimeter. At 2116H automatic weapons and small arms fire was received on all sides of the perimeter. The firing continued every 5 to 7 minutes until 2145H. A second Spooky was on station at 2111H. At 2317H the perimeter received a heavy mortar attack and a ground attack consisting of automatic weapons, small arms and grenades. An estimated 60-70 mortar rounds (60mm and 82mm) were received and 7 machinegun positions were observed. The attack was broken off at 2332H resulting in 2 US KIA and 5 US WHA. A VC rallier picked up by the 1-16 Inf on 27 October 1967 vicinity XT698566 stated that his unit, the 2d Battalion, 271st Regiment had 59 KIA and 67 WHA as a result of counter mortar and ground fire during the attack described above. At 070815H 1 wounded man died. At 070815H a patrol located the missing man who was KIA.

The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT719538. At 1240H vicinity XT712566 Company D located 2 bunkers and sighted 2 VC in the area. An airstrike in the area resulted in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 3 bunkers destroyed.

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT719536. At 2250H vicinity XT719538 the NDP received 3 mortar rounds causing no casualties or damage.

1-4 Cavalry (-) continued to secure FSPB CAISSON III South (XT790555) and CAISSON V (XT736540). At 1005H vicinity XT786554 4 individuals were detained and evacuated for interrogation. 3 were released and 1 turned over to the National Police.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (-) continued RIF, jungle clearing and road repair along Route 240 vicinity XT725355. At 0853H vicinity XT707435 an APC hit a mine causing 6 WHA. At 0905H vicinity XT732363 a squad from Co B fired on 3 VC. A platoon reinforced the squad to make a search of the area. 7 military structures with a camp fire burning were located and destroyed. Also located and destroyed in the

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-TT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1)(U)

same area were 6 bunkers, 1 trip flare, 1 Chinese Communist grenade and 5 CBU's.

The 1-16 Infantry continued to secure FSPB LORRAINE I and conducted RIF operations. At 0804H vicinity XT683432 a patrol from Company C received approximately 50 rounds small arms fire. Fire was returned with small arms and M-79. At 0942H vicinity XT705421 a patrol from Company D located and destroyed 500 pounds of rice and activated a booby trapped CBU causing 2 WIA. At 1325H vicinity XT740454 an LP from Company C received approximately 20 rounds of AK-47 fire. Fire was returned with M-79 and 81mm mortar. There was one US WFA.

1. 7 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT693534. A search of the area of the attack at 1855-2334 hours 6 October 1967 resulted in 24 VC KIA (BC), 1 AK-47 rifle, 1 Chinese Communist 56 machine gun, 1 Chinese Communist rifle, 3 rice sacks, 3 shovels, 10 Chinese Communist grenades, 4 RPG rounds & 7.62 ammunition. The VC were wearing mixed uniforms and new fatigues. Some of the VC wore belts with red stars on the buckles. 125 fighting trenches and positions were located. Most of the trenches were 4 feet by 2 feet by 1 1/2 feet. At 1205H vicinity XT693534 Company B located 6 bunkers with fresh bloody bandages inside. Airstrikes vicinity XT684545 destroyed 2 bunkers, vicinity XT675545 destroyed 16 bunkers, 5 military structures, and vicinity XT665524 destroyed 5 bunkers.

The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations and established a new NDP vicinity XT695506.

The 1-4 Cavalry (-) continued to secure FSPB CAISSON III South and CAISSON V. At 0930H vicinity XT736543 B Troop located 1 VC body dressed in a green uniform.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (Mechanized) (-) continued RIF, jungle clearing and road repair along Route 240 vicinity XT725355. The 1-16 (-) conducted RIF operations and established a new NDP vicinity XT681484.

j. 8 Oct - 1st Brigade - At 1145H vicinity YU091345 a 1st Aviation Battalion UH1D while on a Bloodhound mission received automatic weapon fire. At XU917136 the same aircraft received small arms fire.

The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT689534. At 1000H vicinity XT692538 Company C located and destroyed 25 prone positions. Co C moved back and artillery and airstrikes were put in. At 1014H vicinity XT694525 the point man of Company D while moving into a base camp drew automatic weapons fire, returned the fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). Due to close proximity of the Company C contact and ground fire received by lift aircraft of 2-28, Co D was moved back to its Night Defensive Position to allow maneuver space and priority of fires to Company C and 2-28. At 2115H vicinity XT698534 an unknown number of VC activated a trip flare. Illumination was fired at 2138H and 2 VC were observed dragging a third VC. They were engaged by machine gun fire resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC). The 1-2 Infantry moved to Phuoc Vinh, OPCON to 1st Brigade, and remained DIV RRF.

The 2-28 Infantry air assaulted into a landing zone vicinity XT659557 and established an NDP vicinity XT660555. At 1105H vicinity XT658559, one lift aircraft received a short burst of automatic weapons fire. A light fire team expended into the area and the 1st flight touched down at 1112H.

# CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDR TT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1) (U)

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (Mechanized) (-) continued RIF, jungle clearing, and road repair along Route 13 vicinity XT725355. At 0840H vicinity XT713399 2 armored personnel carriers hit mines causing 2 WHA. Rome Plows cleared 50 acres.

C/1-16 Infantry continued to secure Fire Support Base LORRAINE I. The 1-16 Infantry (-) conducted RIF operations from its Night Defensive Position (XT681484).

k. 9 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT698534. At 1032H vicinity XT696545 Company B received small arms and automatic weapons fire as the point entered a base camp. The point man engaged and killed one VC. The point withdrew and artillery and airstrikes were put into the area resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC) and one secondary explosion. At 1955H vicinity XT677542 an ambush patrol from Company B made contact with an unknown number of VC resulting in 1 US WHA.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (Mechanized) (-) conducted RIF, jungle clearing, and road repair operations along Route 240 vicinity XT725355. Rome Plows cleared 35 acres of jungle.

Fire Support Base LORRAINE II was established at XT685483 and secured by 1-16 Infantry (-). C/1-16 Infantry continued to secure Fire Support Base LORRAINE I.

l. 10 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT698534. At 1000H vicinity XT69542 the recon platoon located 1 pair of sandals, 1 belt with a red star on the buckle and frog graves. The graves contained 4 VC bodies, approximately 5-7 days old. At 1120H vicinity XT696532 a patrol from Company D made contact with an unknown number of VC. Contact was broken at 1130H. 1 US WHA. VC casualties unknown.

The 1-28 Infantry extracted to Phuoc Vinh and assumed the Division Ready Reaction Force mission. The 1-2 Infantry conducted an air assault vicinity XT637512 and established an NDP vicinity XT635509.

m. 11 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT698534. The Battalion (-), traveling in column with Company B in the lead followed by the Command Group and Company C, received sniper fire vicinity XT700552. Light fire teams were employed on the west flank. An estimated VC company then assaulted Company B from the west in order to flank the company. Airstrikes and artillery were employed on the north and east, respectively. Company B withdrew through Company C as the VC pressed the attack against Company C. Contact was broken at 1515H. A total of 9 sorties of air were flown in support of the contact. US casualties were 1 KIA and 4 WHA. There were 21 VC KIA (BC). Documents taken from the bodies identified the 2d Battalion, 271st VC Regiment.

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT635509. At 0211H vicinity XT630514 an ambush patrol from Company C fired claymores at 3 VC. A grenade was thrown at the ambush patrol causing no casualties. The ambush returned fire with small arms and then moved to a new location. At 0700H a search of the area resulted in 3 VC KIA (BC). Two of the VC were wearing black pajamas and one was wearing mixed clothing. At 1830H vicinity XT642506 the recon platoon triggered an ambush with negative results. As the patrol was moving they made contact with 10-15 VC with unknown results. Artillery and mortars were fired into suspected locations. The 2-28 Infantry conducted RIF

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDBL TT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RGS: NAC J3-32) (K-1) (U)

operations vicinity XT660555. At 1553H vicinity XT661555, Company A observed 2 VC running out of a base camp as the company moved in. The VC were fired on with small arms and artillery was fired in the direction the VC were moving. In the base camp the company located 3 VC bodies and destroyed 20 bunkers and 3 bundles of clothing. 1 AK-47 rifle was captured.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (Mechanized) (-) continued to secure Fire Support Base LORRAINE I (XT708433) and conduct RIF, jungle clearing and road repair operations along Route 240. At 1155H vicinity XT669479 an Armored Personnel Carrier was hit by a command detonated claymore causing 4 KIA. Sniper fire was also received. Fire was returned with small arms and automatic weapons and artillery. Contact was broken at 1208H. At 1640H vicinity XT687428 the Recon platoon located and destroyed 25 bunkers with tin roofs and 4 chickens. Four women and 15 children in the area were evacuated for interrogation.

The 1-16 Infantry continued to secure Fire Support Base LORRAINE II (XT685483) and conduct RIF operations. At 1435H vicinity XT684461 Company D located 15 tons of unpolished rice. At 1510H vicinity XT662491 Company C received sniper fire. Fire was returned resulting in 1 VC KIA. A second VC was KIA while attempting to recover the first VC's weapon. A total of 1 AK-47, 1 M-1 rifle, 5 M-17 magazines, with 90 rounds of ammunition and 4 clips of M-1 with 15 rounds of ammunition were captured.

n. 12 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT698534. An ambush patrol on the previous day at 1955H vicinity XT705540 fired claymores at an estimated 5 VC. At 0955H Company D located 4 VC killed by the ambush patrol and 34 prone shelters.

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT625509. At 1115H vicinity XT624508 the Recon platoon engaged 2 VC with unknown results.

The 2-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT660555. At 1217H vicinity XT668552 Company D received 1 hand grenade believed to have been thrown from a tree. Fire was returned with small arms and artillery.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (Mechanized) (-) continued to secure FSPD LORRAINE I (XT708433) and conduct RIF operations, jungle clearing and road clearing operations along Route 240. At 1230H vicinity XT685428 the Recon platoon located and destroyed a base camp consisting of 12 freshly camouflaged military structures, 1 wall, 1 Chinese Communist grenade, 2 excarts, 1 bicycle and 1 meat grinder. Rome Flows cleared 75 acres of jungle. An ambush patrol made contact with 6 VC at 2135H vicinity XT712412. Contact was broken at 2203H. Negative US casualties, unknown VC casualties.

The 1-16 Infantry conducted RIF operations and continued to secure LORRAINE II (XT685483). At 0915H vicinity XT693457 Company D fired on 6 VC moving north. Artillery and light fire team fired into the area with unknown results. At 1230H vicinity XT675430 an outpost received small arms fire. The outpost fired claymores and brought in artillery. The area was checked with negative findings. Eight tons of rice were found and evacuated from vicinity XT698534.

CONFIDENTIAL

LVDB-TT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAJ J3-32) (K-1) (U)

a. 13 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry extracted from vicinity XT690534 to Phuoc Vinh and became Division Ready Reaction Force. The 1-28 Infantry conducted an airmobile insertion vicinity XT698534.

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT635509.

The 1-16 Infantry continued to secure FSPB LORRAINE II (XT665483). At 0704H Company C conducted an air assault into a landing zone vicinity XT635462. At 1010H vicinity XT657469 Company C received small arms and claymore fire resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 WHA. Fire was returned with small arms and automatic weapons. Artillery and LFT supported. Contact was broken at 1043H. At 1125H, Company C moved back into the area and received more fire causing 4 KIA and 2 WHA. Fire was returned and TAC Air, artillery and LFT supported. Contact was broken at 1325H. At 1523H, Company C moved back into the area of contact and received small arms fire. Fire was returned and TAC Air and artillery supported. Contact was broken at 1700H. At 1613H Company D moved by R/W from LORRAINE II to Landing Zone vicinity XT653466. Company C and D established an NDP at that location. At 1645H, Company B moved by R/W from Lai Kho to LORRAINE II.

p. 14 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations. At 1215H vicinity XT687531 Company D received small arms fire causing 1 KIA and 1 WHA. Fire was returned and TAC Air and artillery supported.

The 2-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations and established a new NDP vicinity XT684590. At 1355H vicinity XT663560 Company D fired on 3 VC. Artillery was fired into the area with unknown results.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (MECH) (-) continued security of FSPB LORRAINE I (XT708433) and conducted RIF operations, jungle clearing, and road repair of Route 240. Company D, 1-16 Infantry moved from field positions to Lai Kho.

q. 15 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry became OPCON to 3d Bde and moved to Song Be. The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT698539. At 1035H vicinity XT895435 Company A received automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of VC. Fire was returned. Artillery and mortar supported. Contact was broken at 1100H resulting in 1 US WHA and 2 VC KIA (DC).

1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations and established a new NDP vicinity XT642527. At 1500H vicinity XT641525 Company B wounded and captured 1 VC. The VC was taken to Lai Kho for treatment but was DOA. 1 AK-47 rifle was captured. Several rice storage areas were located in the NDP (XT642527). Total estimated was 10 tons.

The 2-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT684590. At 1428H vicinity XT683578 Company B located a base camp. At 1445H vicinity XT683578 Company B received automatic weapons fire from an estimated 3 VC. VC broke contact at 1453H. A pool of blood and a pair of bloody sandals were located.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (MECH) (-) continued to secure FSPB LORRAINE I (XT708433) and conducted RIF, jungle clearing, and road repair along Route 240. At 1602H vicinity XT688399 Company C received 10 rounds of small arms fire. Fire was returned and contact broken at 1610H. Negative friendly casualties. VC casualties unknown. Some plows cleared 65 acres of jungle.

15

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-TT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1) (U)

The 1-18 Infantry moved from Phuoc Vinh to Song Be and became OPCOM to the 3d Brigade.

2. 16 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT698539. At 0817H vicinity XT691531 the Recon platoon received small arms fire from 1 VC. Fire was returned with small arms and automatic weapons. There were negative casualties. At 1320H vicinity XT685525 Company B received small arms fire from VC in a base camp. Fire was returned with small arms, automatic weapons and artillery. Contact was broken at 1333H. There were no friendly casualties. VC casualties were unknown.

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT642527. At 1525H vicinity XT648528 Company D located and destroyed 10 tons of rice. At 1952H vicinity XT638525 an ambush patrol from Co B fired claymores resulting in 1 VC KIA.

The 2-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT684590. At 1245H vicinity XT698568 Company D received small arms fire and one claymore as the lead elements entered a base camp. Fire was returned and the unit withdrew to call artillery and airstrikes on the base area. Contact was broken at 1310H. US casualties were 1 KIA and 5 WHA. There were 17 VC KIA (20), and 4 VC KIA (Poss). At 1615H vicinity XT683529 artillery fire resulted in 3 VC KIA (20). (The 1 US KIA was the advisor to the Ben Cat Subsector attached to the 2-28 Infantry for operations).

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (MECH) (-) moved from LORRAINE I to LORRAINE II. LORRAINE I was closed out with the removal of A Battery 2-33 Arty to Lai Khe. The 1-16 Infantry moved from FSPB LORRAINE II to Lai Khe.

3. 17 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 2-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT684590. At 0800H the Battalion (-) departed the NDP with Company A leading and Company D following. The Battalion command group was located in the center file of Company D. The direction was due south. Airstrikes were employed parallel to the column at 1,000 meters to the east in the areas of contact the previous day. The Battalion (-) continued to move without incident until 0956H when the point element of Company A encountered a well used NW-SE trail in the vicinity of XT686576 covered with freshly made foot prints. There were freshly cut trees in the vicinity. At 1015H Company A began receiving sporadic small arms fire from its right flank. The VC small arms fire built up gradually. The fires were coming from the trees as well as the ground. Some VC positions were 15 meters away.

Artillery fire was brought in five minutes after contact was made. Enemy fire became extremely heavy, having been augmented by large caliber machine guns. The VC were pressing in close to avoid the artillery. As the firing began against Company A, sporadic fire was received by Company D from approximately 5 VC located in trees on its right flank. The VC were taken under fire and eliminated. The Battalion Commander directed that the command group remain with Company D and the lead platoon maintain contact with Company A. A lull in the firing occurred at this time and Company D received instructions to prepare for the withdrawal of Company A through Company D and to assist in the extraction of Company A's casualties.

13

# CONFIDENTIAL



16

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVDB-TT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1) (U)

Firing broke out again to the right flank of the line of march in the Company A sector & progressed with increasing intensity down the flank toward Company D. Firing then broke out in Company D's sector on the right and left flank and left front. At this time, approximately 1045H, the Command Group had all become casualties.

Company A began to withdraw with the leading elements pulling back through the rear platoons and Company Command Group. The Company then moved north and met elements of Company B which had been sent out of the NDP by the Battalion Commander to assist in the return to the NDP.

At approximately 1220H the 1st Brigade Commander assumed command of the battalion. By 1400H Co C/2-28 Infantry had been inserted into the NDP and was committed to cover the route into the NDP while Company B moved south to assist in the withdrawal and evacuation of casualties. All firing had ceased by 1430H.

Company D/1-16 Infantry was inserted into the NDP at 1545H as additional reinforcement. The last of the wounded had been evacuated by 1730H and the last units closed the NDP by 2000H. US casualties were 56 KIA, 75 WIA, and 2 MIA. There were 106 VC KIA (BC) and 55 KIA (poss). There were 36 sorties of air used to support the contact and four batteries of artillery. The VC were identified as elements of the 271st VC Regiment.

The 2-2 Infantry (-) secured FSPB LORRAINE II (XT685483) and conducted RIF operations. At 1400H vicinity XT685483 52 individuals were detained and evacuated for interrogation to Lai Khe. At 1505H vicinity XT675485 Company C received sniper fire resulting in 1 US KIA. Artillery and airstrikes were placed into the area of contact. VC losses were unknown.

3d Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry continued security, patrolling and RIF operations at Song Be (YU142069). At 1135H vicinity YU146095 Company A received automatic weapons fire. Fire was returned and the VC broke contact immediately. There was 1 US WIA.

t. 18 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry battalion conducted RIF operations vicinity ZT698539. At 1450H an airstrike vicinity XT676546 resulted in 2 VC KIA (BC).

The 1-2 Infantry extracted from NDP loc (XT641527) to Phuoc Vinh and became the Division RIF.

The 2-2 Infantry (MECH) (-) secured FSPB LORRAINE II and conducted RIF operations. At 1410H vicinity XT681482 an OP from Company C received sniper fire from an estimated 4 VC. Fire was returned with small arms and mortars.

The 1-16 Infantry moved from Lai Khe by R/W to NDP vicinity XT635586.

2-28 Infantry extracted from NDP vicinity XT635586 to Lai Khe, OPCON to 3d Brigade.

3d Brigade - The 1-16 Infantry was committed into the 1st Brigade AO. The 2-28 Infantry was extracted from 1st Brigade AO and was OPCON to 3d Brigade at Lai Khe.

**CONFIDENTIAL**



17

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVDR TT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MLO J3-32) (X-1) (U)

u. 19 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry was extracted from NDF to Chon Thanh (XT765625). Extraction completed by 1125H. After a B-52 strike was placed in the vicinity XT691551 the battalion was reinserted and conducted security and patrolling vicinity of NDF.

3d Brigade - The 1-26 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity Quan Loi. At 1500H vicinity XT821930 Company B located and destroyed 12 military structures. Inside one of the structures 2 VC bodies were found in graves approximately 2 weeks old.

v. 20 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-16 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT685586. At 1426H vicinity XT685586 5 VC bodies were located.

3d Brigade - No significant activity.

w. 21 Oct - 1st Brigade - An airstrike conducted on 20 October vicinity XT643330 resulted in 2 VC KIA (BC). The 1-2 Infantry conducted an air assault and established an NDF vicinity XT635509. At 1525H vicinity XT635496 a LFT engaged 3 VC on bicycles resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC) and 3 bicycles destroyed.

The 2-2 Infantry (MECH) (-) secured FSPB LORRAINE II (XT685496) and conducted RIF operations. At 1319H vicinity XT676475 Company C located a suspected VC hospital consisting of 5 military structures containing 1,000 bottles of medicine, 1,000 syringes, 50 pounds of gauze, 1 sewing machine, cooking utensils, 20 medicine books and miscellaneous clothing. At 1300H vicinity XT683483 the battalion NDF received 2 RPG rounds. 1 APC received light damage. At 1557H vicinity XT686589 Company C received small arms, automatic weapons and M-79 fire. Fire was returned and contact broken at 1548H. There was 1 US WHA, VC casualties unknown. The medical supplies, with the exception of a few, were not counted due to enemy contact.

The 1-28 Infantry moved on foot to a new NDF vicinity XT692550 and secured a landing zone for the insertion of the 1-16 Infantry which was inserted to form a joint NDF with the 1-28 Infantry.

3d Brigade - At 2045H vicinity XT784175 an anti-personnel device was detonated against an NF outpost. 1 US was WHA.

x. 22 Oct - 1st Brigade - At 1017H vicinity XT942405 a platoon from 1-28 Infantry sustained 3 WHA by a booby trapped grenade as it moved to secure a downed aircraft.

The 1-16 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT692549. At 0945H vicinity XT695558 Company B throw grenades into a tunnel in a base camp resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC KIA (POSS).

3d Brigade - No significant activity.

y. 23 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (MECH) (-) became OPOON to 3d Brigade and remained at FSPB LORRAINE II.

The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT692549.

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT635509.

18

(CONFIDENTIAL)

AVDB TT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: WJ J3-32) (K-1) (U)

3d Brigade - The 3d Brigade assumed OPCON of FSPB LORRAINE I and LORRAINE II. The 1-26 Infantry moved by R/W from Quan Loi to Chon Thanh and conducted an aerial assault vicinity XT653462. The 2-28 Infantry moved by F/W from Le Khe to Quan Loi.

a. 24 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT692549. At 1145H vicinity XT682524 the Battalion (-) located 10 caches containing a total of 5 122mm rocket motors, 2 122mm rocket warheads and fuses (all with carrying cases and packed in wooden boxes), 24 120mm mortar rounds, 13 cases of RPG-7 rounds (78 rounds and boosters packed in plastic, six rounds per case), 21 81mm mortar rounds, 25 60mm mortar rounds, and 18 additional carrying cases for 122mm rockets.

The 1-2 Infantry located and destroyed 13 tons of salt vicinity XT628518.

3d Brigade - The 1-26 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT856439. At 1224H vicinity XT649458 Company A received sniper fire resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US WHA. Fire was returned and airstrikes, artillery and a LFT supported. At 1402H vicinity XT649458 Company A received 2 claymores causing no casualties. Fire was returned and air and artillery supported.

aa. 25 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry established a new NDP vicinity XT666528.

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT635509. At 1245H vicinity XT823522 the recon platoon fired on 1 VC with unknown results. At 1427H Company A located and destroyed 10 tons of unpolished rice. At 1510H vicinity XT633528 a LFT engaged an unknown number of VC resulting in 2 VC KIA.

The 1-16 Infantry established a new NDP vicinity XT701562.

The 2-2 Infantry (-) secured FSPB LORRAINE I (XT713447).

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (-) secured FSPB LORRAINE I (XT713447) and LORRAINE II (XT685483).

The 1-26 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT656459. At 1526H vicinity XT648458 Company C located and destroyed 3,000 pounds of rice, 4 75mm rounds, 1 claymore, 4 RPG-7s, 1,200 pounds of sugar, 15 pounds of salt, 15 canteens, 8 gas masks, 8 cooking pots, 35 sets of OD fatigues. The following items were evacuated: 2 complete night light sights, 1 magazine for Russian Rifle, 3 pounds of documents, 8 gas masks, 1 compass case, 1 mortar carrying case, 1 mortar aiming stake.

bb. 26 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT666528. At 1400H vicinity XT684519 Company D located 20 tons of salt and 6 caches of rice containing approximately 50 tons. 17 tons were evacuated and operations continued on 27 Oct.

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT635509. At 1145H vicinity XT627528 Company B located a base camp containing a grave with 1 VC body. 18 bunkers, 1 military structure and 2 fighting positions were destroyed. 2 pounds of documents, 1 billfold and a small amount of medical supplies were evacuated.

CONFIDENTIAL

19

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVDB-TT  
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1) (U) 12 April 1968

3d Brigade - The 1-26 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XT656459.

cc. 27 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry extracted 44 tons of unpolished rice from vicinity XT666538. The 1-2 Infantry located and destroyed a VC classroom at 1120H vicinity XT638515. A VC flag, a blackboard and some documents were evacuated. At 1220H vicinity XT638519 Company D located 1.5 tons of polished rice and extracted 500 pounds.

The 1-16 Infantry battalion conducted RIF operations vicinity XT701562. At 0910H vicinity XT698566 Company D captured 1 VC.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry continued to secure PSPI LORRAINE I and LORRAINE II. At 1335H vicinity XT664454 Company B received small arms fire and rifle grenades from 3-4 VC causing 2 WHA. Contact was broken at 1343H. Airstrikes, artillery and LFT's supported.

The 1-26 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT666457. The 1-18 Infantry continued security of Song Be (YU142069). The battalion received a total of 85 mortar rounds between 0040H and 0100H. There were no casualties.

dd. 28 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry evacuated 32 tons of unpolished rice and 2 tons of salt from vicinity XT684519.

The 1-2 Infantry moved from vicinity XT635509 to Phuoc Vinh.

At 1422H the Brigade Commander's UH-1D was hit by ground fire and landed at LORRAINE II. There were no casualties and the aircraft was extracted at 1615H.

3d Brigade - The 1-26 Infantry moved from vicinity XT656459 to Phuoc Vinh.

The 1-18 Infantry moved from Song Be (YU142069) to Lai Khe.

**PHASE II (29 October - 19 November)**

ee. 29 Oct - The 1-2 Infantry moved from vicinity XT666528 to Quan Loi and became OPCON to the 3d Brigade.

The 1-16 Infantry moved from vicinity XT713447 and XT685483 to Lai Khe and became OPCON to 3d Brigade.

The 1-26 Infantry moved from Phuoc Vinh to Quan Loi and became OPCON to 3d Brigade.

The 2-28 Infantry (-) and two batteries of artillery moved to Loc Ninh airstrip (XT730080) and established a FSPB.

The 1-18 Infantry moved from Lai Khe to Quan Loi by Chinook and conducted an air assault vicinity XU697102 at 0950H without incident. The insertion of the 1-18 was in reaction to an attack of the District Headquarters and Special Forces Camp at Loc Ninh Airfield. The VC were identified as elements of the 1st and 2d Battalion, 273d VC Regiment.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVDB-TT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1) (U)

As the last elements of the 1-18 were being inserted, a request was received for assistance from a Special Forces element attached to a CIDG company at Loc Ninh. The CIDG company was in contact with an estimated VC platoon about 1,000 meters north of the 1-18 NDP. The Assistant Division Commander-B ordered Company C north at 1200H. When the company was approximately 600 meters north of the NDP, it made contact with the VC. The VC were in a trench line 200 meters inside the rubber oriented north. The CIDG company was 400 meters further north in the open. The point of C Company got within 20-30 meters of the VC before either side fired. The lead platoon overran the VC position killing 9. The company then deployed and policed the area. The CIDG company reported additional VC 200 meters north of Company C along the edge of the rubber. Light fire teams and artillery were called in.

About 30 minutes after the initial attack, the VC launched a counter-attack from the east with at least 2 platoons. The C Company Commander shifted his platoons to meet the attack with two platoons on line. The Battalion Commander alerted D Company to reinforce. D Company moved north and tied in to C Company's right flank. The fire fight lasted approximately 15 minutes. The VC broke contact at 1305H as D Company came on line. The CIDG Company moved to join the Battalion (-). The Battalion (-) and the CIDG Company swept to the east for 300 meters behind artillery which was constantly being shifted to concentrate on the fleeing VC. The VC fled in a north-south draw where they were subject to intense artillery and airstrikes. Bodies, numerous pieces of web gear, and miscellaneous items were later found which testified to the effectiveness of the artillery and airstrikes.

US casualties were 1 KIA and 9 WHA. There were 24 VC KIA (BC). Nine individual weapons and three crew served weapons were captured along with documents which identified the VC as elements of the 165th NVA Regiment. (See Inclosure 1 to Annex B).

A total of 10 tactical air sorties were flown in support.

ff. 30 Oct - The 1-18 Infantry conducted a RIF operation with Company A to the south and east, closing at 1045H without incident. At 1200H Company A was again dispatched on a search and destroy mission. The company moved south through the rubber for 700 meters, turning southwest on a route over the western edge of Hill 203 (XU700090). As the companies moved up the slope the company was engaged at 1230H by a VC Battalion, later identified as part of the 165th NVA Regiment. The NVA Battalion was occupying trench lines and was apparently oriented to the east. The trenches occupied by the NVA were 2-3 feet in depth, 2 feet wide and varied in length.

The point element of Company A initially saw a single NVA stand up on the side of the hill and engaged him with small arms fire. The fire was returned by an NVA Battalion which had not been seen at this time. The Company Commander deployed his platoons in the direction of fire. The NVA force assaulted the company twice but was repulsed by a heavy volume of fire. The NVA then attempted to flank the left of the company position. The 3d platoon turned back the enveloping force.

The firing could be heard at the 1-18th NDP. The Battalion Commander immediately organized D Company and the CIDG Company to reinforce Company A. As the column moved out, the Battalion Commander received

21  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVDC TT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1) (U)

the situation report from Company A. When the relief force was 200 meters short of Company A, it made contact with the NVA force attempting to envelope Company A. The Company Commander deployed two platoons on line to engage the assaulting forces. The artillery fires forced the NVA to move closer to the friendly forces. Company A withdrew 50-100 meters as artillery was brought closer and Company D worked to close the gap between Company A. The friendly forces maintained fire superiority during this time. The NVA, although well armed with automatic small arms, light machineguns and RPGs, were firing high. Artillery was shifted to the south, behind Hill 203 to allow airstrikes to be brought in on the trench line. The trench line was worked over with CBU, napalm, and LFTs for 2 1/2 hours. At 1530H the Battalion Commander ordered D Company to assault, using A as a pivot and the CIDG to protect Company D's left flank. Company D overran seven trench lines as the NVA forces fled to the southwest through a draw. US casualties were 4 KIA and 5 WIA. There were 83 VC KIA (BC); 27 individual and 5 crew served weapons were captured. Sixteen sorties of tactical air were flown in support. (See Inclosure 2 to Annex B). Company C, 2-28 Infantry secured FSPB at Loc Ninh airfield (XT733080) as Company B, 2-28 Infantry, moved from Loc Ninh to An Loc (XT764894). The 1st Brigade Tactical CP moved from CAISSON III South (XT768557) to Quan Loi. The 1st Brigade became control HQs for Phase II and assumed OPCON of the following battalions at 1800H:

- 1-18 Infantry
- 2-28 Infantry
- 1-26 Infantry
- 1-28 Infantry

A VC rallier picked up by the 1-16 Infantry on 27 October vicinity XT698566 stated that his unit had 59 KIA in an attack against the 1-18th Infantry on 061855H October vicinity XT698566. The rallier also stated that on 14 October 20 members of his unit were killed by bombs vicinity XT701568. A B-52 strike was put into that area on that date.

31 Oct - The Special Forces Camp and the FSPB at Loc Ninh airfield (XU733080) came under mortar attack at 0055H. At 0115H Company C/2-28 Infantry reported receiving heavy small arms fire. At 0210H the small arms fire was sporadic. At 0314H the Special Forces Camp began receiving small arms fire. At 0407H the District Headquarters, located north of the Special Forces Camp on the west side of the runway reported VC on the air strip north of C/2-28 Infantry location and crossing from east to west. Battery A/6-15 Artillery commenced firing HE timed fire directly down the runway. At 0515H Company C/2-28 Infantry reported receiving sporadic small arms fire. At 0520H the VC were reported as having been pushed back outside the District Headquarters Compound.

US casualties were 10 WIA; ARVN casualties were 3 KIA, 21 WIA; PF casualties were 2 KIA and 1 WIA; CIDG casualties were 4 KIA, 18 WIA. There were 110 VC KIA (BC). The unit was identified as the 1st and 2d Battalions, 272d VC Regiment. 69 sorties of tactical air were flown in support of the contact.

The 1-28 Infantry conducted an air assault vicinity XU761070. At 1435H vicinity XU759082 Company B engaged 10 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC). At 1705H vicinity XT759082 the Recon platoon surprised a VC who was digging a position resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). The 1-18 Infantry continued RLF operations vicinity engaged 3 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC) and 1 AK-47 captured.

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AVDB-TT

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1) (U) 12 April 1968

The 1-2 Infantry moved from Phuoc Vinh to positions along Route 13 and became OPCON to the 3d Brigade.

The 1-26 Infantry secured FSPB CAISSON VI (XT738820) and CAISSON VII (XT764894).

hh. 1 Nov - The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XU761070. At 0703H vicinity XU755017 an ambush patrol engaged an unknown number of VC resulting in 2 US KIA. There were 5 VC KIA (BC). At 1412H vicinity XU76009C the lead element of the Battalion (-) came made contact with an unknown number of VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 4 VC WIA (Poss).

Delta Troop 1-4 Cavalry engaged an unknown number of VC resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC) vicinity XU728114 at 1115H. D/1-4 Cavalry killed another VC vicinity XU719128.

ii. 2 Nov - The 1-18th Infantry NDP came under heavy mortar attack commencing at 0930H and lasting for 20 minutes. The mortar positions were reported by ambush patrols, one being directly south of the NDP and one being located to the southwest. About 5 minutes later, Company A ambush patrol reported movement coming from the south. The VC were in the rubber guiding north along a road which led into the NDP. The ambush patrol blew its claymores and returned to the NDP. One VC was KIA attempting to follow the ambush patrol inside the NDP.

To the east Company D's ambush patrol reported heavy movement and the patrol was ordered to return to the perimeter. Company C ambush patrol located north of the NDP also reported movement. The patrol blew its claymores and returned to the NDP. The VC attacked the NDP from three sides, northeast, east and south. Artillery and mortar defensive concentrations served to blunt the assault. Two VC armed with flamethrowers were killed before their weapons could be fired.

As the artillery was brought in close to the NDP from one direction, the VC fire would diminish and build up from another direction.

When LFT's arrived on station they were directed to expend on the main attacking force to the south. The gunships as well as the F4C and the A1 received heavy machinegun fire from three locations to the south. Fire from 12 heavy machineguns were identified. Airstrikes eliminated the positions. The artillery battery inside the NDP was directed to be prepared to fire anti-personnel rounds. The guns were readied but their use was not required.

Contact was broken at 0415H. US casualties were 1 KIA and 8 WIA. There were 198 VC KIA and 22 KBA by body count in the immediate vicinity of the NDP. For the next five days patrols found additional VC bodies bringing the final body count to 263 VC KIA (BC) and 6 POW's. There were 18 individual weapons, 10 crew-served weapons, and 3 flamethrowers captured. The flamethrowers were Soviet Model. PO's. The unit was identified as the 273d VC Regiment. There were 50 sorties of tactical air flown in support of the contact. (See Inclosure 3 to Annex B).

The 1-26 Infantry moved by R/W from CAISSON VI and CAISSON VII to Quan Loi and at 0820H conducted an air-assault vicinity XU707147. CAISSON VII and VI then became OPCON to the 3d Brigade and the 3-22 Infantry (25th Division) was inserted at both locations.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB.TT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1) (U)

The 1-28 Infantry Battalion continued RIF operations vicinity XU761070. At 0743H vicinity XU756079 the lead elements of the Battalion made contact with an estimated 20 VC wearing khaki uniforms. Small arms fire was exchanged. The VC broke contact at 0750H. Airstrikes were called in and artillery and mortars supported the contact. There were no US casualties. VC casualties were unknown.

The 2-2 Infantry (25th Division) moved to Loc Ninh via F/N and conducted an air assault into vicinity XU788136. At 2205H 3-4 VC were discovered inside the NDP carrying flashlights. 4 VC were KIA and 4 were captured.

JJ. 3 Nov - The 2-12 Infantry received 40-50 rounds of 82mm mortar fired into their NDP (XU788136) from the North. A Spooky, FAC, AO and LFT were sent to the area to support. At 0230H the Battalion received a ground attack from the northeast, east and northwest. At 0459H contact was broken. US casualties were 3 KIA and 34 WIA. There were 28 VC KIA (BC). A total of 24 sorties of tactical air were flown in support of the contact.

At 0955H the Battalion NDP received small arms fire from an unknown number of VC who were using villagers as a shield. The Battalion Commander succeeded in gathering the civilians inside the NDP and then returned the fire. There were no US casualties. VC casualties were unknown.

The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XU761070. At 0715H vicinity XU752076 an ambush patrol from Company B killed one VC. At 0910H vicinity XU776090 the Recon Platoon received fire from an unknown size VC force. Artillery and mortars were fired into the area and a search revealed 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 AK-47 captured. At 1005H vicinity XU776086 the Recon Platoon located a fresh grave containing three VC bodies. At 1335H vicinity XU780102 the Battalion made contact with an unknown number of VC resulting in 1 US WIA. Airstrikes and artillery were put into the area. VC casualties were unknown.

KK. 4 Nov - The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XU761070. At 1128H vicinity XU775102 the Battalion received automatic weapons fire from two locations. Contact was broken at 1145H. Results were 1 US KIA, 2 WIA. VC losses: 1 VC KIA (BC). The 1-18 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XU695095. At 1040H vicinity XU699106 the Battalion located 12 VC bodies in fresh graves.

The 1-26 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XU711145. At 1041H XU713164 Company C fired on 4-5 VC with unknown results. The 2-12 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XU783138. At 1350H vicinity XU781135 the battalion located 6 VC bodies in 5 fresh graves. At 1415H vicinity XU780137 1 VC body and 1 AK-47 rifle were found. At 1430H vicinity XU781161 3 VC bodies and 2 60mm mortar rounds were found. At 1455H vicinity XU785135 one VC body was found. At 1500H vicinity XU783138 1 VC body was found.

LL. 5 Nov - 2-28 Infantry (-) continued to secure the MSPB at Loc Ninh Airfield (XT733080). At 1508H vicinity XU738083 the Battalion (-) found 3 VC bodies, apparently killed by artillery or mortar fire, 17 60mm mortar rounds, 1 60mm mortar sight, 1 60mm mortar base plate, 6 canteens, 1 ruck sack, 60mm ammunition pouches, 2 VC gas masks, 6 shovels, 2 lbs of medical supplies, 800 rounds of small arms ammunition, 7 grenades and 2 RPG-2 rounds.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

24

AVDB-TT

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1) (U) 12 April 1968

The 1-18 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XU958095. At 1005H vicinity XU704056 the Battalion located 3 VC bodies, 9 82mm mortar rounds, 1 82mm mortar base plate, and 2 CHICOM grenades.

The 2-12 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XU783138. At 0945H vicinity XU779139 the Battalion located 7 VC bodies, 4 60mm mortar rounds, and 1 CHICOM grenade.

mm. 6 Nov - The 1-28 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XU761070. Company B and C of the 2-28 Infantry continued to secure the FSPB at Lee Ninh airstrip (XU733080). At 1035H vicinity XU803869 a hand grenade was thrown at Company A causing 1 WIA. The VC who threw the grenade ran into the village vicinity XU803869. The National Police searched the village with negative results.

The 1-18 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XU695095.

The 2-12 Infantry at 0920H vicinity XU972137 found 1 VC body and destroyed 10 MG positions. At 1825H the NDP received 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire causing 1 KIA and 17 WIA. Small arms fire was also received. All incoming fire ceased at 1930H.

The 1-26 Infantry was extracted from its field position and conducted an air assault vicinity XU807127.

nn. 7 Nov - The 1-18 Infantry was extracted from field positions vicinity XU695095 to Quan Loi. The 2-12 Infantry extracted from field positions, vicinity XU783138 to Song Ba and became OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division.

The 1-26 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XU807127. The battalion route ran initially due east through rubber trees. At 0948H vicinity XU822125 the point element received sniper fire from one VC in a tree. Fire was returned and the VC ran into a village to the east. The village, mostly uninhabited, was searched with negative results. The battalion column moved east from the village and received more sniper fire from an estimated 3-4 VC. The column then returned northeast. About 10 minutes after the Battalion began to change direction, at 1305H vicinity XU836126, contact was made with an estimated VC Battalion reinforced. The command group was hit directly with an unknown number of RPG-2 and RPG-7 rounds. Commanders and radio operators became primary targets. The Battalion Command Group sustained 100% casualties during the initial contact. The VC tried to encircle the Battalion on the west using elements located north and south of the Battalion. Both encircling elements ran into the trail company in the column and were stopped. The artillery and airstrikes caused the VC to become disorganized and withdraw to the southeast. Contact was broken at 1420H. There were many snipers tied to trees. Company A was sent to reinforce until the arrival of Company B 1-26 Infantry from Lai Khe. At 1645H B/1-26 Infantry replaced D/1-18 Infantry at the 1-26 NDP and D/1-18 Infantry moved to Quan Loi.

The battalion closed into the NDP at 2105H. US casualties: 17 KIA, 21 WIA. VC Losses: 66 KIA (BC), 10 VC KIA (Poss), 27 VC KIA, 1 AK-50, 1 AK-47, 1 RPG-2, 1 CHICOM grenade, and 1 wallet were captured. The unit was identified as the 3d Battalion of the 272d NVA. There were 27 sorties of tactical air flown in support of the contact.

CONFIDENTIAL



25  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVDR TT

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1) (U) 12 April 1968

do. 8 Nov - Task Force 2-28 Infantry moved from Quan Loi to CAISSON VI (XT745817) and became OPCON to the 3d Brigade. Companies B and C continued to secure the FSPB at Loc Ninh Airfield (XT733080). Company B/1-18 Infantry moved from Quan Loi to CAISSON VII and became OPCON to the 3d Brigade. The 1-26 Infantry was relieved in place vicinity XU804126 by the 1-16 Infantry. The 1-26 Infantry became OPCON to the 3d Brigade.

pp. 9 Nov - At 0015H Quan Loi received 15-20 rounds of 122mm rockets causing 5 WHA and destroying one ammo trailer. The 1-28 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XU761070. At 0840H the Recon platoon found 2 VC bodies in separate graves vicinity XU804126. At 1023H the Battalion (-) conducted an air assault vicinity XU803109. to search a B-52 strike area. At 1501H the Battalion (-) was extracted and returned to the NDP.

qq. 10 Nov - The 1-16 Infantry was extracted from its field location vicinity XU804126 to FSPB CAISSON VII (XT764894). Company B/1-18 moved from CAISSON VII to Quan Loi. Companies B and C of the 2-28 Infantry continued to secure the FSPB at Loc Ninh Airfield. The 1st Brigade assumed OPCON of CAISSON VI and CAISSON VII.

rr. 11 Nov - The 1-28 Infantry extracted from their field positions vicinity XU761070 to Loc Ninh by R/W and then from Loc Ninh to Phuoc Vinh by F/W.

ss. 12 Nov - The 1-28 Infantry became Division RRF at Phuoc Vinh. The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations at Quan Loi. The 1-16 Infantry continued to secure FSPB CAISSON VII (XT764894). Task Force 2-28 Infantry continued to secure FSPB CAISSON VI (XT745817). Companies B and D of the 2-28 Infantry continued to secure the FSPB at Loc Ninh airfield.

tt. 13 Nov - No significant activity.

uu. 14 Nov - At approximately 1130H vicinity XT733945 the 399 RF Company made contact with an estimated VC platoon in an ambush position. The 969th RF Company was committed to reinforce. Contact was made at approximately 1430H. Results were 9 VC KIA (BC) including a Company Commander of the 165th Regiment. An AK-47, 1 M-1 rifle, 2 M-2 carbines, and a pistol were captured.

The 1-16 Infantry (-) conducted an air assault vicinity XT738917. At 1103H vicinity XT686914 Company C fired on 1520 VC with unknown results. Artillery, airstrikes and a LFT supported. 1 VC KBA (Poss) was claimed. The Battalion (-) extracted at 1510H from vicinity XT694891. The FSPB at Loc Ninh airfield received 4 rounds of mortar fire at 2159H causing no casualties.

vv. 15 Nov - The 1-16 Infantry (-) conducted an air assault at 0840H vicinity XT679859. At 1145H vicinity XT701835 the Battalion (-) made contact with an estimated 40 VC. Contact was made as the Battalion (-) approached the village at those coordinates. Airstrikes, artillery and LFT supported the contact. Contact was broken at 1223H. US casualties were 2 KHA and 2 WHA. VC losses were 10 KIA (Poss). The Battalion (-) extracted from vicinity XT714854 at 1530H and returned to CAISSON VII.

AVDELTT

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAO J3-32) (K-1) (U) 12 April 1968

ww. 16 Nov - The 1-16 Infantry (-) moved by R/W from CAISSON VII to Quan Loi. C/1-16 Infantry remained at CAISSON VII. Company B/2-28 Infantry moved from Loc Ninh to Lai Khe. D/2-28 Infantry continued to secure the FSPB at Loc Ninh.

xx. 17 Nov - The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations at Quan Loi. The 1-16 Infantry (-) conducted RIF operations at Quan Loi. The C/1-16 secured FSPB CAISSON VII. Task Force 2-28 secured FSPB CAISSON VI. D/2-28 Infantry secured the FSPB at Loc Ninh Airfield.

yy. 18 Nov - At 0220H the Special Forces Camp at Tong Le Chen received an unknown number of mortar rounds. At 1035H vicinity XT905685 the 1-9 ARVN Battalion made contact with an estimated VC Company. 1st Brigade supplied a FAC. Airstrikes placed in the vicinity of the contact resulted in 14 VC KBA (BC) and 4 VC KBA (Poss). Task Force 2-28 Infantry (-) moved from Quan Loi to CAISSON VI. At 0020H the 2-28 received approximately 10 rounds of mortar and recoilless rifle fire at CAISSON VI. Casualties were 3 KMA and 9 WHA.

zz. 19 Nov - The 1-18 Infantry moved from Quan Loi to positions along Highway 13 and became OPCON to 3d Brigade. The 1-28 Infantry moved from positions along Route 13 to Quan Loi and became OPCON to the 1st Brigade. The FSPB at Loc Ninh was closed and D/2-28 moved from Loc Ninh to Lai Khe and became OPCON to 3d Brigade. Operation SHELANDOAH II terminated at 1935H November 1967.

## 12. (C) RESULTS:

### a. Friendly Losses:

- (1) KMA - 106
- (2) WHA - 323

### b. VC Personnel Losses:

- (1) VC KIA (BC) - 957
- (2) VC PW's - 15

### c. VC Equipment Losses:

#### (1) Weapons:

- (a) Small Arms - 70
- (b) Crew Served - 31
- (c) Flamethrowers - 3

#### (2) Ammunition:

- (a) Small Arms - 6316 rds
- (b) Mortar - Total 174 rds
  - 1. 120mm - 24
  - 2. 82mm - 25
  - 3. 81mm - 21
  - 4. 60mm - 104
- (c) Rockets - Total 134 rds
  - 1. RPG-7 - 101
  - 2. RPG-2 - 23
  - 3. Unk type - 3

## CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-TT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (ROS: MAC J2-32) (X-1) (U)

- (3) Explosive Material:
  - (a) Explosives - 1 lb
  - (b) CBU - 18
  - (c) Claymores - 21
  - (d) Mines - 30
  - (e) Fuse caps - 5
  - (f) Grenades - 258
  - (g) Artillery rds - 5
  - (h) 122mm rocket warheads - 2
  - (i) Bangalore torpedoes - 1
  - (j) Booty traps - 141
  - (k) Mortar charges - 1
  - (l) Claymore detonators - unk amount
  - (m) 122mm rocket motors - 5
  - (n) Gunpowder - 41 lbs
  - (o) CS - 105 lbs
- (4) Foodstuffs:
  - (a) Rice - 246.9 tons
  - (b) Tea - 30 lbs
  - (c) Salt - 29 tons
  - (d) Peanuts - 5 lbs
  - (e) Sugar - 1,200 lbs
- (5) Medical Supplies:
  - (a) Medicine - 1,000 bottles
  - (b) Gause - 30 lbs
  - (c) Syringes - 1,000
  - (d) Medical books - 30
  - (e) Morphine - 103 bottles
  - (f) Med supplies - 1,000 lbs
- (6) Signal Equipment:
  - (a) Earphones - 1 set
  - (b) Commo Wire - 910 meters
  - (c) Radio packs - 1
  - (d) Telephones - 1
- (7) Miscellaneous:
  - (a) Small arms magazines - 21
  - (b) Gas masks - 23
  - (c) Canteens - 29
  - (d) Entrenching tools - 3
  - (e) Pistol belts - 9
  - (f) Tool sets - 1
  - (g) Mortar base plates - 3
  - (h) Mortar sights - 1
  - (i) Mortar cannisters - 23
  - (j) Packs - 24
  - (k) Litters - 3
  - (l) Hammocks - 4
  - (m) Ammo boxes - 1
  - (n) Ponchos - 8
  - (o) Bicycles - 33
  - (p) Picks - 2
  - (q) Sledge hammers - 1
  - (r) Saws - 2
  - (s) Shovels
  - (t) Sewing machines - 1

CONFIDENTIAL

28

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVDL-TT 12 April 1968  
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (ACS: MAC J3-32) (X-1) (U)

- (u) Batteries - 20
- (v) Weapons racks - 1
- (w) Blackboards - 1
- (x) Documents - 81 lbs
- (y) Narcotics - 1 pkg
- (z) Cigarettes - 40 pkgs
- (aa) Cooking pots - 8
- (bb) Compass case - 1
- (cc) Night light sets for mortar - 2
- (dd) Mortar tube carrying case - 1
- (ee) Mortar aiming stake - 1
- (ff) 75mm AR cleaning staff - 1
- (gg) Clothing - 35 OD fatigues
- (hh) Pigs - 3
- (ii) Chickens - 5
- (jj) Jars - 15
- (kk) Billfolds - 4
- (ll) Notebooks - 1
- (mm) RPG cleaning rods - 2
- (nn) Film - 1 roll (exposed)
- (oo) Caps - 1
- (pp) Heavy MG barrel - 1
- (qq) Ammo pouches - 6
- (rr) Cleaning swab for 60mm mortar - 1
- (ss) Emergency rations - 6
- (tt) Water buffalo - 13
- (uu) Oxcoats - 3
- (vv) Bunkers, foxholes, mil structures, tunnels, etc. - dest 1994
- (ww) Oil - 5 gal.

13. (U) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

- a. Supply, Maintenance, and Transportation: See Annex H.
- b. Treatment of Casualties and Medical Evacuation: See Annex I.
- c. Communications: See Annex J.

14. (O) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

a. Airmobile Operations:

(1) General: 1st Infantry Division airmobile operations are characterized by preparatory fires on the landing zone, the "five ship LZ", and the five points of LZ security.

(2) Landing zone areas are always assumed to be occupied by the VC and a policy of thoroughly "prepping" every landing zone with hard bombs, napalm and artillery is adhered to. An LZ preparatory fire plan is prepared, assigning sectors to the artillery and showing where the tactical air and gunships are to expend. Preparatory fires on a landing zone are controlled by the brigade commander through the artillery and Air Force LNO riding in his command and control ship. No more than five ships are put into an LZ at one time. This is the maximum number that should be exposed at any one time. All LZ's are secured by an initial force inserted after the "prep" which sets up five secure positions equally spaced around the LZ. Their positions are immediately marked with smoke to facilitate the immediate use of air and artillery in case of enemy contact. Insertion of the remainder of the unit begins two minutes after insertion of the security element.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

29

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVIE-77

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (R08: M4C J3-32) (K-1)(U) 12 April 1968

b. The 1st Infantry Division Fighting Position: During SHENANDOAH II the VC attacked a night defensive position on five separate occasions; 6 October, 11 October, 31 October, 2 November, and 3 November. The US KIA totaled seven. The VC KIA was 509 by body count. One of the major reasons why the friendly casualties were so low was the 1st Infantry Division fighting position. This fighting position has become standardized throughout the division and provides each soldier with adequate overhead cover, overhead clearance, a protective berm to the front with firing apertures at a 45 degree angle, a berm to the sides, adequate rear protection, and thorough camouflage. The fighting position is completed during the first day in a new NDP, before the soldier is allowed to sleep.

c. The Technique of Massing and Controlling Supporting Fires:

(1) The objective is the employment of all supporting fires simultaneously. As a rule, artillery should never be cut off to facilitate delivery of air; rather, it should be shifted if necessary to allow the use of tactical air.

(2) Supporting fires should be employed at the point(s) of contact with the enemy, along the exposed flanks of the friendly unit, and along enemy reinforcement and withdrawal routes.

(3) The technique requires a single commander, normally an infantry battalion commander, to direct the efforts of the Forward Air Controller, Artillery Aerial Observer, Light Fire Team Commander, and at night, the Flareship Pilot.

(4) The commander must know the following:

(a) The location of friendly forces.

(b) The location of point(s) of contact.

(c) Artillery gun target line(s).

(d) Location of fire coordination lines.

(e) Type ordnance on board fighter aircraft.

(5) Actions upon enemy contact:

(a) Artillery is immediately brought to bear at the point of contact. Additional batteries may be required to protect exposed flanks.

(b) Immediate airstrikes and LFTs are requested. The commander continues to work the artillery at the point of contact and along exposed flanks until the air and LFTs arrive.

(c) If the LFT arrive prior to the tactical air, they should be put to immediate use along the flanks away from the gun target lines.

(d) When tactical air becomes available, the commander may put it on the same flank as the LFT or he may impose an FCL, causing the artillery to shift and bring the air across the point of contact.

AVDB-TT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MLO J3-32) (X-1) (U)

while the artillery fires on one flank and the gunships on the other. Troops in contact receiving effective artillery fires will not have this fire lifted in favor of some other means of fire support.

15. (C) COMMANDERS ANALYSIS:

a. SHERANDOAH II revealed several significant changes in VC tactics. Their repeated attacks, despite heavy casualties, against well prepared positions were a distinct departure from prior tactics.

b. There was a marked increase in the number of RPGs, especially RPG-7s, used during this period. The RPG has become the VC's assault artillery and is extremely effective and accurate weapon, although the sloped frontal berm of the 1st Division fighting position offers excellent protection from the round.

c. The use of the infiltration method to attack a prepared position became increasingly evident. The VC advance by crawling, digging prone shelters, firing, crawling forward again, digging in again, and repeating the same process until the perimeter is reached. The M-79, used in searching pattern of fire, has a devastating effect on this type tactic.

d. Standardized methods of operation contributed significantly to the success achieved during SHERANDOAH II. Standardization was the goal of a program begun in July 1967 to preserve the experiences of seasoned commanders who rotated in the spring and summer months.

(1) For example, airmobile operations are conducted in the same manner by all battalions in the division. Planning is facilitated because all factors are known and can be applied to any battalion. Airmobile operations become more efficient and can be conducted rapidly with a minimum of warning time given.

(2) For the defensive operations, the fighting positions and the organization of a night defensive position became standard throughout the division. The time required to construct an RDP was reduced and the effectiveness of the position to withstand assault was improved to such an extent that each VC attack was repulsed with tremendous losses to the attacker and few if any casualties to friendly forces.

(3) Standardization greatly facilitated the learning process of the new commanders, as well as their troops, and raised the proficiency of each battalion to a very high degree.

e. Another factor which contributed to the success of SHERANDOAH II was the careful analysis of the terrain, to use it to the best advantage:

(1) Objective areas must be selected where the placement of US troops poses the greatest threat to the VC/NVA units and yet offers the greatest possible security for US troops.

(2) Fire support bases should be selected so that firing batteries are in mutual support.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVDB-TT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (ROS: MAC J3-32) (K-1) (U)

(3) A detailed intelligence study will indicate the best areas to rapidly employ a haliborne force to block or ambush VC/NVA forces. This quick reaction type force can pay excellent dividends.

(4) Once VC/NVA forces are fixed, all available resources, combat and combat support, should be concentrated upon the destruction of that force.

f. Forward logistical bases become absolutely essential once it becomes evident that the VC/NVA forces are going to stand and fight. There must not be any lapse in providing the necessary fire power and mobility necessary for the destruction of enemy force; therefore, placement of Class III and Class V must be as near as possible to the action. For operation SHENLANDOAH II, Quan Loi provided this logistical base. Without it the entire outcome of the battle of Lee Minh could have been very different.

16. (C) Close coordination between US/ARVN units is particularly important when both forces are engaged. There can be no error in knowledge of where each force is located. This is especially important in fire control and coordination. This coordination can best be achieved by the participating brigade placing liaison officers at province, district and any other GVN headquarters that is actively engaged. Division headquarters should place liaison officers at ARVN division level.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



THOMAS L. VERRIER  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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AVFBC-RE-H (12 Apr 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 25 APR 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,  
Washington, D.C. 20310

The attached after action report for the 1st Inf Div, Operation Shenandoah  
II, is forwarded in accordance with MACV Dir 335-8, 1 September 1967,  
subject: Combat Operations After Action Reports (MACV J3-32(K-1)).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*O B Fory*

O. B. FORY  
1LT, AGC  
Asst AG



# OPERATION SP-1 AND


## PHASE I 29 SEPTEMBER

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



SHEPARD OAH

SEPTEMBER - 28 OCTOBER













# PHASE II (29

CAMBODIA  
VIETNAM



# OPERATION SHEN LAH II

## 1-29 OCTOBER-19 NOVEMBER-LOC NINH



### KEY TO MAJOR ACTIONS

1. SROK SILAMITE I 29 OCT
2. SROK SILAMITE II 30 OCT
3. LOC NINH 31 OCT
4. SROK SILAMITE III 2 NOV
5. BU NHÒ RUNG 3 NOV
6. SROK RUNG 7 NOV




III  
273

ALA 29 OCT

QUAN LOC NINH  
QUAN AN LOC

3


3. LOC NINH 31 OCT
4. SROK SILAMITE III 2 NOV
5. BU NHO RUNG 3 NOV
6. SROK RUNG 7 NOV





39

SHON SILAMLITE  
29 OCTOBER 67  
XU 701108




LEGEND

X ARTILLERY FIRE

34


INCL 1 TO ANNEX B

SROK SILAMLITE  
30 OCTOBER 67  
XU 700040



41

SHOK SILAMLITE  
2 NOVEMBER 67  
XO 698103



END

★ AIR STRIKES

↑ 127MM MG ON AA TRIPODS

○ 82MM MORTAR

→ VC ASSAULT

→ VC RETREAT

INCL 3 TO ANNEX B

43

## CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS  
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY  
APO US FORCES 96345

AVDB-RAT

8 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (U)

TO: Commanding General  
1st Infantry Division  
ATTN: G3  
APO US FORCES 96345

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: SHENANDOAH II: Search and Destroy
2. (U) DATE OF OPERATION: 30 September 67 to 19 November 67

3. (U) GENERAL: The 1st Infantry Division Artillery was the command headquarters for the operation. The 1st Bn, 5th Artillery, was initially in direct support of the 1st Brigade. On 30 Oct 67 it was assigned the mission of reinforcing the 2d Bn, 33d Arty. The 1st Bn, 5th Arty was responsible for planning and controlling fires for Shenandoah II North. The 2d Bn, 33d Arty was in direct support of the 3d Bde and was responsible for planning and controlling fires for Shenandoah II South. The 6th Bn, 15th Arty was initially in direct support of TF DIXIE at Quan Loi. Later it was assigned the mission of direct support of the 1st Brigade in the Loc Ninh area and was responsible for planning and controlling the fires in the Loc Ninh area. The 1st Bn, 7th Arty was in direct support of the 2d Bde. The 8th Bn, 6th Arty was in general support of the 1st Inf Div. The missions were specified in Annex C (fire support plan) to OPORD 19-67 (Shenandoah II). Direct support and reinforcing fires were provided from Quan Loi, Lai Khe, and the following fire support bases:

CAISSON I	XT792446
CAISSON II	XT788515
CAISSON III S	XT788556
CAISSON III N	XT767607
CAISSON V	XT734541
LORRAINE I	XT708433
LORRAINE II	XT683483
FSPB	XU731078
FSPB	XU699102

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DDI DIR 5200.10

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ANNEX C

37

44

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AVDB-RAT

8 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (U)

FSPB	XU711149
FSPB	XU760872
FSPB	XU804126

a. Reporting Officer: Maj Fredrick H. Nidermeyer, Assistant S-3  
1st Inf Div Arty.

b. Task Organization:

1st Bn, 5th Arty (LTC Joseph V. Spitler Jr, CO)  
30 Sep 67 to 30 Oct 67, DS 1st Bde.  
30 Oct 67 to 19 Nov 67, reinf 2d Bn, 33d Arty.

2d Bn, 33d Arty (LTC Arthur D. Wells, CO)  
DS 3d Bde.

6th Bn, 15th Arty (LTC Frank E. Serio, CO)  
30 Sep 67 to 28 Oct 67, DS TF DIXIE  
29 Oct 67 to 19 Nov 67, DS 1st Bde

1st Bn, 7th Arty (LTC John W. Cassel, CO)  
DS 2d Bde

8th Bn, 6th Arty, (LTC Ambrose A. Szalwinaki, CO)  
GS 1st Inf Div

6th Bn, 27th Arty (-) (LTC Robert J. Haras, CO)  
GSR 1st Inf Div Arty.

2d Bn, 13th Arty (-)  
GSR 1st Inf Div Arty, further assigned  
GSR 1st Bn, 7th Arty

Btry C, 7th Bn, 9th Arty (CPT Walk CO)  
Attached 2d Bn 33d Arty

1st Plt, Btry B, 1st Bn, 84th Arty (LT John Sekula)  
Attached 6th Bn, 15th Arty 10-17 Nov 67.

1st Plt, Btry I, 29th Arty  
GS 1st Inf Div

4. (C) INTELLIGENCE: See Annex A (Intelligence) to OPORD 19-67  
(Op Shenandoah II). The terrain, weather, and fortifications encountered  
did not significantly effect the artillery support.

5. (C) MISSION: 1st Infantry Division Artillery provided artillery  
support for the maneuver elements.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

(2)

31

45

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8 December 1967

SUBJECT: bat Operation After Action Report (U)

6. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: Artillery units moved to field locations and occupied fire support bases Caisson I, II and III S from 25 to 29 Sep to provide initial fire support. All units were prepared to occupy additional fire support bases as required by the actions of the maneuver elements.

7. (C) EXECUTION:

1. 1 Oct 67 Btry A, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing to fire support base Lorraine I.

2 Oct 67 Btry B, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by road from Di An to Lai Khe and then by rotary wing to Caisson III S.

3 Oct 67 Btry B, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing to Caisson III S.

4 Oct 67 Btry A, 1st Bn, 5th Arty moved by rotary wing and established Caisson V. Btry C, 7th Bn, 9th Arty moved by road from Di An to Lai Khe, attached to 2d Bn, 33d Arty.

5-8 Oct 67 No Arty moved. All units continued support of maneuver units.

9 Oct 67 Btry C, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing from Lai Khe to Lorraine II. OPCON 1st Bn, 5th Arty

10 Oct 67 Btry B, 6th Bn, 15th Arty moved by rotary wing from Caisson III S to Caisson V.

11-15 Oct 67 No Arty moved. There were no significant arty actions during this period.

16 Oct 67 Btry A, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing from Lorraine I to Lai Khe.

17-22 Oct 67 No significant change in Arty support.

23 Oct 67 Btry A, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing to Lorraine I.

24-27 Oct 67 No change in Arty support.

28 Oct 67 Btry C, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing from Lorraine II to Lai Khe.

29 Oct 67 6th Bn, 15th Arty assumed mission of direct support of the 1st Bde, Quan Loi, for action starting in the Loc Ninh area. Btry A, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing from Lorraine I to Lai Khe and then by fixed wing to Quan Loi attached to 6th Bn, 15th Arty. Btry A, 6th Bn, 15th Arty moved by rotary wing from Quan Loi to the Loc Ninh area (XU731078)

CONFIDENTIAL

(3)

39

46

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8 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (U)

Btry C, 1st Bn, 7<sup>th</sup> Arty moved by rotary wing from Quan Loi to the Loc Ninh area (XU731078), attached to 6<sup>th</sup> Bn, 15<sup>th</sup> Arty.

30 Oct 67 1st Bn, 5<sup>th</sup> Arty assumed the mission of reinforcing the 2d Bn, 33d Arty. Btry C, 1st Bn, 7<sup>th</sup> Arty moved by rotary wing from Loc Ninh back to Quan Loi.

31 Oct 67 Btry A, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing from Quan Loi to Loc Ninh area (XU699102)

1 Nov 67 No significant Arty action.

2 Nov 67 Btry B, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing from Caissan III S to Loc Ninh area (XU711149). Attached to 6<sup>th</sup> Bn, 15<sup>th</sup> Arty. Btry C, 2d Bn, 13<sup>th</sup> Arty moved by fixed wing from Di An to Loc Ninh (XU731078). Attached to 6<sup>th</sup> Bn, 15<sup>th</sup> Arty.

3-4 Nov 67 No significant change in Arty support.

5 Nov 67 Btry B, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing from XU711149 to XU760072.

6 Nov 67 No significant Arty action.

7 Nov 67 Btry A, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing from Loc Ninh to Quan Loi and returned to control of parent unit. Btry C, 2d Bn, 13<sup>th</sup> Arty moved from XU731078 to XU804126 by rotary wing.

8-10 Nov 67 No significant Arty action.

11 Nov 67 Btry B, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved from XU760072 to XU731078 by rotary wing.

12-15 Nov 67 No significant Arty action.

16 Nov 67 Btry A, 6<sup>th</sup> Bn, 15<sup>th</sup> Arty moved by rotary wing to XU731078.

18-19 Nov 67 All Arty units extracted from the Loc Ninh area. Operation terminated.

b. There were three significant artillery actions during the operation.

(1) On 17 Oct 67, 2 companies of 2d Bn 28<sup>th</sup> Infantry engaged in heavy contact with a large Viet Cong force in the vicinity of XU688578. The immediate response of artillery fires was instrumental in disrupting the enemy force. During this engagement, an artillery observer was killed while moving between two units to adjust close in artillery fires. During this engagement, 105 Howitzers fired 6,400 rounds and 1000 rounds were fired from the 155 Howitzers.

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40

47

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8 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (U)

(2) During the afternoon of 31 Oct 67, 1/18 Inf made contact with an estimated Viet Cong company force in the vicinity of grid XU795097. Btry A, 6<sup>th</sup> Bn, 15<sup>th</sup> Arty fired 1600 rounds in support of the contact. Several times the fire was brought in as close as 500 meters from friendly forces. Fire control lines were established which formed a sorted triangle of artillery, tactical air strikes and gunships around the area of contact. Approximately one half of the enemy dead were attributed to artillery fires.

(3) On 310055 Oct 67, the Viet Cong launched a combined mortar, rocket and ground attack against a sub-sector headquarters in an ARVN compound (XU730080) and the fire support base (XU731078) of Btry A, 6<sup>th</sup> Bn, 15<sup>th</sup> Arty and Company C, 2d Bn, 28<sup>th</sup> Inf. The artillery battery utilized one howitzer to fire 302 rounds in self-illumination and another howitzer fired 578 rounds direct fire across an airstrip to break up the ground attack. The remaining 4 howitzers fired 705 rounds in a counter mortar/counter rocket program.

8. (U) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Resupply actions were conducted almost entirely by CH-47 aircraft. This required very close control over the A-22 bags and sling equipment. It required a maximum effort to keep class V supplies prepared for delivery to the field.

b. A supplementary air warning center was established at Chissan III to broadcast air data to the air traffic along Highway 13. This helped speed the response time for artillery fires.

c. Ammunition expended for Shenandoah II:

105mm Howitzer	107,145
155mm Howitzer	28,291
81mm Howitzer	6,145
175mm Gun	<u>682</u>
TOTAL	142,264

9. (C) COMMANDER ANALYSIS:

a. There were no written orders issued during the course of the operation. Verbal orders and flexibility were the usual requirements. Decisions made by the Commanding General were quickly translated into action by moving units on short notice to support the maneuver units. The optimum number of 105 Batteries were attached to the direct support battalions throughout the operation. At no time did it appear that more direct support artillery was needed. An entire medium artillery battery would have been a valuable asset in the Loc Ninh area. More targets could have been engaged with the greater range capability.

CONFIDENTIAL

47



CONFIDENTIAL

48

AVDB-RAT

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (U)

8 December 1967

b. On several occasions, the maneuver units found dead Viet Cong and destroyed base camps while on search and destroy operations. This attests to the effectiveness of target acquisition and an effective H & I program.

10. (c) CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Conclusions:

(1) Effective artillery fires delivered in support of close contact should not be lifted for delivery of air strikes or for gunships. Artillery fires should, if necessary, be shifted to permit the use of air and gunships on the far flanks of the area of contact.

(2) Fire coordination lines worked to great advantage when they were determined in coordination between the ground commander and the supporting artillery commander.

(3) The necessity for the use of air observers for units in contact was conclusively proven. The forward observer's observation is too limited in the jungle terrain. The ground and air observers, working in concert, can effect good placement of artillery fires.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) In situations where units are moved quickly by air and attached to another commander, the present assignment of radio frequencies is not adequate. Spare frequencies must be made available to Division Artillery to avoid overcrowded fire direction nets.

(2) Artillery fires, gunships and tactical air can be utilized concurrently in close proximity for the proper assignment of fire coordination lines.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*Donald A. Piskone*  
DONALD A. PISKONE  
Major, Artillery  
Adjutant

CONFIDENTIAL

42

49

**ANNEX D, B-52 STRIKES IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION SHENANDOAH II, PHASE I**  
**29 September to 30 October 1967**

<u>#</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>LOW LEVEL VISUAL RECON OBSERVATIONS</u>
1	BINH LONG 1302	080230 Oct	Base camp containing knapsacks with 3 to 4 mortar rounds, 2 good bunkers, ponchos, heavy foot traffic through bomb craters. The area was occupied just before and after strike. Uncovered 3 base camps. Numerous wires crossing trail; could be communication wires.
2	BINH LONG 1303	091040 Oct	Destroyed 75% of a base camp. Uncovered or partially destroyed several huts. Uncovered camouflaged fighting positions, bunkers, base camps with broken pottery in area, trenchline, and 4 foxholes.
3	BINH LONG 1304	140605 Oct	20 bunkers, mostly destroyed. Small base camp destroyed. One military structure destroyed. 8 fighting positions. Cut escort trail. Uncovered tunnel entrance. One storage area. One large bunker; base camp with 7 bunkers.
4	BINH LONG 1305	181500 Oct	8-10 fighting positions destroyed. One foxhole destroyed. One bunker damaged. One tunnel entrance destroyed. Platoon sized base camp partially destroyed. 10 bunkers uncovered. 2 huts uncovered. 2 locations of foot traffic after strike. Uncovered equipment on ground.
5	BINH LONG 1306	191200 Oct	Base camp destroyed. Storage area destroyed. 2 huts destroyed. 2 spiderholes destroyed. Uncovered week-old base camp.
6	BINH LONG 1309	201500 Oct	2 KBA (BC). Company size base camp and sqd size BC dest. 20 bunkers destroyed. One storage bunker destroyed. 7 fighting positions destroyed. 5 military structures damaged. 3 roads cut. 2 trenches opened up. 2 military structures damaged. 3 tunnel entrances uncovered. 6 secondary explosions.
7	BINH LONG 1310	210600 Oct	Battalion size base camp (20-25 bunkers) destroyed. 500 meters of trench partially destroyed. 2 huts (10x10) partially destroyed. Foxhole with trenchline partially destroyed. 3 fighting positions destroyed. Tunnel entrance uncovered. (VR discovered heavy trail movement to S-SW since 201500 Oct).
8	BINH LONG 1307	220600 Oct	100 meters tunnel destroyed, trail network destroyed, 2 bunkers destroyed; 3 fighting positions, 3 bunkers and 1 tunnel entrance uncovered.

ANNEX D

43

50

ANNEX D, B-52 STRIKES IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION SUREFLOOD II, PHASE I, (Con't)  
29 September to 30 October 1967

#	TARGET	DTG	LOW LEVEL VISUAL RECON OBSERVATIONS
9	BINH LONG 1308	230600 Oct	11 bunkers destroyed, 3 foxholes destroyed, 1 foxhole partially destroyed, 10 bunkers uncovered, 20 meters of trench exposed, 12 foxholes exposed, 2 platforms exposed, 6 or 7 logs, 8 fighting positions exposed. Due to heavy concentration of bunkers, (est 120) foxholes, and fighting positions in the area XT665554 - XT674558, it is believed that this area could be a very large base camp. A large amount of ordnance fell in this area and churned up the ground to the point that it was difficult to identify what had been there prior to the strike.
10	BINH LONG 1304	260610 Oct	Appears to be a bn size base camp or larger. Estimated size: 100 or more bunkers and 1000 meters of trench. Strike went right through the middle of the base camp. Estimate camp 50% destroyed.
11	BINH DUONG 1305	300715 Oct	Company or larger sized base camp, 50% destroyed. Size: 150-175 meters in diameter. Extensive trench system connecting bunkers and fighting positions. Footprints in craters indicated area had been occupied after strike. Additional Data: 8 bunkers destroyed, 2 bunkers, 1 tunnel entered, 100 meters of trench partially destroyed, 2 fighting positions and 45-50 meters of trenchline uncovered.

51

**ANNEX D, B-52 STRIKES IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION GUENANDOH II, PHASE II**  
**29 October to 19 November 1967**

#	TARGET	DTG	LOW LEVEL VISUAL RECON OBSERVATIONS
1	BINH LONG 1203	291725 Oct	Estimated crater diameter 12-14 meters, depth 2-10 meters, 2 bunkers and 7 foxholes partially destroyed.
2	BINH LONG 47	302045 Oct	4 bunkers uncovered, 2 trails destroyed from cratering.
3	BINH LONG 1204	311700 Oct	2 company sized base camps partially destroyed, 1 company sized base camp uncovered, platoon sized base camp partially destroyed.
4	BINH LONG 46	011120 Nov	100% of the ordnance fell within the target box, and covered 75-80% of target area. Unknown results.
5	BINH LONG 1205	011438 Nov	2 Fox holes destroyed, 4 bunkers partially destroyed 2 bunkers 2'x2' and 20 meters of trench exposed and 3 tunnels entrance partially destroyed and 20 meters of trench uncovered.
6	BINH LONG 1201	021136 Nov	4 bunkers with connecting foxholes destroyed and 7 bunkers with connecting foxholes uncovered.
7	BINH LONG 1313	051115 Nov	Major East-West tunnel complex dest. trails destroyed by crater, area was used after strike.
8	BINH LONG 1312	070400 Nov	100% ordnance fell within box 60% of target, unknown results.
9	BINH LONG 1315	081345 Nov	Tunnel entrance and fighting position uncovered.
10	BINH LONG 1316	091230 Nov	2 bunkers destroyed, 2 bunkers uncovered, 2 fighting positions uncovered.
11	BINH LONG 1207	120110 Nov	100% ordnance on target 80% in target box, unknown results.
12	BINH LONG 1232	130550 Nov	A major tunnel complex was uncovered and partially destroyed by the strike. Hole 10 feet deep and two large craters 3'x3' tunnel entrances made of wood partially destroyed. 1 tunnel entrance 4' x 3' uncovered, and an underground complex destroyed.

45

B-52 STRIKES  
SHENANDOAH II

29 SEP-30 OCT

MAP

REF: 1:50,000 VIETNAM

MAP

SHEETS: 6231 I, 6231 II, 6331 IV, 6331 III

63

57+

1307

1308

1302

1304

1305

1306

1310

1303

1309

+54

72

~~1304~~  
~~1305~~

B-52 STRIKES

SHENANDOAH II

29 OCT-19 NOV

MAP REF: 1:50,000 VIET NAM

MAP SHEETS: 6232 I, 6232 II  
6332 IV, 6332 III  
6332 I, 6332 II

70  
+ 20

1201

1203



1312  
⑧

② ✓

1267  
⑪

⑦ 1313

1232  
④

1316  
⑥


1315  
⑨

80  
+ 00

1201 ⑥

1204 ①

46 ⑦





⑫ 1232


⑦ 1313

⑩ 1316

⑨ 1315

⑤ 1205

80  
+ 00



57  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

HEADQUARTERS  
1ST AVIATION BATTALION  
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96345

AVDB-AV

8 December 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report Operation Shenandoah II

TO: Commanding General  
1st Infantry Division  
ATTN: AVDB-TT  
APO 96345

1. GENERAL: The 1st Aviation Battalion provided general aviation support to the 1st Infantry Division throughout Operation Shenandoah II. Aviation support consisted of (a) planning, coordinating, and executing airmobile operations with organic and non-organic resources; (b) providing normal organic aviation support; (c) providing aerial fire support; and (d) providing coordination and control of all air traffic at Quan Loi and Loc Ninh during phase two (2) of the operation.

2. MISSION: a. The 1st Aviation Battalion planned and conducted two (2) airmobile operations in support of the 1st Brigade during Operation Shenandoah II. Both operations were conducted on 10 October 1967. The first operation began at 1030 hours with an airmobile insertion of the 1-2 Infantry (Dracula) into LZ vic XT633507. The second operation began at 1245 hours with the extraction of 1-28 Infantry from a PZ vic XT705585 to an LZ at Chon Thanh. Both operations were conducted with 15 aircraft flying a total of 75 troop carry sorties for each operation. Five (5) aircraft were provided by A Co 1st Aviation and ten (10) aircraft from the 188th Assault Helicopter Company. LZ suppression and enroute escort were provided by the Rebels of A Co 1st Aviation Battalion and the Spiders of the 188th AHC.

b. A Co 1st Aviation Battalion also participated in six (6) additional airmobile operations during phase one (1) of Shenandoah II and during phase II conducted a platoon size lift to secure a downed aircraft vicinity Loc Ninh. In each case five (5) aircraft were provided.

c. Statistics for airmobile operations planned and/or executed by the 1st Aviation Battalion are as follows:

(1) Total sorties: 600

(2) Troops or troop equivalents moved: 2100

d. On 17 October 1967 LTC Paul B. Malone III Battalion Commander 1st Aviation Battalion was designated air mission commander to conduct the extraction of numerous dead and wounded of the 2-28th Infantry after a major engagement with a battalion of the VC 271st Regiment. Due to the heavy jungle canopy early extraction efforts were confined to the use of hoist and jungle penetrator equipped aircraft. The relief force succeeded in cutting out a small opening in the jungle which late that day came to be known as the "hole". Several OH-13 aircraft from the aviation sections of the 1st Brigade and Division Artillery were used to extract wounded. Later the "hole" was enlarged and UH-1B helicopters were able to make the 100 foot vertical descent to the ground from tree top level to evacuate wounded. LTC Malone requested additional UH-1's and continued the operation with the resources at hand. The last wounded man was extracted on the last available aircraft. Only the dead remained. With darkness rapidly approaching, LTC Malone without regard for his own

ANNEX E

**CONFIDENTIAL**

58

## CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-AV

SUBJECT: After Action Report Operation Shernandoah II

personal safety elected to begin evacuation of the dead to the nearby NDP with his own C&C aircraft. On approach to the "hole" LTC Malone's aircraft became the target of intense automatic weapons fire. His aircraft was hit six (6) times and LTC Malone was seriously wounded in the right foot. At that time LTC Malone was evacuated to the hospital. The evacuation of the dead continued by aircraft from A Co 1st Aviation Battalion and the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company. Sporadic fire was received until the mission was terminated by darkness. One (1) other aircraft was hit by Viet Cong fire during the operation. Five (5) UH-1D's of A Co 1st Aviation Battalion returned on 18 October to complete the extraction. LTC Malone was later evacuated to CONUS as a result of his wounds.

a. Of significant note is the role played by the Armed Helicopter Platoon "Rebels" of A Co 1st Aviation Battalion during the Loc Ninh phase of Shernandoah II. The "Rebels" were employed nightly between 29 October and 6 November in support of ARVN, Special Forces and 1st Infantry Division units heavily engaged with elements of three (3) Viet Cong Regiments in the Loc Ninh area. They were continuously exposed to heavy antiaircraft machine gun fire but continued their support and were given credit on three (3) occasions for preventing the VC from over running friendly positions. During the battle of Loc Ninh the "Rebels" proved themselves as a most effective and responsive fire support asset, particularly during night operations.

3. Statistics for 1st Aviation Battalion aircraft during Operation Shernandoah II are as follows:

a. Type aircraft	Hours flown	Sorties	Cargo (T)	Pax
UH-1D	2945	7215	123	8608
UH-1 (Armed)	414	685	—	—
OH-13S	1086	1448	—	642
OV-1	<u>262</u>	<u>345</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>
Totals	4707	9693	123	9250

b. Aircraft Availability:

UH-1D	76%
UH-1 (Armed)	85%
OH-13S	81%
OV-1	70%

c. Ammunition expended:

7.62mm	549,550 Rds
40mm	1,811 "
2.75FFR	1,793

d. Friendly losses by hostile actions:

Aircraft Hit: 7 (16 hits 1 aircraft)  
 KIA: 2  
 KIA: 0

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SUBJECT: After Action Report Operation Shenandoah II

## e. Enemy Losses:

VC KIA (EC) - 26

VC KIA (Prob) - 18

## f. Friendly personnel evacuated:

NIA - 53 KIA - 68

## 4. Lessons Learned:

a. It became apparent early during the Loc Ninh phase of the operation that the facilities at Quan Loi airstrip were going to be severely taxed in order to handle the rapid build up of supplies, personnel, and equipment. The Pathfinder Detachment of the 1st Aviation Battalion was taken to Quan Loi to assist in airfield control later this team were positioned at Loc Ninh to control air traffic. Handling Fixed and Rotary wing traffic simultaneously at Quan Loi proved to be very difficult. It was necessary to establish priorities for landing in order to get priority cargo on the ground ASAP. It was necessary to station an officer in the tower to identify aircraft with priority cargo and give them priority in landing and to assist in holding aircraft when the airfield was being used as a staging area for airmobile operations. Definite coordination is required between personnel controlling the tactical operations and the logistical build up. On several occasions USAF cargo aircraft arrived at Quan Loi and at Loc Ninh during airmobile operations and had to be held away from the airfield so as not to interfere with the tactical operation. In addition USAF aircraft consistently arrived in large numbers in a short time span and had to be held due to limited cargo off loading space.

Recommendations: (1) That LOCC impose time restrictions on USAF cargo aircraft in order to prevent interference with tactical operations. (2) That consideration be given to off loading capabilities when aircraft are scheduled into forward airstrips.

b. Some forward airfield control difficulties were experienced by the Pathfinder as a result of a lack of multicomunications. Normally aircraft work with the supported unit on their FM radio leaving only UHF radio for landing information and advisories. Currently the Pathfinders have portable FM communications only. During the period the Pathfinder controlled Loc Ninh an AN/PRC-41 portable UHF radio was borrowed from the Combat Controller Team at Quan Loi.

Recommendation: That the Pathfinder Detachment be authorized the AN/PRC-41 UHF radio or a radio with similar capability.

c. During armed helicopter fire support missions against VC initiated attacks the Rebels encountered numerous 50 Cal and 12.7mm anti-aircraft weapons. In each case the weapons were positioned to provide all around defense for the attacking force. Invariably the VC gunners would not engage the armed helicopters on their firing passes, rather they would wait until the aircraft turned away and began climb out. To counter act this tactic the second aircraft in the fire team would fly with all lights blacked out and attempt to be in position to engage the VC AA position during the lead aircrafts break and climb out. Utilizing the above technique the Rebels were able to silence three (3) heavy machinegun positions on the night of 31 October at Loc Ninh and one (1) position on the night of 2 November vicinity Dongfay NLP.

*Robert M. Sirocchi*  
 ROBERT M. SIROCCHI JR.  
 LTC, INF  
 Commanding

CONFIDENTIAL

61

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 1ST ENGINEER BATTALION  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96345

AVDB-CL-3

10 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

THRU: Commanding General  
1st Infantry Division  
ATTN: AVDB-T  
APO SF 96345

TO: Commander  
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
ATTN: J321

1. NAME OF OPERATION: SHENANDOAH II

2. DATE OF OPERATION: 170600 Oct 67 thru 192400 Nov 67.

3. GENERAL: The command headquarters for the engineer portion of Operation Shenandoah II was Headquarters, 1st Engineer Battalion, Lai Khe, acting in accordance with 1st Inf Div FRAG ORDER 93-67, dated 15 Oct 67. The 1st Engineer Battalion supported the Infantry Division by sweeping, rooting, maintaining, and clearing jungle on Route 13 from Lai Khe to An Loc.

a. Reporting Officer: LTC THOMAS R PATTERSON  
Commanding Officer  
1st Engineer Battalion

b. Task Organization:

Hq's, 1st Engr Bn - LTC THOMAS R PATTERSON

(1) Company A - CPT MICHAEL ALAUX

(2) Company B - CPT MARION L CALDWELL

(3) Company C - CPT JAMES I CROWTHER

(4) Company D - CPT EDWARD W WILDLACK III

4. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Terrain: The area of interest during this operation was in the Binh Duong and Binh Long Provinces. Specifically, the Richard Battalion was involved in repairing and upgrading CL 13 from Ben Cat (XT 742332) to An Loc (XT 747883), and supporting combat operations in the vicinity of Loc Ninh (XU 735095). The terrain adjacent to the southern sector of CL 13 was poorly drained and characterized by secondary growth and rice paddies. The northern sector of CL 13 was characterized by heavy forest and rubber plantations in which the visibility was very limited.

b. Army Situation: The area south of Ben Cat is considered pacified while the area north is dominated by VC and security must be maintained. The enemy units in the area were the 165th Regt, 9th NVA Div, 271st Regt, 7th VC Div and Phu Loi Bn (a local guerrilla force). Units providing engineer work party security made contact with these VC units during the operation. One REG round was fired at engineer elements at XT 788543 on 12 Nov 67.

ANNEX F

51

10 December 1967

c. Intelligence During Operation: Prior to and during the operation daily low level reconnaissances were made on CL 13. In addition, the Tunnel Hatz conducted missions at XT 73624 and XT 75599, and the Reconnaissance Section made the following ground reconnaissances:

- (1) Road recon, LTL 1A, vic XT 86220
- (2) Road recon, LTL 1A, vic XT 70073
- (3) Road recon, Route 246, vic X. 722890
- (4) Road recon, CL 13, vic XU 74304
- (5) Water Point recon, vic XU 735095
- (6) Bridge recon, XT 722472
- (7) Bridge recon, XT 785628
- (8) Bridge recon, XT 882661
- (9) Bridge recon, XT 834688

d. Mine and Booby Trap Incidents During Operation:

- (1) 25 Oct 67 vic XT 830900 dozer hit mine  
(minor damage, 1 KIA)
- (2) 28 Oct 67 XT 780472 dozer hit mine  
(scored out)
- (3) 1 Nov 67 XT 785435 dozer hit mine  
(minor damage)
- (4) 1 Nov 67 XT 792436 dozer hit mine  
(scored out)
- (5) 2 Nov 67 XT 785510 command AT mine
- (6) 3 Nov 67 XT 420794 booby trapped pressure mine
- (7) 4 Nov 67 XT 793440 command mine  
(1 KIA)
- (8) 10 Nov 67 XT 792462 mine blown in place
- (9) 13 Nov 67 XT 866275 butterfly bomb destroyed

5. MISSION: The 1st engineer Battalion supports the 1st Infantry Division's combat operations along Route CL 13 from Lai Khe to Cuan Loi with road opening, jungle clearing, and LZ missions.

6. COMBAT OF OPERATION: ... Company conducts engineering operations along Route CL 13 from Cuan Loi to XT 766740. C Company conducts engineer operations along Route CL 13 from Lai Khe to XT 766740. B and D Companies provide dump trucks, LZ teams, and mine sweep parties in support of A and C Companies. Hq Company equipment Platoon provides equipment support for A and C Companies.

7. CAUTION:

17 Oct 67

A Company - Moved by fixed wing aircraft from Phouc Vinh to Cuan Loi and prepared for road opening.

C Company - One demolition team sent to destroy rice cache, vic XT 641547.

18-19 Oct 67

C Company - Stood down for maintenance

20 Oct 67

C Company - Home plows and bull blades cleared 35 acres of light rubber trees vic XT 779365 and 59 acres of heavy jungle from XT 765365 to XT 759357.

21 Oct 67

C Company - 1st platoon deployed on LZ at 1/16 Inf HDP vic XT 693343. Home plows cleared approximately 76 acres vic XT 7635.

AVDB-CG-3  
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

10 December 1967

22 Oct 67

C Company - 1st platoon cleared fields of fire at 1/23 Inf NDP, XT 692549. Six Rome plows and four bull blades cleared approximately 63 acres vic XT 7635.

23 Oct 67

C Company - Four Rome plows and two bull blades cleared approximately 77 acres vic XT 7635.

24 Oct 67

C Company - One mine sweep party sent to 1/4 Cavalry. The Rome plows cleared 38 acres vic XT 7635.

25 Oct 67

A Company - Constructed two 36"x24' corrugated steel culverts for later emplacement on Route 13.

C Company - 1st platoon cut LZ at XT 693548. Five Rome plows and one bull blade cleared 58 acres vic AT 7635.

26 Oct 67

A Company - Constructed 24' double barrel box culvert.

B Company - 2nd platoon cut a resupply LZ at XT 660330.

C Company - 1st platoon continued to work on LZ vic XT 693548. Five Rome plows and one bull blade cleared approximately 64 acres vic XT 7635.

27 Oct 67

A Company - Constructed two 36"x24' corrugated steel culverts for later emplacement on Route 13.

C Company - Rome plows with equipment platoon leader (Dishard 80) cleared approximately 44 acres vic AT 7634.

28 Oct 67

C Company - Five Rome plows and two bull blades cleared 56 acres from XT 788409 to XT 788427 and 5 acres vic XT 7635.

29 Oct 67

B Company - The 2nd platoon provided three mine sweep teams and one NCO to 2/28 Inf. The 3rd platoon provided two mine sweep teams and one NCO to 1/4 Cavalry Squadron.

C Company - Rome plows and two bull blades cleared approximately 110 acres vic XT 7635.

30 Oct 67

C Company - Cleared approximately 60 acres vic XT 7635 with seven Rome plows.

31 Oct 67

C Company - 2nd platoon moved to NDP vic XT 766613, prepared defensive positions, and stockpiled rock and other road repair material.

D Company - Sent three mine sweep teams from Quan Loi and



10 December 1967

6 teams from Di An to be positioned at RDP's along Route 13. 2nd Platoon began construction of a resupply LZ at XU 689087.

1 Nov 67

B Company - 2nd and 3rd platoons were airlifted by CH47 from Di An to XT 765728 to construct a 70' class 50 timber trestle bridge which was completed at 1630 hrs.

C Company - 9 Rome plows and two bull blades cleared approximately 30 acres just north of Lai Khe. Route 13 was rooted from XT 792415 to XT 793435. 2nd platoon emplaced two box culverts 12"/18"x24" at XT 767719. 3rd platoon emplaced two 12"/14"x24" corrugated steel culverts at XT 785575. 1st platoon used 6 loads of laterite and two loads of rock for road repair on Route 13 north of Lai Khe.

D Company - 2nd platoon completed LZ at XU 689087.

2 Nov 67

A Company - Cleared rubber and made road repairs on Route 13 from Cuan Loi to XT 766800. Repaired a large crater in road via XT 766800 with 12 loads of rock and a laterite cap.

C Company - 1st platoon graded Route 13 via Bau Long. 2nd platoon used 14 loads of laterite to repair craters and potholes. 13 loads of rock were hauled to RDP via Chon Thanh. Rome plows cleared 112 acres of jungle along Route 13 from XT 765666 to XT 765647. Route 13 was rooted from XT 792436 to XT 796473 and from XT 786473 to XT 784416.

3 Nov 67

A Company - Emplaced two 36"x24" corrugated steel culverts and widened the roadway on Route 13 via XT 767761. Assisted C Company with fill in repairing crater via XT 766751.

C Company - 1st and 2nd platoons maintained ready reaction forces (RMF). 3rd platoon installed two 24"x24" culverts at XT 751462. Equipment platoon cleared 75 acres along Route 13 from XT 766666 to XT 766672 and from XT 760648 to XT 766687. Route 13 was rooted from XT 796473 to XT 786492 and from XT 785494 to XT 787476.

D Company - 2nd platoon cut LZ for Infantry via XU 779137.

4 Nov 67

A Company - Constructed two 36"x24" corrugated steel culverts.

B Company - 1st platoon was airlifted from Di An to XU 765135 to cut a resupply LZ for the Infantry. 3rd platoon supported Route 13 operations with 3 dump trucks.

C Company - 1st and 2nd platoons maintained RMF for Route 13. 3rd platoon hauled 13 loads of laterite to culvert site, XT 769468. Equipment platoon cleared 62 acres along Route 13 from XT 755696 to XT 766715 with 7 Rome plows.

5 Nov 67

B Company - 1st platoon airlifted from Di An to cut LZ in grid square XU 753074.

C Company - 2nd platoon graded Chon Thanh airfield. Rooter operations continued in Bau Long area via XT 793547. Equipment platoon cleared 140 acres of jungle and rubber along Route 13 from XT 766692 to XT 766721, from XT 766710 to XT 766719, and via XT 790418.



10 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

6 Nov 67

A Company - Filled potholes on Route 13.

C Company - 2nd and 3rd platoons repaired craters along Route 13 from Lai Khe to grid line 73. Both sides of Route 13 were rooted to XT 767629. Equipment platoon with 7 Rome plows cleared 72 acres of dense jungle along Route 13 from XT 766721 to XT 766735.

7 Nov 67

A Company - Opened laterite pit at XT 767759 and hauled laterite for road upgrading.

C Company - 2nd and 3rd platoons hauled 23 loads of laterite in support of Route 13. Equipment platoon cleared 82 acres along Route 13 from XT 766744 to XT 766769.

8 Nov 67

A Company - Continued to upgrade and repair Route 13.

C Company - 2nd platoon hauled 5 loads of laterite in support of Route 13 operations. 3rd platoon hauled 14 loads of laterite for potholes vic XT 793547. Equipment platoon cleared 76 acres along Route 13 from XT 794435 to XT 789461, from XT 767752 to XT 767757, and from XT 768762 to XT 767779.

9 Nov 67

C Company - 2nd platoon repaired potholes north of Chon Thanh and reconnoitered for laterite. 3rd platoon used 20 loads of laterite on Route 13 vic XT 793547. Equipment platoon with seven Rome plows cleared 82 acres along Route 13 from XT 768779 to XT 768793.

10 Nov 67

A Company - Continued road repairs and repaired bridge approaches at XT 765728.

C Company - 2nd platoon reconnoitered laterite pit XT 790545 and repaired potholes north of Chon Thanh. 3rd platoon repaired potholes and filled mine craters at XT 788462.

11 Nov 67

A Company - Maintained and improved Route 13.

C Company - 2nd platoon repaired road north of Chon Thanh with 9 loads of laterite. 3rd platoon repaired road from Lai Khe to vic XT 793547. Equipment platoon cleared 70 acres from XT 768793 to XT 767800 Route 13.

12 Nov 67

A Company - Maintained and improved Route 13.

C Company - 2nd platoon repaired potholes vic Chon Thanh with 4 loads of laterite. 3rd platoon repaired potholes from Lai Khe to Bau Long. Equipment platoon cleared 69 acres vic XT 767700.

13 Nov 67

A Company - Maintained and improved Route 13.

C Company - 2nd platoon used 31 loads of laterite to repair vic Chon Thanh. Equipment platoon with four Rome plows cleared 57 acres vic XT 766767.

10 December 1967

14 Nov 67

A Company - Completed maintenance and improvement of Route 13 to Chon Thanh.

C Company - 2nd platoon used 13 loads of laterite to repair potholes vic of Chon Thanh.

15 Nov 67

C Company - All elements returned to Lai Khe.

8. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Elements of the 1/4 Cavalry and 2/2 Infantry (mech) were utilized on a daily basis for immediate security of engineer work parties and the Rome plow clearing team.

b. Overall area security was provided by elements of the 2nd Brigade. Fire support bases were placed so that all portions of Route 13 could be supported by artillery fire and secured rapidly each day.

9. RESULTS:

a. Friendly losses:

- (1) Personnel: 8 MIA, 1 KIA
- (2) Equipment: 1 Rome plow, 1 bulldozer

b. Enemy losses:

- (1) Personnel: Unknown
- (2) Equipment: Unknown

c. Construction:

- (1) Constructed one class 50 timber trestle bridge 70' long vic XT 765728.
- (2) Constructed five LZ's at coordinates XU 785135, XT 693546, XT 660330, XU 689087, XU 779137, XU 753074.
- (3) Assembled and installed 72 feet of box culvert and 100 feet of CSC.
- (4) Route 13 was opened and maintained during the entire operation.
- (5) Four mines and booby traps were found and destroyed by engineer personnel.
- (6) Over 1,846 acres of jungle and rubber cleared along Route 13 and vic of Lai Khe.
- (7) 485 loads of laterite and rock were used on Route 13.

10. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Average strength in the field: 125.

b. Supply: Normal supply channels were used. POL for Rome plows was trucked to field locations from Lai Khe.

c. Maintenance: Equipment repair was performed at either Lai Khe, Quan Loi, or field location. A contact team from the 1st Engineer maintenance section remained with the Rome plows.

67  
AVDB-CE-3

10 December 67

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

d. Transportation: Organic transportation was supplemented by four low boys from supporting units, and various types of helicopters which were used for reconnaissance, command and control, resupply, and LZ missions.

e. Communications: TO & E radios were the principle means of communication.

f. Medical Support: Organic medical personnel were utilized.

11. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: Site preparation for a 70' timber trestle bridge was accomplished with explosives. This technique proved to be advantageous in that it reduced construction time by one day and obviated the need for moving engineer construction equipment to the site.

12. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: No new problem areas in combat engineer support were encountered during this operation. Shenandoah II provided the 1st Engineer Battalion with additional experience in planning and coordination, engineer reconnaissance, mine detecting, jungle clearing, road maintenance and upgrading, LZ construction, and resupply.

However, one phase of this operation presented an excellent example of the requirement for and rewards of flexibility in reacting to changing situations. The day before engineer work was to begin, the Viet Cong cratered the road in three locations along a three-km stretch of Route QL 13. This interdiction was carefully planned as the cratered area was located halfway between the rock sources required for repair. The attached sketch illustrates the situation as of 311045 October, when the northern crater was blown.

The plan of repair for the first day (1 Nov) called for A Company to move south out of An Loc to repair the northern culvert site, while B Company to be airlifted with precut bridging into the southern site to begin construction of the 70'-ft timber trestle bridge. The best estimates, considering the time required to sweep the road out of An Loc each day, to repair sites 1 and 2 and concurrently construct the 70'-ft bridge was two days. On the third day (3 Nov), the last crater at the northern end of site 3 would be filled by trucks from the north as the finishing touches were put on the bridge.

At 1630 hours on the first day, the Battalion Operation Section received the report from Bravo 6 that he expected the bridge to take traffic by late that evening. The S-3 asked for a confirmation of this report as it was thought impossible to complete the task in that short time. However, Bravo 6 reaffirmed his report stating that all of our plans had gone even better than expected, and that with the exception of curbing, the job would be completed prior to lift off that evening.

The way was then open to complete all sites in one and one-half days, instead of the two and one-half days estimated. C Company's mission was changed immediately to load rock at Lai Kho that night and to move at first light. November 2nd found A Company sweeping out of Quan Loi to complete site 1 and moving to site 2. C Company moved north out of Lai Kho, picked up additional rock trucks at Chon Thanh, and moving over the now passable B Company bridge site, filled the northern crater at site 3. They then proceeded north to meet the A Company trucks at site 2 for a combined effort on the final repair. The road was completely repaired by 1400 hours, and the main supply convoy was able to move one day ahead of schedule, at 1430 hours on 2 November.


FOR THE COMMANDER:

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as

*Stanley G. Genega*  
STANLEY G. GENEGA  
CPT, CE  
Adjutant

AVDB-CE-3  
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

10 December 1967



Inclosure 1 to Combat Operation After Action Report, 7 December 1967.

Incl 1 to ANNEX F

69

# CONFIDENTIAL

## Annex 6 (Intelligence) to After Action Report for Operation Shenandoah II (U)

Introduction: (C) Shenandoah II will be dealt with in two phases:

Phase I: 29 Sep 67 to 29 Oct 67; Phase II:  
29 Oct 67 to 7 Nov 67. Shenandoah II officially  
continued until 191930 Nov 67, however no  
significant contact occurred after 7 Nov 67.

### PHASE I:

1. (C) Intelligence prior to the operation: The area was chosen as a probable troop concentration target. Intelligence reports indicated that elements of the 271st VC Regt had recently moved into the area west and southwest of Chon Thanh. Also probably in the area were the 165th NVA Regt, Phu Loi Bn, C 64 Dan Tieng Dist Co, and C 45 Chon Thanh Dist Plt. Although the 101st NVA Regt was unlocated it was thought that elements were possibly in the area. There were many reported and confirmed VC installations throughout the entire operational area. The 83d Log Group was known to be operating in the area. Visual reconnaissance confirmed the presence of active trails and base areas.
2. (C) Enemy situation during the operation: Friendly forces moving into the operational area immediately made contact. More than 60 contacts were made ranging from 1-2 VC to Regimental size. Night defensive positions were mortared on several occasions. On 2 Oct, 1-2 Inf received 40-50 rounds of 82mm mortar. Also on 2 Oct a NVA PW captured by 1-2 Inf stated that his unit, Phu Loi II Bn, was located in its base camp vic XT 657 529. 1-2 Inf on 4 Oct, XT 712 537, contacted an unknown number of VC resulting in 12 VC KIA (BC). On 061914 Oct 1-18 Inf received 150 rounds of 60 & 82mm mortar. Counter mortar and ground fire based on information gained from PW captured 27 Oct. The PW (NVA), Do An Mai, stated his unit, 2d Bn, 271st Regt was located in a base camp vic XT 723 575 on 4 Oct and participated in the mortar attack. Mai also stated the Recon elements of Phu Loi Regt (G-2 comment: probably Phu Loi II Bn) had been attached to his bn. He further stated his unit was short of food. Documents captured on 7 Oct vic XT 685 434 indicated the presence of a rear service element of the 83d Logistics Group. At 110945 Oct, 1-18 Inf at XT 700 552 made contact with estimated 100-150 VC resulting in 21 VC KIA (BC). Documents taken from the bodies identified 2d Bn, 271 Regt. Other documents taken from a VC body at XT 636 514 identified 271st Regt (possibly 1st Bn). On 12 Oct a document captured vic XT 672 549 consisted of a letter from the Rear Service Office of the 9th VC Division to HQ GP 83. It stated in essence that the 271st Regt had moved from YT 0070 to its present location in the Long Nguyen Secret Zone because GP 81 was unable to provide it with logistical support. The Regt was therefore moved to the Long Nguyen area in order to receive support from Group 83. (G-2 comments: Only the presence of the 1st and 2nd Bns was verified; however, it is believed that the entire Regt was in the area. The move of the Regt to this area also indicates that there were sufficient supplies stored in this area to support the Regt). On 16 Oct, 2-28 Inf at XT 698 568 contacted a VC force in a base camp; air and arty accounted for 17 VC KIA (BC). The most significant contact occurred on 17 Oct when A and D Companies, 2-28 Inf at XT 686 576, had heavy contact with an estimated Regt (271st). VC losses for this encounter were 101 (BC). On 22 Oct having suffered heavily from contacts, arty, air and B-52 strikes, the 271 Regt began to move southwest into the 25th US Div area. From this point on there was only one other significant contact when on 291405 Oct, 2-2 Inf, XT 705 442, received 40-50 rounds of 60mm mortar. In addition to contacts, ground troops uncovered many installations and active base areas.

ANNEX 6

CONFIDENTIAL

70

( CONFIDENTIAL )

Annex B (Intelligence) to After Action Report for Operation Shenandoah II  
(U)(CONT'D)

Significant amounts of rice, salt and ammunition were captured and destroyed. Visual reconnaissance and BDA indicated the presence of many more installations. Shenandoah II caused the VC considerable losses both in manpower and supplies.

PHASE II (THE LOC NINH BATTLES):

1. (C) Intelligence prior to operation: During the early morning hours of 29 Oct, the USSF/CIDG Camp and the District Hq in Loc Ninh were subjected to a major VC attack by fire followed by ground assault. This was the first of a series of significant engagements on the Loc Ninh area which lasted until 7 Nov. Enemy units involved during the course of the battle were the Hq, 9th VC Div, the 273d and 272d Regt's and probably rocket and arty units of unknown size. Additionally, evidence indicates that individual fillers (and possibly small units) from the 141st and 165th Regt's assisted the 272d and 273d Regt's respectively. There is some evidence that the 271st Regt was also originally intended for these battles but because of its losses in the Long Nguyen area in Oct, could not be committed. A possible VC/NVA reason for targeting Loc Ninh at that time appears to have been to embarrass the GVN by demonstrating a capability to seize a district capitol during the period of the inauguration of their new president. There could also have been the desire to strengthen MR-10 as a VC "safe area" possibly for future political reasons. It is our best estimate that the decision to remain in the Loc Ninh area after the first attack was a NVN political decision perhaps based upon lack of knowledge of the military realities in SVN caused in part by the favorable VC/NVA reports flowing northward and a misinterpretation of the political situation in the US. The continued presence of the Hq 9th VC Div and 272d Regt in the Loc Ninh area from 3 to 7 Nov does not appear to have been a decision to press the siege but rather an effort to minimize losses during the reorganization prior to withdrawal. Evidence suggests that major elements of the 273d Regt withdrew on or about 3 Nov from the western periphery of the Loc Ninh area. The withdrawal of the 272d Regt was less well organized, but the Regt appeared to have left the area by 6 Nov.

2. (C) Enemy Situation During The Operation:  
Enemy operations in the Loc Ninh area began with a mortar attack on the Special Forces Camp and the Loc Ninh District Headquarters Compound. Hostile fires started at 290115 Oct and continued until 0535H. The VC infantry units later identified as 1st and 2d Bns 273d VC Regt subordinate to VC 9th Division, assaulted the area across the airfield which lies to the west of the compound area. A portion of the District Headquarters was overrun and held by the VC until 1515H. The VC suffered 147 KIA(BC) as a result of this attack. At approximately the same time US forces at Quan Loi received 14 rounds of 75mm RA fire and An Loc District Headquarters received 12 rounds of 82mm mortar. At 291208 October, 1-18 Inf which had been placed in the area, made contact with an estimated VC Co at XU 698096; the unit identified here was the 165th NVA Regiment. In this engagement, the VC lost 12 KIA(BC) and 50 KIA(poss). The following day, there were four significant engagements. An RF Co outpost vicinity XU 770055 received 100 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire, commencing at 0445H. At 0450H a hamlet vicinity XU 775050 received 50 rounds 60mm mortar. At 301230 October, a 1-18 INF/CIDG patrol vicinity XU 695094 made contact with an estimated VC Bn(-) of the 165th Regt: results 83 KIA(BC), 72 KIA(poss). At 1715H the VC attacked a hamlet at XU 740133 with small arms and mortar fire. During the third day of the battle the compound area at Loc Ninh was attacked by the 1st and 2d Bns 272d VC Regiment.

CONFIDENTIAL



71

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### Annex B (Intelligence) to After Action Report for Operation Shemandoah II (U) (CONT'D)

The attack began with mortar fire and 122mm rocket fire at 310050 October, built up to a ground attack which was repulsed by friendly units in the area, and ended in the early morning hours leaving 66 VC KIA(BC). At one point during this encounter, direct fire was employed by the artillery. The US units involved in the battle were C/2-28 Inf and A/6-15 Arty. At 310050 October Quan Loi received 6-8 rounds of 82mm mortar. Sporadic SA, AW and mortar fire was again employed against Loc Ninh from 010100 November until 010320 November. At 010703 Nov a patrol from 1-28 Inf engaged an unknown size force, killing 5 VC(BC). 1-28 Inf made contact again that day at 1412H resulting in 2 VC KIA(BC) and 4 KIA(possible). From 020030 until 020400 November, vicinity XU 695095 the 1-18 Inf received 100 rounds 82mm mortar, RPG, 50 cal MG and heavy SA fire. In the battle that ensued, 196 VC were killed by body count. The enemy unit which mounted the attack was again the 273d Regiment. During the same time 2-28 Inf at XU 733080 was under attack, they received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar, RPG and SA fire until 0410H. At 0743H 1-28 Inf vicinity XU 756079 contacted 20 VC, resulting in 5 VC KIA(possible). At 1200H A/1-18 vicinity XU 699096 contacted an estimated VC platoon with unknown results. At 2340H, 8 VC accidentally walked into 2-12 NDP vicinity XU 783138. Results of this were 4 VC KIA(BC) and 4 POW's from the 272d Regiment. 2-12 Inf was attacked the following day (3 Nov) at 0220H vicinity XU 786135. The VC used 82mm mortar, 50 cal and SA fire. The VC lost 28 KIA(BC) in this encounter. At 0623H 2-28 Inf received 20-25 rounds 82mm mortar. On 041128 Nov 1-28 Inf vicinity XU 775 102 made contact, killing 1 VC(BC). There were no contacts on 05 Nov. 2-12 Inf in their NDP vicinity XU 786135 received 20 rounds 60mm mortar and SA fire from 1825 until 1920H. The last major contacts of the operation were made on 7 November. 2-12 Inf XU 786135 received 40 rounds 82mm mortar fire east of their NDP at 0108H. In heavy fighting at 1310H, 1-26 Inf was in contact with the 3d Bn, 272 Regt vicinity XU 835125. Contact was broken by the VC at 1420 leaving 66 dead(BC). During the remainder of the operation only two attacks occurred. A/1-18 Inf XT 815905 received 25-30 rounds 122mm rockets at 0900H Nov. At 090025 Nov An Loc SF Camp and District Headquarters received 20 rounds 75mm RR, 82mm mortar and 120mm rocket fire. In addition to major elements of the 272d and 273d Regts involved in the Loc Ninh area, elements of the 165th and 141st Regiments were employed apparently to replace the 271st which although originally scheduled to participate in the attack was unable to do so due to the heavy casualties sustained in the Long Nguyen area. The 141st NVA Regt identified by documents in the 1-18 Inf area at Loc Ninh on 01 Nov at XU 702099 and on 02 Nov at XU 695094; the 165th NVA Regt was identified by documents captured by 1-18 Inf on 03 Oct vic XU 695094 and a POW from that unit captured by 1-18 Inf on 02 Nov at XU 695095 and further identified through documents by 2-26 Inf on 02 Nov via XU 755079. A POW, Nguyen Van Tuan of the 2d Bn, 141st Regt, captured by B/1-18 Inf on 08 Dec 67 vic XT 764732, indicated that his unit was used as a reserve force in the Loc Ninh area but was never committed. While the magnitude of commitment of the 141st Regiment is not known, it is clear from documents taken from bodies that at least individual troops from the regiment were engaged during the course of the battle. PW Le Quoi Gioi, 2d Bn, 165th Regt, captured by 1-18 Inf on 10 Dec vic XT 752819, indicated that the regiment occupied a base camp west of Loc Ninh on 1 Nov, and that the 165th Regt did participate in the battle and further that this base camp was hit by air and artillery early in the attack.

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Appendix 1 (Aerial Surveillance, Terrain and Weather) to Annex G  
(Intelligence) to After Action Report for OP Shenandoah II (U)

1. (C) G-2 Air operational control was exercised from Lai Khe throughout the period.
2. (C) During the period the following aerial surveillance was conducted in support of division operations.
  - a. Red Haze:
 

(1) ASTA Platoon	33 missions
(2) 73d AVN Co.	60 missions
(3) AF	4 missions
  - b. SLR:
 

(1) ASTA Platoon	19 missions
(2) 73d AVN Co.	35 missions
  - c. D Troop, 1/4 CAV:
 

(1) Conducted 155 VR's during this period.
(2) H-13 hours flown; 1,006.45
(3) HU-1B hours flown; 786.35
  - d. Visual:
 

(1) G-2 Air section personnel flew approximately 245 hours of visual reconnaissance.
(2) II FPV Air personnel flew approximately 25 hours of visual reconnaissance.
(3) 73d AVN Co. personnel flew approximately 60 hours of visual reconnaissance.
  - e. Photographic support provided during the period.
 

(1) ASTA - 46 requests flown.
(2) AF - 18 requests flown (3 priority missions)
  - f. Bloodhound - Division Chemical flew 52 missions in the area reporting 884 hotspots.
3. (C) Significant Accomplishments:
  - a. Maintained visual and LSAR surveillance over the area of operation and surrounding area.
  - b. Coordinated the division's reconnaissance efforts.
4. (C) Problems Encountered:
  - a. Seven Red Haze and five SLR missions were cancelled because weather or equipment malfunction.
5. (C) Terrain and Weather:
  - a. Terrain: Shenandoah II area of interest includes two areas. The area in the south has the following coordinates: XT 5032 - XT 5020 - XT 8370 - XT 8332. Prominent terrain features are: the Song Saigon, forming the western border; large rubber plantations, the largest being Michelin, in the west. The area is generally flat with relief under 60 meters and is covered with secondary forests and bamboo. QL/13 is the primary N/S road, with 239 and 240 secondary routes. The northern part of Shenandoah II area is bounded by the Cambodian border on the North and East, on the West by the 90 (N-S) grid line and on the South by the 88 (E-W) grid line. The center of this area is covered by rubber plantations with secondary and virgin jungle along the edges. QL/13 is the main N-S route.
  - b. Weather: The weather during operation Shenandoah II was generally rainy but only hindered operations on one day. The mean temperatures during the period were 74.7°F high to 70°F low. The average relative humidity was 76%. The number of days with visibility restricted to 5 miles or less due to ground fog was 22. The number of days with a ceiling below 4000 ft was 28 days. The total rainfall during the period amounted to 16.9 inches.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX G

## CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 2 (Hard Installations 29 Sep - 19 Nov 67) to Annex G (Intelligence)  
to After Action Report for CP Shenandoah II (U)

DTG	COORDINATES	UNIT	TYPE INSTALLATION	ACTION
Sep 67				
290933H	XT 768513	C/1-16	10 Foxholes	Destroyed
290940H	XT 765514	C/1-16	4 Foxholes	Destroyed
291012H	XT 703516	C/1-2	Mil structure	Destroyed
291012H	XT 703516	C/1-2	Punker w/OH cover	Destroyed
291020H	XT 730509	D/2-28	3 bunkers	Destroyed
291020H	XT 730509	D/2-28	20 Mil structures	Destroyed
291233H	XT 800428	1/16	1 bunker	Destroyed
291233H	XT 800428	1/16	Tunnel	Destroyed
291505H	XT 720420	A/S	5 bunkers	Destroyed
291554H	XT 670573	A/S	7 bunkers, 25m of trench	Destroyed
291636H	XT 672506	A/S	4 bunkers	Destroyed
291636H	YT 656484	A/S	1 structure, 1 bunker	Destroyed
291710H	XT 670523	A/S	Structure, 4 bunkers	Destroyed
300831H	XT 675422	A/S	9 bunkers(dest), 2 bunkers exposed	N/A
300952H	XT 714570	A/S	3 bunkers	Exposed
Oct 67				
011310H	XT 660424	A/S	6 bunkers	Destroyed
011415H	XT 693443	A/S	8 Bunkers	Destroyed
020845H	XT 713449	A/1-16	50 spider holes, 1 bunker	Destroyed
			2 huts	Destroyed
020921H	XT 690507	A/S	4 bunkers	Destroyed
020937H	XT 710455	A/S	4 bunkers	Destroyed
021235H	XT 710481	B/2-28	2 trenches, lean-to	Destroyed
021315H	XT 675427	A/S	4 bunkers	Destroyed
021412H	XT 676432	A/S	6 bunkers(exposed), 3 bunkers	Destroyed
030940H	XT 666415	A/S	2 bunkers	Destroyed
031113H	XT 673474	A/S	6 bunkers	Destroyed
031203H	XT 682440	A/S	3 fighting pans	Destroyed
031222H	XT 727438	C/1-16	3 bunkers	Destroyed
031222H	XT 713380	C/2-2	bunker	Destroyed
031225H	XT 735466	A/1-16	Bunker	Destroyed
031309H	XT 664469	A/S	50m trench(exposed), 4 bunkers	Destroyed
031315H	XT 682527	A/S	7 fighting pans, mil structures	Destroyed
031335H	XT 726434	C/1-16	Prone shelter	Destroyed
031519H	XT 675422	A/S	Storage bunker	Destroyed
041350H	XT 720577	A/S	7 bunkers	Destroyed
041524H	XT 695415	A/S	2 structures	Destroyed
050945H	XT 726546	A/S	2 bunkers	Destroyed
051157H	XT 715568	A/S	1 bunker	Destroyed
051233H	XT 686435	A/S	2 base camps, 5 bunkers, 200m of trench (uncovered)	N/A
051530H	XT 683443	C/1-16	Hut	Destroyed
051632H	XT 650542	A/S	Mil structure	Destroyed
060838H	XT 677532	A/S	Mil structure	Destroyed
060845H	XT 716543	A/1-2	2 bunkers	Destroyed
060939H	XT 718574	A/S	4 bunkers, hut	Destroyed
060956H	XT 832913	D/1-16	10' tunnel, log bridge	N/A
061003H	XT 635511	A/S	Mil structure	Destroyed
061010H	XT 943515	A/1-28	4 spider holes	Destroyed
061117H	XT 667405	A/S	2 huts, 2 bunkers	Destroyed
061118H	XT 650543	A/S	Mil structure	Destroyed
061143H	XT 704530	D/1-18	2 bunkers, 5' trench	Destroyed
061232H	XT 677528	A/S	Bunker	Damaged
061240H	XT 712566	1-28	2 bunkers	Destroyed
061250H	XT 660426	A/S	13 bunkers (uncovered)	N/A
061339H	XT 677525	A/S	Mil structure	Destroyed
061512H	XT 712566	A/S	3 foxholes	Destroyed
061607H	XT 685547	A/S	4 bunkers	Destroyed
061607H	XT 692518	A/S	18 bunkers	N/A
070927H	XT 713534	B/1-2	2 bunkers	Destroyed

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Appendix 2 to Annex G

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 2 (Hard Installations 29 Sep - 19 Nov 67) to Annex B (Intelligence)  
to After Action Report for OP Shenandoah II (U) (CONT'D)

<u>DTG</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE INSTALLATION</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
071011H	XT 677415	A/S	Storage bunker	Destroyed
071043H	XT 684545	A/S	2 bunkers	Destroyed
071117H	XT 677413	A/S	10 bunkers(uncovered)	N/A
071305H	XT 706524	B/1-2	3 mil structures, lean-to	Destroyed
071314H	XT 693535	A/S	Foxhole	Destroyed
071353H	XT 685545	A/S	4 bunkers	Destroyed
071410H	XT 685545	A/S	100m trench, 2 bunkers, 5 foxholes, 5 mil structures	Destroyed
071537H	XT 706524	A/S	25m trench(uncovered), 5 bunkers	Destroyed
071616H	XT 692547	Recon 1-18	6 bunkers, 5 foxholes	Destroyed
071720H	XT 690515	A/S	30m trench(uncovered), 5 bunkers	Destroyed
080230H	XT 658553	B-52 strike	Numerous bunkers, trenches, foxholes	Destroyed
081000H	XT 692538	C/1-18	25 prone shelters	Destroyed
081207H	XT 698540	A/A	30 fighting psns, 30m trench	Destroyed
081240H	XT 683545	A/S	2 bunkers	Destroyed
081400H	XT 693450	C/1-16	Mil structure	Destroyed
081415H	XT 658493	A/S	Storage structure, 4 bunkers	Destroyed
081557H	XT 695545	C/1-18	Large hole	N/A
081612H	XT 652550	A/S	3 structures, 5 bunkers	Destroyed
081645H	XT 675432	A/S	2 bunkers, 25m trench	Destroyed
090930H	XT 704564	A/S	Bunker, 4 foxholes	Destroyed
090955H	XT 704564	A/S	7 bunkers	Destroyed
090955H	XT 696455	D/1-18	2 foxholes	Destroyed
091040H	XT 659526	B-52 strike	Numerous bunker, trenches huts	Destroyed
091247H	XT 663562	D/2-18	33 bunkers	Destroyed
091330H	XT 683486	1st Engr Bn	Foxhole	Destroyed
091434H	XT 668405	A/S	4 bunkers	Destroyed
091520H	XT 704564	A/S	3 bunkers	Destroyed
091803H	XT 663565	A/S	2 bunkers	Destroyed
101000H	XT 728418	B/2-2	Bunker	Destroyed
101135H	XT 894250	D/2-16	2 bunkers	Destroyed
101138H	XT 632512	A/S	3 bunkers(uncovered)	N/A
101158H	XT 686451	C/2-2	130m trench	Destroyed
101306H	XT 709550	A/S	Mil structure	Destroyed
101310H	XT 735521	A/1-2	4 fighting psns	Destroyed
101425H	XT 666559	A/2-28	18 bunkers	Destroyed
101505H	XT 703563	A/S	4 bunkers	Destroyed
101650H	XT 692525	A/S	4 bunkers (damaged)	N/A
111047H	XT 702419	B/2-2	Bunker	Destroyed
111245H	XT 660491	C/1-16	Mil structure	Destroyed
111245H	XT 685460	C/1-16	Mil structure	Destroyed
111450H	XT 664553	2-2	Mil structure	Destroyed
111553H	XT 661555	A/2-28	20 bunkers	Destroyed
111630H	XT 644500	D/1-2	6 bunkers, 1 mess area, 1 tunnel in well	Destroyed
111640H	XT 687428	Recon/2-2	25 bunkers	Destroyed
120810H	XT 663554	A/S	25m trench (crossed), 3 bunkers	Destroyed
120941H	XT 650505	A/S	1 bunker, 2 mil structures	Destroyed
120955H	XT 705540	1-18	34 prone shelters, 26 rider holes	N/A
121100H	XT 665555	D/2-28	Mil structure	Destroyed
121107H	XT 670552	A/S	Mil structure, 2 large buildings	Destroyed
121153H	XT 700561	A/S	2 bunkers	Destroyed
121230H	XT 685428	Recon/2-2	Well, 12 mil structures	Destroyed
121237H	XT 713566	A/S	Bunker	Destroyed
121310H	XT 637502	D/1-2	4 bunker	Destroyed
121325H	XT 713566	A/S	bunker	Destroyed
121445H	XT 621508	Recon/1-2	15 mil structures	Destroyed

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Appendix 2 (Hard Installations 29 Sep - 19 Nov 67) to Annex B (Intelligence)  
to After Action Report for OP SPENDING II (U) (CONT'D)

121530H	XT 665487	C/1-16	4 bunkers	Destroyed
121532H	XT 691535	Recon/1-18	8 spider holes; 7 prone shelters	N/A
121656H	XT 621507	A/S	5 bunkers	Destroyed
130800H	XT 685395	A/S	4 bunkers	Destroyed
131046H	XT 640499	B/1-2	Mil structure, bunker	Destroyed
131120H	XT 703417	C/2-2	3 bunkers	Destroyed
131149H	XT 635452	A/S	150m trench (exposed)	Destroyed
131205H	XT 643517	A/S	15 bunkers	Destroyed
131307H	XT 683545	A/S	4 bunkers	Destroyed
131405H	XT 661471	A/S	4 mil structures	Destroyed
131419H	XT 683545	A/S	4 bunkers	Destroyed
131455H	XT 695414	A/S	bunker	Destroyed
131445H	XT 684537	B/2-2	2 mil structures	Destroyed
131448H	XT 735526	B/1-28	5 foxholes, bunker	Destroyed
131512H	XT 661472	A/1-2	3 fighting pens	Destroyed
131724H	XT 667472	A/S	100m of trench (exposed)	N/A
131801H	XT 667472	A/S	50m of trench (exposed)	N/A
131822H	XT 677472	A/S	5 bunkers	Destroyed
140605H	XT 659526	A/S	4 bunkers, 150m of trench	Destroyed
140704H	XT 775553	B52 strike	Many bunkers	Destroyed
141008H	XT 695536	C/1-4	Underwater bridge	Destroyed
141032H	XT 664474	B/1-28	25 foxholes	Destroyed
141035H	XT 646510	A/S	3 bunkers	Destroyed
141107H	XT 653470	D/1-2	5 mil structures	Destroyed
141130H	XT 694525	A/S	5 bunkers, 50m trench	Destroyed
141207H	XT 658472	A/S	2 bunkers	Destroyed
141315H	XT 644521	A/S	3 bunkers, 20m trench	Destroyed
141333H	XT 691523	D/1-2	5 bunkers	Destroyed
141345H	XT 725528	A/S	1 mil structure	Destroyed
141505H	XT 667560	A/1-4	3 "Y" shaped holes	Destroyed
141540H	XT 691523	A/S	3 bunkers, mil structure	Destroyed
141630H	XT 693358	A/S	2 mil structures, 2 bunkers	Destroyed
141643H	XT 688524	1-2	5 bunkers	Destroyed
141312H	XT 640483	A/S	bunker, 5 foxholes	Destroyed
151114H	XT 688524	A/S	3 bunkers	Destroyed
151115H	XT 656465	A/S	13 hooches, 3 bunkers	Destroyed
151135H	XT 688524	A/S	4 bunkers	Destroyed
151144H	XT 637518	A/S	3 bunkers, tunnel	Destroyed
151155H	XT 685577	B/1-2	Mil structure	Destroyed
151215H	XT 656465	A/S	Bunker	Destroyed
151420H	XT 683578	A/S	6 bunkers	Destroyed
151450H	XT 684394	B/2-28	Bunker	Destroyed
160955H	XT 697465	C/2-2	Mil structure w/tunnel	Destroyed
161045H	XT 632530	A/1-16	30' x 40' mil structure	Destroyed
161120H	XT 681539	A/S	2 bunkers	Destroyed
161145H	XT 698563	A/S	4 fighting pens, 13 AA pens	Destroyed
161438H	XT 698565	A/S	Mil structure, 2 bunkers	Destroyed
161506H	XT 682528	A/S	2 bunkers	Destroyed
161615H	XT 698567	A/S	Bunker	Destroyed
161555H	XT 698567	A/S	10 bunkers	Destroyed
161633H	XT 698565	A/S	2 bunkers	Destroyed
170854H	XT 695567	A/S	4 bunkers	Destroyed
170850H	XT 684528	A/S	O/H bunker	Destroyed
170910H	XT 695570	A/S	2 fighting pens	Destroyed
170807H	XT 684528	A/S	Large o/h bunker	Destroyed
171012H	XT 628527	A/S	2 bunkers	Destroyed
171055H	XT 684528	A/S	Bunker, 15m trench	Destroyed
171120H	XT 686576	B/1-28	2 mil structures	Destroyed
171109H	XT 625523	A/S	3 bunkers	Destroyed
171712H	XT 670560	Recon/1-2	3 bunkers	N/A
180852H	XT 675545	A/S	2 o/h bunkers (uncovered)	Destroyed
180933H	XT 675545	A/S	O/H bunker	Destroyed
		A/S	4 bunkers	Destroyed

CONFIDENTIAL 65

Appendix 2 (Hard Installations 19 Sep - 19 Nov 67) to Annex B (Intelligence)  
to After Action Report for OP SIDNANDON II (U) (CONFID)

181023H	XT 683394	A/S	3 bunkers	Destroyed
181112H	XT 672548	A/S	14 fighting psns, 2 bunkers	Destroyed
181205H	XT 672548	A/S	Mil structure	Destroyed
181334H	XT 672548	A/S	3 bunkers	Destroyed
181356H	XT 672548	A/S	Bunker	Destroyed
181435H	XT 672548	A/S	5 bunkers, hut	Destroyed
181500H	XT 687562	B52 strike	Many bunkers, tunnels, foxholes	Destroyed
181617H	XT 672548	A/S	Hootch, 2 bunkers, trench	Destroyed
181645H	XT 672548	A/S	50m trench, 5 bunkers (uncovered)	N/A
181628H	YT 672548	A/S	6 bunkers	Destroyed
181730H	YT 672548	A/S	6 bunkers	Destroyed
191023H	XT 632231	A/S	2 bunkers, tunnel	Destroyed
191200H	XT 698555	B52 strike	Many mil structures, storage area, many bunkers	Destroyed
191430H	XT 657529	A/S	Bunker, 100m trench	Destroyed
191505H	XT 663510	A/S	Foxhole, bunker	Destroyed
191550H	XT 663485	B/2-2	2 mil structures	Destroyed
191712H	XT 624470	A/S	20m trench, bunker (uncovered)	N/A
191730H	XT 680525	A/S	2 mil structures, bunker	Destroyed
200720H	XT 825382	A/S	4 fighting psns, bunker	Destroyed
200754H	XT 692545	A/S	4 fighting psns	Destroyed
200830H	XT 821386	A/S	2 fighting psns, bunker	Destroyed
200930H	XT 676474	A/S	3 bunkers	Destroyed
201200H	XT 676474	A/S	4 bunkers, 25m trench	Destroyed
201240H	YT 674471	A/S	2 bunkers	Destroyed
201310H	XT 702566	A/S	2 bunkers	Damaged
201332H	YT 811377	A/S	15 fighting psns, 4 bunkers	Destroyed
201500H	XT 644530	B52 strike	Many mil structures, storage bunker, base camp	Destroyed
201640H	XT 815385	A/S	100m trench (exposed)	Destroyed
210600H	YT 668541	B52 strike	2 huts, base camp, 500m trench	Destroyed
211042H	XT 645425	A/S	4 bunkers, 50m trench	Destroyed
211024H	XT 674474	A/S	5 bunkers	Destroyed
211240H	XT 679546	A/S	2 bunkers, mil structures	Destroyed
211319H	XT 676475	C/2-2	5 mil structures	Destroyed
211325H	XT 630510	A/S	2 bunkers	Destroyed
211615H	XT 676554	A/S	Hootch, 3 bunkers	Destroyed
211647H	XT 623503	A/S	Mil structure, 2 bunkers	Destroyed
211625H	XT 623503	A/S	Hootch, bunker	Destroyed
220600H	XT 687578	B52 strike	100m trench, many bunkers & fighting psns	Destroyed
220907H	YT 675540	A/S	2 bunkers	Destroyed
220945H	XT 702561	A/S	1 bunker, 2 fighting psns	Destroyed
221045H	XT 624491	A/S	3 bunkers	Destroyed
221020H	XT 665545	A/S	3 bunkers, trench	Destroyed
221100H	XT 684472	B/2-2	2 o/h foxholes	Destroyed
221110H	XT 624491	A/S	Hootch, 3 bunkers	Destroyed
221315H	YT 704562	B/1-16	2 bunkers, 6 fighting psns	Destroyed
221515H	XT 674472	A/S	5 bunkers, 30 fighting psns	Destroyed
221530H	XT 685550	R/1-28	15 foxholes, mil structure	Destroyed
221659H	XT 709527	A/S	2 bunkers, mil structure	Destroyed
221757H	XT 709527	A/S	20m trench, 3 bunkers (uncovered)	N/A
230600H	XT 665554	B52 strike	Base camp, many bunkers & fighting psns	Destroyed
230850H	XT 644513	1-2	5 bunkers	Destroyed
230949H	XT 700563	A/S	6 bunkers	Destroyed
231107H	XT 615526	A/S	5 bunkers, 9 fighting psns	Destroyed
231128H	XT 695523	A/S	4 bunkers, 5 fighting psns	Destroyed
231247H	XT 700489	A/S	50m trench, 2 bunkers	Destroyed
231248H	XT 710563	A/S	50m trench (uncovered), 2 bunkers	Destroyed



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Appendix 2 (Hard Installations 29 Sep - 19 Nov 67) to Annex B (Intelligence)  
to After Action Report for OP SPANMOUTH II (U) (CONT'D)

231314H	XT	690506	I/S	Bunker (uncovered)	N/A
231355H	XT	677529	1-28	Mil structure	Destroyed
231408H	XT	690510	I/S	12 bunkers, tunnel ent	Destroyed
231515H	XT	390302	C/2-16	2 mil structures, 2 bunkers	Destroyed
231517H	XT	688515	I/S	Bunker, 2 mil structures	Destroyed
231648H	XT	637505	I/1-2	Bunker, 2 mil structures	Destroyed
231715H	XT	690510	I/S	8 bunkers, 250m trench (uncovered)	N/A
240750H	XT	818398	I/S	50m trench (exposed), 3 bunkers	Destroyed
240930H	XT	628519	1/2	Food storage	Destroyed
241000H	XT	628518	1/2	Food storage	Destroyed
241030H	XT	675529	I/S	4 bunkers	Destroyed
241051H	XT	675525	I/S	5 foxholes, 2 bunkers, structure	Destroyed
241101H	XT	710544	I/1-16	Rice storage	Destroyed
241145H	XT	682529	1/28	Rice storage	Destroyed
241159H	XT	716572	I/S	Bunker, foxhole	Destroyed
241120H	YT	643460	I/S	Bunker	Destroyed
241345H	XT	677515	I/S	Hootch	Destroyed
241206H	XT	818388	I/S	2 bunkers	Destroyed
241502H	XT	590514	I/S	4 bunkers, 3 fighting pens	Destroyed
241607H	XT	750458	I/S	6 bunkers	Destroyed
241628H	XT	750458	I/S	Hootch, 10 bunkers, trench	Destroyed
241614H	XT	650458	I/S	5 bunkers	Destroyed
241707H	XT	690514	I/S	5 bunkers, 12 foxholes, 300m trench	Destroyed
250838H	XT	649458	I/S	50m trench (exposed), 4 bunkers	Destroyed
250915H	XT	798515	I/S	Tunnel (exposed), 2 hootches	Destroyed
250955H	XT	651458	I/S	7 bunkers	Destroyed
250959H	XT	663528	I/S	200m trench (uncovered), fighting pen	Destroyed
251034H	XT	642462	I/S	3 bunkers, 4 fighting pens	Destroyed
251020H	YT	663528	I/S	3 fighting pens	Destroyed
251045H	XT	669492	B/2-2	4 mil structures, tunnel	Destroyed
251155H	XT	662513	I/S	3 bunkers, 50m trench	Destroyed
251252H	XT	641467	I/S	3 bunkers	Destroyed
251520H	YT	642449	I/S	9 bunkers	Destroyed
251525H	XT	648548	C/1-28	2 mil structures	Destroyed
251750H	YT	633529	I/S	4 bunkers	Destroyed
260600H	XT	695519	B52 strike	Base camp	Partially Destroyed
260730H	XT	625525	I/S	1 structure, 2 bunkers	Destroyed
260731H	XT	670471	I/S	7 fighting pens	Destroyed
260808H	XT	632527	I/S	Structure	Destroyed
260840H	YT	719570	I/S	2 o/h bunkers	Destroyed
260900H	XT	666523	D/1-28	2 bunkers	Destroyed
260935H	XT	651462	I/1-27	5 fighting pens, 6 bunkers	Destroyed
260935H	XT	667527	D/1-28	3 spider holes, 6 bunkers	Destroyed
261043H	XT	718524	I/S	4 fighting pens	Destroyed
261125H	XT	681528	D/1-28	15 bunkers	Destroyed
261136H	XT	667493	C/2-2	Tunnel	Destroyed
261145H	YT	627528	B/1-2	Messhall, 7 bunkers	Destroyed
261206H	XT	640513	I/1-2	Empty rice storage	Destroyed
261300H	XT	640516	I/1-2	4 bunkers	Destroyed
261345H	XT	715566	B/1-16	Tunnel, bunker	Destroyed
261345H	XT	651555	I/S	100m trench (uncovered) bunker	Destroyed
261415H	XT	651535	I/S	Bunker	Destroyed
261520H	XT	662469	D/1-26	Bunker	Destroyed
261610H	XT	651535	I/S	Hootch, 4 bunkers, trench	Destroyed
261620H	XT	650412	I/S	Hootch	Destroyed
270745H	XT	671523	D/1-28	Mil structure, foxhole	Destroyed
270809H	XT	645455	I/S	4 bunkers, 7 fighting pens	Destroyed
270947H	XT	640455	I/S	7 bunkers, 100m trench, tunnel	Destroyed
270820H	XT	636517	I/S	Hootch	Destroyed
270748H	XT	645455	I/S	9 bunkers	Destroyed

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Appendix 2 (Hard Installations 29 Sep - 19 Nov 67) to Annex B (Intelligence)  
to After Action Report for OP SHENANDOAH II (U) (CONT'D)

270925H	XT 635528	A/S	4 bunkers	Destroyed
271615H	XT 652535	A/S	40m trench, 9 bunkers	Destroyed
271045H	XT 623517	A/1-2	Mil structure, bunker w/oh cover	Destroyed
271120H	XT 697457	B/1-26	Mil structure	Destroyed
271132H	XT 662455	D/1-26	3 bunkers	Destroyed
271140H	XT 704524	A/S	2 bunkers, hootch	Destroyed
271200H	XT 789332	A/S	Bunker	Destroyed
271200H	XT 627468	A/S	5 bunkers	Destroyed
271235H	XT 664494	B/2-2	4 foxholes	Destroyed
271332H	XT 652535	A/S	4 bunkers	Destroyed
271402H	XT 915319	A/2-18	Mil structure	Destroyed
271435H	XT 665456	D/1-26	2 mil structures	Destroyed
280943H	XT 783331	A/S	Fighting pen	Destroyed
280858H	XT 693512	A/S	40 bunkers and 30m trench (uncovered)	Destroyed
280910H	XT 683524	B/1-28	Food storage	Destroyed
280917H	XT 783331	A/S	3 fighting pens, trench	Destroyed
280945H	XT 707558	D/1-16	4 o/h bunkers	Destroyed
281155H	XT 715566	A/S	2 bunkers	Destroyed
281249H	XT 652536	A/S	Bunker	Destroyed
281250H	XT 783363	A/S	Bunker, 3 fighting pens	Destroyed
281653H	XT 653537	A/S	4 bunkers, hootch	Destroyed
281710H	XT 653537	A/S	3 bunkers	Destroyed
281750H	XT 653537	A/S	2 bunkers	Destroyed
281634H	XT 668496	A/S	Mil structure	Destroyed
290942H	XT 632523	A/S	2 bunkers (uncovered)	N/A
291008H	XT 632523	A/S	Bunker (uncovered)	N/A
291121H	XT 694513	A/S	3 bunkers	Destroyed
291250H	XT 635515	A/S	Foxhole, trench	Destroyed
291325H	XT 635515	A/S	7 bunkers	Destroyed
291550H	XU 659125	B52 strike	2 bunkers, many foxholes	Destroyed
302045H	XU 815240	B52 strike	4 bunkers (uncovered) trail	Destroyed
311615H	XT 580990	B52 strike	2 base camps	Partially Destroyed
311640H	XT 758057	1-28	2 mil structures	Destroyed
NOVEMBER 1967				
011240H	XU 924067	B52 strike	Foxhole	Destroyed
011240H	XU 923066	B52 strike	2 bunkers, 20m trench (exposed)	N/A
011240H	XU 926063	B52 strike	1 bunker	Partially Destroyed
			1 tunnel entrance	N/A
011405H	XU 633040	A/S	2 fighting pens	Destroyed
	XU 930061	B52 strike	2 tunnel entrance	Partially Destroyed
	XU 931072	B52 strike	20m trench (exposed)	N/A
	XU 931065	B52 strike	1 foxhole	Destroyed
020220H	XU 694091	A/S	2 AW pens, 1 sec explosion	Destroyed
020700H	XU 702103	A/S	2 sec explosions	N/A
	XU 689072	A/S	3 fighting pens (uncovered)	N/A
020900H	XU 873049	A/S	1 bunker	Destroyed
021004H	XU 764102	A/S	1 mil structure	Destroyed
021130H	XU 584115	B52 strike	3 mil structure	Destroyed
	XU 583114		5 mil structures (exposed)	N/A
	XU 584115		4 bunkers	Destroyed
	XU 583114		7 bunkers	Destroyed
021447H	XU 784134	A/S	1 structure	Damaged
021618H	XU 679080	A/S	4 trails cut	N/A
021657H	XU 680670	A/S	1 mil structure, 1 bridge	Damaged
			2 bunkers (exposed)	
021850H	XU 705080	A/S	Sec explosion	N/A

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Appendix 2 (Hard Installations 29 Sep - 19 Nov 67) to Annex B (Intelligence)  
to After Action Report for OP SHENANDOAH II (U) (CONT'D)

031141H	XU 775166	A/S	1 mil structure	Destroyed
			1 mil structure	Damaged
031350H	XU 725070	C/2-28	Mortar pens	Destroyed
031521H	XU 788118	A/S	3 fighting pens	Destroyed
031530H	XU 788119	A/S	3 fighting pens	Destroyed
031750H	XU 816159	A/S	2 tunnels (exposed)	N/A
040800H	XU 712154	1-26	10 bunkers, 1 cmd bunker, 2 MG pens	Destroyed
041005H	XU 800141	D/2-12	1 mil structure	Destroyed
041200H	XU 715114	1-18	5 bunkers	Destroyed
041207H	XU 782095	A/S	Sec fire	
041345H	XU 815115	A/S	1 mil structure	Destroyed
041350H	XU 781155	2-12	Mort pen	Destroyed
041521	XU 810106	A/S	Trail cut	N/A
041554H	XU 789107	A/S	4 trails cut	N/A
041705H	XU 805110	A/S	1 mil structure	Destroyed
			2 trail cut	N/A
041721H	XU 805109	A/S	1 trail cut	N/A
041739H	XU 805100	A/S	2 trails cut, 1 structure	Destroyed
050821H	XU 781152	A/S	20m trench, 2 bunkers (uncovered)	Destroyed
050850H	XU 781152	A/S	3 bunkers (uncovered)	N/A
			2 spider holes	Destroyed
050910H	XU 781152	A/S	2 bunkers, 3 spider holes	Destroyed
			25m trench (uncovered)	N/A
051055H	XU 775137	B/2-2	3 bunkers	Destroyed
051110H	XU 773138	2-12	100 foxholes	Destroyed
051235H	XU 715135	D/1-26	30 bunkers, RR pens	Destroyed
051320H	XU 767154	2-12	30 foxholes	Destroyed
051410H	XU 825036	A/S	2 trails cut	N/A
051420H	XU 700092	A/S	24 foxholes	Destroyed
060920H	XU 792137	2-12	10 MG pens	Destroyed
060945H	XU 795099	A/S	Tunnel ent (exposed)	N/A
061140H	XU 683088	1-18	1 mil pen, 7 bunkers	Destroyed
061200H	XU 807125	A/S	1 mil structure	Damaged
			1 bridge	Destroyed
061210H	XU 683081	1-18	150 bunkers	Destroyed
061225H	XU 688088	1-18	7 mil pens	Destroyed
061250H	XU 863098	A/S	2 trails cut, 1 bunker	Destroyed
061352H	XU 758088	B/1-28	20 bunkers	Damaged
061406H	XU 754078	B/1-28	30 foxholes	Destroyed
061412H	XU 833100	A/S	Trench (exposed)	N/A
061505H	XU 799095	A/S	1 bunker (uncovered)	N/A
070600H	XU 764234	B52 strike	80m trench	Destroyed
			1 bunker, 2 fighting pens (exposed)	N/A
070845H	XU 750235	A/S	1 trail cut	N/A
071025H	XU 665083	A/S	2 bunkers (exposed)	N/A
071120H	XU 875075	A/S	1 trail cut	N/A
071209H	XU 825160	A/S	2 trails cut	N/A
081230H	XU 775100	A/S	2 bunkers (exposed)	N/A
081300H	XU 775000	A/S	2 bunkers (exposed)	N/A
081345H	XU 862095	B52 strike	Tunnel entrance (exposed)	N/A
			fighting pen (exposed)	N/A
081558H	XU 826109	2-28	Tunnel	Destroyed
081600H	XU 774100	A/S	10 fighting pens (exposed)	N/A
081650H	XU 830100	A/S	1 mil structure, 1 cmd bunker	Destroyed
090741H	XU 795098	A/S	1 bunker	Destroyed
			1 tunnel entrance (exposed)	
090827H	XU 870150	A/S	1 trail cut	N/A
			1 bunker (exposed)	
090907H	XU 882158	A/S	1 mil structure, 1 bunker	Destroyed
			2 roads cut	N/A

69

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Appendix 2 (Hard Installations 29 Sep - 19 Nov 67) to Annex B (Intelligence)  
to After Action Report for OP SHENANDOAH II (U) (CONT'D)

091120H	XU 880157	A/S	2 mil structures	Destroyed
			1 bunker	Damaged
			1 sec explosion	
091207H	XU 706523	A/S	100m trench (exposed)	N/A
091220H	XU 80435	A/S	8 bunkers	Destroyed
091230H	XU 841102	B52 strike	2 bunkers	Destroyed
			2 bunkers, 2 fighting pens (uncovered)	
091243H	XU 830178	A/S	2 small structures	Destroyed
091511H	XU 880150	A/S	1 mil structure, 1 bunker	Damaged
			1 trail cut	N/A
100826H	XT 880921	A/S	1 bunker	Destroyed
110802H	XT 800925	A/S	Road cut	N/A
111125H	XT 600955	A/S	8 bunkers (exposed)	N/A
			2 roads cut	N/A
121118H	XU 887006	A/S	1 bunker (exposed)	N/A
130840H	XT 628930	A/S	Bunker	Destroyed
131518H	XT 824959	A/S	1 bunker, 1 mil structure	Destroyed
140656H	XU 840033	A/S	Secondary fire w/white smoke	N/A
140939H	XU 868173	A/S	1 mil structure	Destroyed
141216H	XT 689920	A/S	1 mil structure	Destroyed
151129H	XU 745085	D/2-28	4 foxholes	Destroyed
161030H	XU 722089	2-28	1 mortar pen	Destroyed
161637H	XT 639961	A/S	Sec explosion w/blue smoke	N/A
171055H	XU 654046	A/S	1 bunker	Destroyed
181333H	XU 746063	D/2-28	1 tunnel	Destroyed
190421H	XU 604020	A/S	Tunnel (exposed)	Destroyed

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81


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COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT

OPERATION "SHERMANOAH II"

(29 September to 19 November 1967)

1st Infantry Division Support Command



DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
TERMS DECLASSIFIED AFTER  
12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.10.

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ANNEX H

71

82

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## I. (C) CONCEPT OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS:

### A. (C) GENERAL:

The basic concept for logistical support of Operation "CHUENHONG II" featured supply point distribution of high tonnage items from established forward distribution points at Lai Khe and Quan Loi. A forward support area for Class III was established at Loc Ninh when dictated by the tactical situation during the closing phase of the operation. Unit distribution of Class V was effected from Lai Khe and Quan Loi by rotary wing aircraft to Fire Support Patrol Bases (FSPB) Lorraine I West of Lai Khe Lorraine II, Northwest of Lai Khe; Caisson III at Ban Long; Caisson V, West of Ban Long; Loc Minh N, vicinity Loc Ninh; Defiant NDP, vicinity Loc Ninh and Dogface NDP, vicinity Loc Ninh. Unit distribution of Class V 105mm ammunition was made to the Loc Ninh airstrip FSPB. The impetus of supply was from the rear and focused on the maintenance of adequate stocks at the forward distribution and forward supply points to meet peak unit demands without delay or adverse effect on tactical operations. Resupply of the forward distribution points at Lai Khe was predominately by land LOC. Resupply of the forward distribution point at Quan Loi was accomplished by land and air LOC, and at the forward support area by air LOC exclusively. Through continuous liaison with the tactical units by Support Command elements, and by the full use of the Logistical Operation Coordination Center (LOCC), logistical problems were anticipated or identified so that remedial actions were taken before they reached a magnitude that hampered tactical operations. Through the LOCC machinery, corrective action and anticipatory planning was initiated in a timely manner to insure logistical support of all operations.

### B. (C) FORWARD COMMAND POST:

The Support Command Forward Command Post, in conjunction with the Logistical Operation Coordination Center (LOCC) was operational at Division Headquarters (Main) at Lai Khe at the onset of Operation "CHUENHONG II" and remained so during the period. The LOCC functioned as a coordination center for all logistical support rendered during the operation. This was accomplished by receiving, evaluating, consolidating, and transmitting to the 1st Supply and Transportation Battalion, at Di An and its forward support elements as applicable at Lai Khe, Quan Loi and Loc Ninh, requests for Class I, II and IV and III support. In a similar manner requests for Class V were transmitted to 3rd Ordnance Battalion, 29th General Support Group in Long Binh. Maintenance requirements were transmitted to the 701st Maintenance Battalion at Di An and its forward support elements at Lai Khe and Quan Loi. Aggressive follow up action was initiated and continually exercise throughout the operation to insure that all valid demands were satisfied in the shortest possible time span. The LOCC, in addition, was the focal point for consolidation of data relative to consumption rates, receipts and due in of supplies and equipment. This information was translated into meaningful planning data to insure the uninterrupted and timely flow of optimum amounts of all classes of supplies and equipment to the ultimate consumer. The Division Transportation Office, which is integrated into the structure of the LOCC likewise had its Forward Command Post established at the onset of the operation. It remained so during the period. Requests for fixed wing lifts were accepted by the DTO, coordinated with the LOCC, and forwarded to the Airlift Control Center (ALCC), a part of the 834th Air Division, Tan Son Nhut Air Force Base in Saigon for appropriate action. Continued monitoring and coordination between all concerned was effected to insure successful mission completion. Convoy control in support of the operation was exercised from the DTO Forward Command Post. The DTO rear element at Di An, under the command and control of the DTO Forward Command Post, coordinated and assisted in loading of all cargo airlifted from Di An airfield in support of Operation "CHUENHONG II".

1

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## C. (C) METHOD OF DIRECT SUPPORT AND RESUPPLY:

### 1. 1st Supply and Transport Battalion:

a. The activities of the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion were controlled by the Battalion Commander through his staff and subordinate commanders. The Battalion CP was located Di An. Operation of the permanent Forward Supply Sections at Lai Khe, Phuoc Vinh and Quan Loi and the CAC aircraft refueling points at Caisson III and Loc Ninh were controlled in a normal, routine manner. The office of the Division Supply Officer served as a focal point for the coordination of the logistical support rendered by the Supply and Transport Battalion. Here data on consumption receipts and amounts on hand in the forward areas were gathered and considered with the logistical situation, locations of units and planned movements of units to insure the uninterrupted flow of adequate supplies to the forward areas. In addition, a representative of S-3 was located with the LOCC at the Division Forward Command Post for liaison with the Support Command and G4.

b. The battalion concept of supply and service support for Operation "SHENANDOAH II" involved utilization of established Forward Supply Sections at Lai Khe, Phuoc Vinh and Quan Loi base camps. All units participating in the operation were supported with Class I, Class III and Class II&IV from these three locations. In addition refueling points were established at FSPB Caisson III S (XT790555) and Loc Ninh to provide convenient refueling locations within the operational area for command and control aircraft. Adequate stocks were maintained at Lai Khe by LandLOC from 1st Log Command activities located in Saigon-Long Binh logistical complex and the battalion main supply facility at Di An. AF aircraft were utilized on a non-scheduled basis to supply both barrier material and fast moving Class II&IV items to Phuoc Vinh and Quan Loi. Class III was supplied by air to FSPB Caisson III S and Loc Ninh. Normal frag of AF aircraft and Jan LOC were utilized to provide Class I and Class III materials at Lai Khe and Quan Loi. Normal frag of AF aircraft provided Class III and Class I materials to Phuoc Vinh.

c. The battalion maintained the capacity to provide for emergency refueling in isolated field locations and to expand existing Class III facilities on short notice to support air lift and airmobile assault operations for the duration of the operation.

### d. SUPPORT LOCATIONS:

LOCATION	SUPPORT	DATES OPEN	PERSONNEL
Lai Khe	Class I, II&IV, III, OR REG, SALVAGE	Perm	1 Off 23 EF
Phuoc Vinh	Class I, II&IV, III, OR REG, SALVAGE	Perm	1 Off 10 EF
Quan Loi	Class I, II&IV, III, OR REG, SALVAGE	Perm	1 Off 22 EF
FSPB Caisson III S	Class III	7 Oct-1 Nov	2 EF
Loc Ninh	Class III	2 Nov-16 Nov	2 EF

e. A combination of area and unit support was used during this operation. Class I and II&IV supplies were normally provided on a unit basis. Class III and OR REG were normally provided on an area basis. Salvage collection was accomplished on an area basis utilizing internal transportation assets.

### 1. Lai Khe

a. Unit support was provided for Class I and II&IV while Class III, OR REG and salvage collection were provided on an area basis.

b. Land and air LOC were utilized for re-supply.

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## 2. Phuoc Vinh

a. Unit support was provided for Class I and Class II&IV while Class III, OR REC and salvage collection were provided on an area basis.

b. Air LOC was used exclusively for re-supply.

## 3. Quan Loi

a. Unit support was provided for Class I and Class II&IV while Class III, OR REC and salvage collection were provided on an area basis.

b. Land and air LOC were utilized for re-supply.

## 4. F. S. P. B. Calson III E

a. Area Class III support was provided for command and control aircraft.

b. Air LOC was used exclusively for re-supply.

## 5. Loo Ninh

a. Area Class III support was provided for command and control aircraft.

b. Air LOC was used exclusively for re-supply.

2. 701st MAINTENANCE BATTALION:

a. The 701st Maintenance Battalion supported operations conducted during "SHENANDOAH II" using the normal base camp concept and the concept of on site support through the use of contact teams. The total efforts of C Company, 701st and the D Company Quan Loi Contact Team were directed toward support of these operations. A and B Companies participated in a limited capacity. Up to twelve contact teams with a total strength ranging from 18 to 62 personnel were employed daily. Personnel for these contact teams were drawn from all units of the battalion with the majority coming from Headquarters and A and D Companies. Aircraft support was provided by E Company from Phu Loi with extensive use of contact teams for on site repair.

b. Maintenance Teams were provided by:

1. Headquarters and A Company from Di An and Phu Loi with augmentation personnel sent to Lai Khe and other forward areas.

2. B Company from Di An, and 8 men to Lai Khe to augment C Company.

3. C Company from Lai Khe and a 6-man contact team at Chon Thanh.

4. D Company from Phuoc Vinh, and 1 officer and 16 EM contact team at Quan Loi. Artillery repairmen deployed to Loo Ninh on call.

5. E Company from Phu Loi with on site repair team dispatched as required for repair and recovery.

c. The use of contact teams proved highly satisfactory in minimizing down time for equipment at forward locations; i. e., within three hours, three 105 Howitzers were reported down for recoil mechanisms and were repaired and returned to action.

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## d. Method of Resupply:

Resupply was accomplished by use of air and surface transportation. Repair parts were issued through Headquarters and A Company at Di An, to forward support companies at Lai Khe and Phuoc Vinh and the D Company contact team at Quan Loi for immediate use of shipment to forward locations to support on site repairs. A relatively small amount of supplies were moved by air, the majority was moved by convoy. Nevertheless, the movement of critically needed repair parts by air for on site repairs was vital to maintenance support.

## 3. DIVISION AMMUNITION OFFICE:

a. During Operations "SUNNEDOWN II", class V support provided through forward distribution points (FDP) at Lai Khe and Quan Loi. The Lai Khe and Quan Loi FDP's were resupplied by periodic Log Command convoys from Long Binh. The Quan Loi FDP was also resupplied by Air Force air from Bion Hoa. EOD service was provided by a team from the 1st Ord Det (EOD) at Lai Khe and later at Quan Loi.

b. Ammunition supply service to the Division was controlled by the DAO whose base of operation was in 100C at Donger Main in Lai Khe. The DAO was assisted in the 100C by the two enlisted men. One EM from the DAO section, four EM from the 40th Ord Company operated the FDP at Lai Khe. Two EM from the DAO section and six EM from the 40th Ord Company operated the FDP at Quan Loi. Stockage of the FDP's was coordinated by the DAO-100C and the ADAO at Long Binh.

c. Method of Direct Support and Resupply: The method of resupply for the units engaged in operations "SUNNEDOWN II" was split between land LOC and air LOC as follows:

Lai Khe FDP	Quan Loi FDP
Air LOC - 0	Air LOC - 18%
Land LOC - 100%	Land LOC - 82%

## 4. DIVISION TRANSPORTATION OFFICE:

The Division Transportation Office (DTO) was organized into two basic elements, one forward and one rear. The forward element was concerned with the overall DTO operation with primary emphasis being placed on airlift and convoy operations. The rear element handled outgoing and incoming hold baggage and operated the Di An fixed wing airstrip and the heliport.

## D. (C) GENERAL SUPPORT AND RESUPPLY SOURCES:

### 1. 1st Supply and Transport Battalions

The 1st Supply and Transport Battalion used its normal resupply sources throughout the operation. Requirements of supported units were routed to the Division Supply Office at Di An. For those items not available, and for anticipated requirements, a request was placed on the 506th Field Depot in Saigon.

### 2. 701st Maintenance Battalion:

Repair parts back-up support was received from the 506th Field Depot and the 34th General Support Group.

### 3. Division Ammunition Office:

The Long Binh Ammunition Depot, operated by the 3rd Ord Bn provided ammunition by unit distribution to the Lai Khe and Quan Loi FDP's.

## E. (C) UNIT SUPPLY CONCEPTS:

### 1. 1st Supply and Transportation Battalion:

Supply point distribution was provided throughout the operation. Unit trains were located vicinity Lai Khe, Quan Loi, and Phuoc Vinh. Units received supplies at the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion Forward Supply Sections at these three locations. An exception to this method of resupply was the delivery of ice cream to field locations.

75  
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## 2. 701st Maintenance Battalion:

Limited transportation support was provided by the 48th Transportation Group in the movement of repair parts forward from Headquarters and A Company. The preponderance of repair parts transportation into the division and to forward support companies was accomplished with organic transportation. All of the repair parts moved by air were moved by Support Command, E Company 701st Maintenance Battalion, and AOC.

## 3. Division Ammunition Offices:

The Division Ammunition Office received unit distribution from Long Binh in all cases.

## F. (C) SUPPORT OF NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS:

### 1. 1st Supply and Transportation Battalions:

During Operation "SHEN JONGH IK" the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion supported 3-22 (Falcon) and 2-12 (Flames) Infantry Battalion of the 25th Division from 28 Oct 67 to 5 Nov 67 with Class I, Class II and Class II&IV through the Battalion's Forward Supply Section at Quan Loi.

### 2. 701st Maintenance Battalion:

a. The 168th Engineer Battalion was supported on a mission by mission basis.

b. One recovery mission of an M110 howitzer was accomplished for the 6th Battalion 27th Artillery.

### 3. Division Ammunition Offices:

Non-Divisional Infantry and Artillery were supported in the same manner as organic units.

## G. (C) MAJOR ITEM LOSSES (SUPPORT COMMAND)

There were no major items of equipment lost by Support Command units.

## II (C) EXPERIENCE DATA

### A. MATERIAL AND SERVICES:

#### 1. (C) SUPPLY:

##### a. (U) Quantities of Supplies Consumed:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AIR LOC</u>	<u>LAND LOC</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Class I (Short Tons)	635.7	1,154.4	1,790.1
Class III			
JFu (Gallons)	709,440	1,106,270	1,815,710
Avgas (Gallons)	72,750	67,100	139,850
Mogas (Gallons)	177,900	305,650	483,550
Diesel (Gallons)	199,230	346,200	545,430
Class II&IV (SHORT TONS)	40	59	99
Loss Barrier Material			
Barrier Material	43	60	103
Small Arms & Other Class V (Short Tons)	23.10	3289.90	-0-
Arty and Large Caliber	447.87	7512.46	-0-
Repair Parts	27	386	-0-

##### b. (C) Support to G-5 Activities

None

26  
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## c. (U) Class II Analysis.

(1) Location: Lai Khe:

## (a) A Rations:

DATES	S/O	TOTAL REQ'D	AV DLY REQ'D	TOTAL AIR	S/T HMY	TOTAL ISSUE	AV DLY ISSUE	AV DLY ON END
29 Sep	1 day	10,830	10,830	0	10.8	6,900	6,900	13,728
30 Sep-6Oct	1 day	51,170	7,310	0	44.7	51,400	7,343	20,431
7 Oct-13Oct	1 day	56,674	8,096	0	56.8	52,267	7,467	20,262
14Oct-20Oct	1 day	65,309	9,328	0	65.7	51,300	7,328	23,711
21Oct-27Oct	1 day	39,315	5,645	0	39.8	50,300	7,186	22,601
28Oct-3Nov	1 day	49,600	7,085	0	50.3	49,300	7,043	18,098
4Nov-10Nov	1 day	44,200	6,314	0	44.4	44,500	6,357	19,641
11Nov-17Nov	1 day	48,498	6,928	0	48.7	43,250	6,179	24,823
18Nov-19Nov	1 day	12,442	6,221	0	12.5	13,870	6,935	23,782
RECAP	1 day	378,349	8,472	0	373.7	363,087	7,842	23,383

## (b) B Rations:

29 Sep	15 days	0	0	0	0	0	0	68,700
30Sep-6Oct	15 days	0	0	0	0	50,400	7,200	32,700
7 Oct-13Oct	15 days	80,000	11,429	0	120.0	54,600	7,800	47,871
14Oct-20Oct	15 days	80,000	11,429	0	120.0	0	0	74,985
21Oct-27Oct	15 days	0	0	0	0	52,500	7,500	85,700
28Oct-3Nov	15 days	80,000	11,429	0	120.0	49,000	7,000	69,628
4Nov-10Nov	15 days	0	0	0	0	20,700	2,957	86,343
11Nov-17Nov	15 days	0	0	0	0	44,100	6,300	48,900
18Nov-19Nov	15 days	40,000	0	0	0	0	0	56,300
RECAP	15 days	280,000	4,285	0	360.0	271,300	4,844	61,390

## (c) C Rations:

29 Sep	5 days	3,072	3,072	0	17.5	561	561	26,291
30Sep-6Oct	5 days	3,840	548	0	13.7	7,904	1,129	24,456
7Oct-13Oct	5 days	12,288	1,755	0	46.0	8,942	1,277	19,065
14Oct-20Oct	5 days	0	0	0	0	6,684	955	21,324
21Oct-27Oct	5 days	0	0	0	0	6,228	890	15,573
28Oct-3Nov	5 days	21,504	3,029	0	65.2	3,516	502	26,809
4Nov-10Nov	5 days	0	0	0	0	2,918	425	27,753
11Nov-17Nov	5 days	0	0	0	0	1,071	153	26,343
RECAP	5 days	44,544	1,290	0	155.8	37,954	740	26,918

## (d) Supply Packs:

29 Sep	3 days	90	90	0	2.1	21	21	460
30Sep-6Oct	3 days	0	0	0	0	219	31	430
7Oct-13Oct	3 days	0	0	0	0	210	30	391
14Oct-20Oct	3 days	300	43	0	7.0	204	29	285
21Oct-27Oct	3 days	240	34	0	5.6	174	25	365
28Oct-3Nov	3 days	160	23	0	3.5	178	25	457
4Nov-10Nov	3 days	0	0	0	0	159	23	368
11Nov-17Nov	3 days	30	4	0	.7	181	25	221
18Nov-19Nov	3 days	120	60	0	2.3	7	3	217
RECAP	3 days	940	31	0	21.7	1,353	26	399

(2) Location: Phuoc Vinh:

## (a) A Rations:

29 Sep	1 day	0	0	0	0	4,500	4,500	19,399
30Sep-6Oct	1 day	39,380	5,626	44.4	0	34,090	4,870	20,174
7Oct-13Oct	1 day	21,256	3,036	20.3	0	25,746	3,678	19,310
14Oct-20Oct	1 day	45,514	6,516	46.1	0	34,585	4,941	20,911
21Oct-27Oct	1 day	28,536	4,076	29.8	0	33,818	4,831	17,329
28Oct-3Nov	1 day	30,832	4,404	30.3	0	28,250	4,036	18,246
4Nov-10Nov	1 day	15,815	2,259	15.3	0	22,860	3,265	17,062

87

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DATES	S/S	TOTAL REC'D	AV DLY REC'T	TOTAL AIR	S/T HWY	TOTAL ISSUE	AV DLY ISSUE	AV DLY ON HAND
11Nov-17Nov	1 day	33,408	4,772	33.1	0	27,950	3,992	16,368
18Nov-19Nov	1 day	3,376	4,188	8.1	0	748	374	19,069
RECAP	1 day	223,217	4,359	227.4	0	212,547	4,310	19,857

## (b) B Rations:

29Sep	15 days	0	0	0	0	0	0	67,449
30Sep-6Oct	15 days	0	0	0	0	36,500	5,214	41,444
7Oct-13Oct	15 days	90,000	0	135.0	0	33,075	4,725	72,101
14Oct-20Oct	15 days	0	0	0	0	33,775	4,825	64,244
21Oct-27Oct	15 days	73,621	10,571	110.4	0	3,745	535	48,903
28Oct-3Nov	15 days	38,400	5,485	536.0	0	28,140	4,020	87,307
4Nov-10Nov	15 days	0	0	0	0	23,485	3,355	84,285
11Nov-17Nov	15 days	0	0	0	0	27,440	3,920	57,975
18Nov-19Nov	15 days	0	0	0	0	0	0	50,135
RECAP	15 days	202,021	16,056	299.0	0	186,160	3,324	71,793

## (c) C Rations:

29 Sep	5 days	0	0	0	0	1,188	1,188	21,288
30Sep-6Oct	5 days	15,714	2,244	549.0	0	7,774	1,139	29,371
7Oct-13Oct	5 days	0	0	0	0	9,758	1,394	24,890
14Oct-20Oct	5 days	0	0	0	0	4,724	674	18,183
21Oct-27Oct	5 days	14,608	2,086	47.3	0	5,800	828	22,545
28Oct-3Nov	5 days	348	49	1.0	0	3,664	523	22,255
4Nov-10Nov	5 days	0	0	0	0	5,248	750	18,932
11Nov-17Nov	5 days	0	0	0	0	4,828	689	15,737
18Nov-19Nov	5 days	0	0	0	0	0	0	11,188
RECAP	5 days	30,670	4,379	103.2	0	43,177	898	22,935

## (d) Sundry Packs:

29 Sep	3 days	0	0	0	0	16	16	369
30Sep-6Oct	3 days	90	12	2.4	0	128	18	331
7Oct-13Oct	3 days	0	0	0	0	158	23	252
14Oct-20Oct	3 days	0	0	0	0	110	27	132
21Oct-27Oct	3 days	296	42	12.6	0	210	30	320
28Oct-3Nov	3 days	421	60	9.8	0	53	7	731
4Nov-10Nov	3 days	0	0	0	0	68	9	733
11Nov-17Nov	3 days	0	0	0	0	95	13	558
18Nov-19Nov	3 days	0	0	0	0	34	17	570
RECAP	3 days	807	114	24.5	0	872	20	499

## (3) Locations: Quan Loi:

### (a) A Rations:

29 Sep	1 day	2,700	2,700	2.5	0	1,850	1,850	10,050
30 Sep-6Oct	1 day	6,050	844	4.8	0	12,290	1,756	6,762
7Oct-13Oct	1 day	10,000	1,448	7.9	0	11,435	1,633	14,233
14Oct-20Oct	1 day	8,150	1,164	8.2	0	10,630	1,518	11,201
21Oct-27Oct	1 day	14,225	2,032	19.1	0	11,795	1,685	13,001
28Oct-3Nov	1 day	19,805	2,829	19.0	0	20,080	2,868	11,597
4Nov-10Nov	1 day	40,400	5,771	34.3	6	31,885	4,555	17,682
11Nov-17Nov	1 day	23,650	3,378	16.0	7.8	30,238	4,319	18,674
18Nov-19Nov	1 day	8,225	4,112	0	8.3	5,200	2,600	18,292
RECAP	1 day	133,205	3,033	111.8	22.1	135,403	2,848	15,187

### (b) B Rations:

29 Sep	10 days	0	0	0	0	0	0	65,820
30Sep-6Oct	10 days	0	0	0	0	12,750	1,821	59,227
7Oct-13Oct	10 days	47,000	6,713	0	0	11,550	1,650	76,220
14Oct-20Oct	10 days	0	0	0	0	10,810	1,544	76,592
21Oct-27Oct	10 days	4,200	685	7.2	0	12,320	1,760	65,057
28Oct-3Nov	10 days	0	0	0	0	26,450	3,778	46,625

2/



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DATES	S/S	TOTAL REC'D	AV ILY REC'T	TOTAL AIR	S/T HMY	TOTAL ISSUE	AV ILY ISSUE	AV ILY ON END
4 Nov-10Nov	10 days	60,000	8,571	0	60.0	36,646	5,235	28,734
11Nov-17Nov	10 days	30,463	4,351	0	30.0	29,180	4,168	71,910
18Nov-19Nov	10 days	0	0	0	0	0	0	61,383
RECAP	10 days	42,263	2,540	7.2	90.0	139,706	2,494	68,951

## (c) C Rations:

29 Sep	5 days	0	0	0	0	276	276	30,084
30Sep-6Oct	5 days	0	0	0	0	996	128	29,513
7Oct-13Oct	5 days	0	0	0	0	480	68	28,779
14Oct-20Oct	5 days	0	0	0	0	748	106	28,112
21Oct-27Oct	5 days	3,072	438	10.7	0	1,592	227	29,561
28Oct-3Nov	5 days	0	0	0	0	11,552	1,650	28,617
4Nov-10Nov	5 days	80,072	11,438	42.1	127.4	12,148	1,735	51,284
11Nov-17Nov	5 days	1,794	256	0	1.8	5,024	717	84,179
18Nov-19Nov	5 days	0	0	0	0	848	424	81,660
RECAP	5 days	84,938	1,516	52.8	129.2	33,664	667	48,948

## (d) Sundry Packs:

29 Sep	3 days	0	0	0	0	0	0	412
30Sep-6Oct	3 days	0	0	0	0	124	17	397
7Oct-13Oct	3 days	0	0	0	0	50	7	257
14Oct-20Oct	3 days	0	0	0	0	134	19	147
21Oct-27Oct	3 days	0	0	0	0	111	15	213
28Oct-3Nov	3 days	0	0	0	0	257	36	166
4Nov-10Nov	3 days	1,140	120	9.8	.7	340	48	643
11Nov-17Nov	3 days	120	17	0	1.2	309	44	1,014
18Nov-19Nov	3 days	0	0	0	0	71	10	856
RECAP	3 days	1,260	17	9.8	1.9	1,396	24	513

## (4) Class I Consumption Trends:

Class I was available for issue at Lai Khe, Phuoc Vinh and Quan Loi. Generally, consumption of C rations was on a one meal per day basis in field locations, while A rations were consumed for the other two meals. Supporting elements and units not deployed to field locations consumed a complete A ration. Consumption of ice and other related Class I items was not out of proportion to standards established in previous operations.

79

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## d. (C) Class III Analysis

(1) Location: Lai Khe

(a) JP-4:

DATE	AV NO OF DISP PTS	S/O GAL	TOTAL REC'D	AV DLY REC'D	TOTAL AIR	S/T H/M	TOTAL ISSUE	AVG DLY ISS	AVG DLY O/H END TO S/O END (+ -)	VARIATION
29Sep67	17	70000	15000	15000	0	45	16266	16266	79159	
30Sep-60Oct67		70000	120000	17142	0	360	118209	16887	74093	
7Oct-13Oct67		70000	135000	19285	0	405	135143	19305	76563	
14Oct-20Oct67			110000	15714	0	330	121466	17352	75937	
21Oct-27Oct67			131100	18728	0	393.3	127728	18246	73658	
28Oct-3Nov67			131000	18714	0	393	11734	16770	72130	
4Nov-10Nov67			49700	7100	0	149.1	51140	7305	84138	
11Nov-17Nov67		70000	60000	8571	0	180	57346	8192	85713	
18Nov-19Nov67		70000	30000	15000	0	90	40139	20209	74842	
RECAP	17	70000	718700	16905	0	2345.4	785070	17561	87066	

Highest Day Issue: 34,272 on 28 Oct

Percentage of Highest Day over Average Day for the period: 195%

(b) Avgas

29Sep	10000	5000	5000	0	15	0	0	15900	
30Sep-60Oct67		5000	714	0	15	6000	857	14100	
7-13 Oct67		5000	714	0	15	6600	942	13194	
14-20Oct67		1000	1428	0	30	9900	1414	12957	
21-27Oct67		1000	1428	0	30	11100	1535	11524	
28Oct-3Nov67		7100	2014	0	21.3	6400	914	12457	
4-10Nov67		10000	1428	0	30	6000	857	13400	
11-17Nov67		5000	714	0	15	9100	1300	12542	
18-19Nov67		0	0	0	0	1400	600	11100	
RECAP	10000	57100	3128	0	171.3	53300	1048	17888	

Highest Day Issue: 3400 on 24 Oct

Percentage of Highest Day over Average Day for the period: 269%

(c) Mogas

29Sep	45000	5000	5000	0	15	5855	5855	51527	
30Sep-60Oct67		35000	5000	0	105	28881	4125	49275	
7-13Oct67		35000	5000	0	105	37791	5378	55326	
14-20Oct67		35000	5000	0	105	37454	5351	52907	
21-27Oct67		35000	5000	0	105	38371	5453	52307	
28Oct-3Nov67		35650	5092	0	106.9	37752	5393	49775	
4-10Nov67		25000	3571	0	75	32723	4674	46267	
11-17Nov67		45000	6428	0	135	36475	5210	49182	
18-19Nov67		10000	5000	0	30	16175	862	45024	
RECAP	45000	260650	5636	0	731.9	271235	5287	56448	

Highest Day Issue: 10,300 on 1 Nov

Percentage of Highest Day over Average Day for The Period: 194%

(d) Diesel

29Sep67	50000	5000	5000	0	15	2168	8269	50500	
30Sep-60Oct67		40000	5714	0	120	34539	4935	48753	
7-13Oct67		25000	3571	0	75	36076	5153	53197	
14-20Oct67		35000	5000	0	105	36246	5178	45523	
21-27Oct67		40000	5714	0	120	40832	5832	41541	
28Oct-3Nov67		45000	6428	0	135	43242	6177	46121	
4-10Nov67		40000	5714	0	120	46003	6543	42854	
11-17Nov67		45000	6428	0	135	46003	6927	42606	
18-19Nov67		15000	2500	0	45	15999	7999	33424	
RECAP	50000	290000	6583	0	970	310201	7139	50554	

Highest Day of Issue: 10,926 on 4 Nov

Percentage of Highest Day over Average Day for the Period: 153%

91

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(2) Location: Phouc Vinh

(a) JP-4

29Sep67 13	70000	20390	20390	61.1 0	14590	14590	76900
10Sep-60Oct67 13		37400	5342	112.2 0	52700	7528	65192
7-13Oct67		75400	10771	2262 0	40800	5828	86921
14-20Oct67		35550	5078	106.6 0	47950	6850	78814
21-27Oct67		52500	5700	157.5 0	52800	7542	77528
28Oct-3Nov67		28200	4028	84.6 0	27500	3928	75657
4-10Nov67		47100	6714	141.5 0	26250	3750	92028
11Nov-17Nov67		24400	3485	73.2 0	40400	5771	96157
18-19Nov67	70000	11400	5700	34.2 0	16450	8225	83000
RECAP 13	70000	332340	8401	917.1 0	319440	8000	91523

Highest Day of Issues: 16450 on 3 Oct

Percentage of Highest Day Over Average Day for the Period: 205%

(b) Avgas

29Sep67	10000	0	0	0 0	500	500	13200
30Sep-60Oct67		5000	714	15 0	5300	757	12150
7-13Oct67		2400	342	7.2 0	7950	1135	10378
14-20Oct67		7950	1135	23.8 0	2300	328	9678
21-27Oct67		1500	214	45 0	1850	264	14814
28Oct-3Nov67		0	0	0 0	4050	578	12342
4-10Nov67		5600	800	16.8 0	4880	697	11974
11Nov-17Nov67		4000	571	12 0	3070	438	11100
18-19Nov67		12000	6000	36 0	2500	1250	19525
RECAP:	10000	38450	1222	155.8 0	32400	742	14395

Highest Day of Issues: 2700 on 7 Oct 67

Percentage of Highest Day Over Average Day for the Period: 365%

(c) Mogas

29Sep67	40000				900	900	48900
30Sep-60Oct67	40000	15000	2142	45 0	18550	2650	48271
7-13Oct67		17200	2457	51.6 0	23500	3357	40107
14-20Oct67		18000	2571	54 0	21400	3057	33750
21-27Oct67		25600	3657	76.8 0	16800	2400	43992
28Oct-3Nov67		15700	2242	47.1 0	18900	2700	42021
4-10Nov67		14800	2114	44.4 0	14350	2050	45414
11-17Nov67		11200	1600	33.6 0	17300	2471	38100
18-19Nov67		4000	2000	12 0	4450	2225	34425
RECAP	40000	121500	2347	363.9 0	136150	2726	46872

Highest Day of Issues: 6600 on 5 Oct

Percentage of Highest Day over Average Day for the Period: 242%

82

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d. Diesel									
DATE	AT NR OF	S/O	TOT L	AV DAILY	TOT L	S/T	TOT L	AVG DLY	AVG DAILY
	DISP PTS	G/L	REC'D	REC'D	AIR	FT	ISSUE	ISSUE	O/H
29 Sep		30,000					2350	2350	35,250
30 Sep-6 Oct		19050	2721		50.5	0	23250	3321	34271
7 Oct-13 Oct		21500	3071		64.5	0	32700	4671	29721
14 Oct-20 Oct		16400	2342		48.9	0	16350	2335	29414
21 Oct-27 Oct		32800	4685		89.6	0	23350	3335	36514
28 Oct-3 Nov		12800	1821		38.4	0	17700	2528	37000
4 Nov-10 Nov		11000	2000		42	0	15850	2264	38935
11 Nov-17 Nov		15200	2171		45.6	0	17500	2500	34907
18 Nov-19 Nov	30,000	3200	1500		9.6	0	3350	1675	31725
TOTAL	30,000	134,950	2532		388.2	0	172100	2705	38467
Highest Day of Issues: 5500 Gallons on 5 Oct.									
Percentage of Highest Day over average day for the period 203%.									
(3) Location: <u>Quan Loi</u>									
(a) JP-4									
29 Sep 15		80000	20390	20930	61.1	0	115950	115950	76900
30 Sep-6 Oct		26800	3828		80.5	0	12150	6084	64257
7 Oct 13 Oct		75100	10771		225.8	0	41600	5942	86778
14 Oct 20 Oct		21500	3071		64.5	0	31350	4478	68057
21 Oct-27 Oct		31,700	4528		95.1	0	28450	4064	70965
28 Oct 3 Nov		197,000	28,442		449.4	141.6	187,350	26764	56,071
4 Nov 10 Nov		261,500	37,357		214.5	570	203,600	29005	92,628
11 Nov 17 Nov	80000	80,000	11,428		0	240	93,100	13,300	117,185
18 Nov 19 Nov	80000	0	0		0	0	33,100	16,550	105,050
TOTAL	80,000	714,290	11939		1,190.8	951.6	67,550	15,104	82,311

Highest Day of Issues: 53,300 gallons on 8 Nov.  
Percentage of Highest Day Over Average Day for the Period 353%.

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## (b) Avg-s.

DATE	AVE NO OF DISP PTS	S/O GAL	TOTALS RSC'D	AV DAILY RSC'D	TOTAL AIR	S/T EMI	TOTAL IS US	AVE DLY ISSUE	AVE DAILY OAH
29 Sep		10,000	2600	1228	12.9	0	500	500	13,200
30 Sep - 6 Oct		2400	0	313	7.2	0	1300	614	14,135
7 Oct - 13 Oct		0	0	0	0	0	6150	878	10,376
14 Oct - 20 Oct		8000	0	1112	0	0	2250	321	10,050
21 Oct - 27 Oct		7700	0	1100	24	0	3450	192	11,635
28 Oct - 3 Nov		10,000	14,500	2071	23.1	0	12,100	1,585	12,092
4 Nov - 10 Nov		10,000	5000	714	28.5	15	12,750	1,821	14,185
11 Nov - 17 Nov		10,000	0	0	0	15	7,500	1,071	15,250
18 Nov - 19 Nov		10,000	0	0	0	0	850	145	10,350
TOTAL		10,000	16,200	824	75.7	30	18,650	983	13,909

Highest Day of Issue: 3750 Gallons on 4 Nov.  
Percentage of Highest Day over Average Day for the Period 3915.

## (c) Days.

DATE	AVE NO OF DISP PTS	S/O GAL	TOTALS RSC'D	AV DAILY RSC'D	TOTAL AIR	S/T EMI	TOTAL IS US	AVE DLY ISSUE	AVE DAILY OAH
29 Sep		10,000	2600	1228	12.9	0	500	500	13,200
30 Sep - 5 Oct		14,500	0	2071	13.5	0	17,050	900	18,900
7 Oct - 13 Oct		17,200	0	2157	52.6	0	23,500	2135	18,200
14 Oct - 20 Oct		0	0	0	0	0	5,500	357	15,707
21 Oct - 27 Oct		8,000	0	1112	0	0	7,300	785	19,192
28 Oct - 3 Nov		4,000	0	571	24	0	11,700	1,042	17,850
4 Nov - 10 Nov		33,000	0	4714	24	75	32,050	1,671	14,828
11 Nov - 17 Nov		10,000	20,000	2057	0	60	13,950	1,592	14,135
18 Nov - 19 Nov		10,000	0	0	0	0	7,450	3,725	18,611
TOTAL		10,000	96,700	1726	155.1	135	199,100	2519	52,510

Highest Day of Issue: 9000 Gallons of 4 Nov.  
Percentage of Highest Day over Average Day for the Period 3536.

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(d) Diesel.

DATES	AV ER OF DL P FRS	S/O Q L L	TOT L FRCD	AV DEX R CND	TOT L PER	S/T FR	TOT L ISSUE	AVO DEX ISSUE	AVO DAILY U/A STD
29 Sep		30,000	0	0	0	0	2350	2350	35,250
30 Sep-6 Oct		30,000	15,600	2228	40.2	0	19,050	2721	34,900
7 Oct -13 Oct		30,000	21,500	3071	64.5	0	24,500	3500	29,721
14 Oct-20 Oct		30,000	2500	357	7.5	0	1,750	678	39,750
21 Oct-27 Oct		30,000	7200	1028	10.8	0	10050	1135	33,328
28 Oct-3 Nov		30,000	28,400	4057	51.6	336	39700	5671	24,400
4 Nov-10 Nov		30,000	28,020	1002	9	75	23,870	1124	35,478
11 Nov-17 Nov		30,000	20,000	2857	0	60	20,250	2892	32,400
18 Nov-19 Nov		30,000	0	0	0	0	2400	700	35,950
TOT L		30,000	123,220	2199	183.6	168.6	133,775	3008	38,117

Highest Day of Issue: 11,150 Gallons on 2 Nov.  
Percentage of Highest Day over Average for the Period 370%.

(h) Locations: Loc High

(a) JP-4

2 Nov-8 Nov	2	4000	6000	1500	18	0	7500	1875	2050
9 Nov-15 Nov	2	4000	4300	611	12.1	0	5800	828	4985
16 Nov	2	4000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT L	2	4000	10,300	1057	30.1	0	13,300	1,351	3917

Highest Day of Issue 2000 Gallons on 6-8 Nov.  
Percentage of Highest Day over Average Day for the Period 116%.

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95

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(b) Aves.

DATE	AV IR OF HSP FTS	S/O CAL	TOTAL HSP	AV DRAIN HSP	TOTAL HSP	S/T HSP	TOTAL HSP	AV DRAIN HSP	AV DRAIN HSP
------	---------------------	------------	--------------	-----------------	--------------	------------	--------------	-----------------	-----------------

2 Nov -8 Nov 2000 2000 500 0 3750 937 1121  
 9 Nov -15 Nov 2000 2500 357 0 1600 226 2171  
 16 Nov 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0

REC.P 2000 15000 128 13.5 0 5350 582 1798

Highest Day of Issue 2200 gallons on 8 Nov.  
 Percentage of Highest Day over average day for the period 377%.

(c) Gas.

2 Nov -8 Nov 500 300 75 0 630 157 137  
 9 Nov -15 Nov 500 1900 271 0 1450 61 730  
 16 Nov 500 0 0 0 0 0 0

REC.P 500 2200 173 6.6 0 1080 110 118

Highest Day Issue 200 gallons on 7 Nov.  
 Percentage of Highest Day over average day for the period 113%.

(d) Diesel.

2 Nov 8 Nov 1000 0 0 0 760 190 1337  
 9 Nov 15 Nov 1000 500 71 0 1300 185 1085  
 16 Nov 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0

REC.P: 1000 500 35 1.5 0 2060 187 1211

Highest Day Issue 160 gallons on 5 Nov.  
 Percentage of highest day over average day for the period 215%.



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(5) Location: Cassion III ZT79552

(a) JP-4

DATE	AV 13 OF	S/O	TOTL	AV D IN	TOTL	S/T	TOTL	AV DAILY	AV D IN
DISP	PTS	G/L	REC'D	REC'D	ATP	IN	ISSUE	ISSUE	O/A END
7 Oct-13 Oct	2	2000	1000	112	3	0	1200	171	700
14 Oct 20 Oct			2000	285	6	0	0	0	2800
21 Oct 27 Oct			6500	928	19.5	0	5000	711	2000
28 Oct 1 Nov			2500	357	7.5	0	2300	265	1355

EXC.P: 2 2000 12000 125 26 0 8200 292 1005

Highest Day of Issue: 1700 gallons on 25 Oct.  
Percentage of highest day over average day for the period 582%.

(b) Avges.

7 Oct-13 Oct	1000	3000	128	9	0	0	1550	221	735
14 Oct 20 Oct		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1100
21 Oct 27 Oct		2500	357	7.5	0	0	1500	211	1657
28 Oct 1 Nov		1000	112	3	0	0	1200	171	857

EXC.P: 1000 6500 231 19.5 0 1250 151 1619

Highest Day of Issue: 700 gallons on 12 Oct.  
Percentage of highest day over average day for the period 163%.

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97  
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(6) Class III Consumption Trends:

Analysis of Class III Consumption trends for Operation "SHENANDOAH II" revealed no particular variation from past operations with the exception of the period from 28 Oct to 9 Nov at Quan Loi. It should be noted that the consumption of JP-4 at Quan Loi during this period was more than half of what was consumed at that location during the entire operation. This can be attributed both to the amount of CH-47 aircraft traffic required to reposition artillery batteries and the amount of Helicopter assault aircraft used to transport the infantry battalions to the Loc Ninh area. Consumption of Avgas at Quan Loi also dropped sharply after the Loc Ninh battle. Consumption of Hogs and Diesel did not vary greatly from trends established in previous operations.

.. (U) Class II and IV Analysis

(1) Selected Common Items.

<u>ITEMS</u>	<u>LAI KHE</u>	<u>QUAN LOI</u>	<u>HUOC VINH</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Plates, Paper (Ctn)	682	393	180	1,255
Cup, Paper (Ctn)	565	130	160	855
Knife, Plastic (Hundreds)	6120	1800	3390	11,310
Fork, Plastic (Hundreds)	95,100	1800	2640	14,050
Spoon, Plastic (Hundreds)	5,940	2669	3600	12,209
Can, Water (ea)	80			80
Sandbags (ea)	951,000	2,083,200	458,800	2,593,000
Concertina (Blod)	80	319	8	407
Pickets (Ea)	21,570	21,570	8,868	52,077
Machete 18" (ea)	60		100	160
Swing Blades (ea)	50	50	33	133
Batteries: BA-386	500	5,808	2,796	9,104
BA-30	19,104	35,352	3,918	58,374
BA-200	480	730	360	1,570

(2) Selected Repair Parts/ASL Item Demand Data

<u>End Item</u>	<u>Nr Spt'd</u>	<u>Assys Replaced</u>
M113, Carrier Personnel	13	
M113A1, Carrier Personnel	136	12E, 11T, 2t
M48A3, Tank, Combat	34	13E, 8T, 2F
M58, Recovery Vehicle Medium	10	1E, 1T, 2t
M578, Recovery Vehicle Light	5	1E
M108A1, Howitzer, 105MM	72	7r, 9c
M109, Howitzer, 155MM	18	9E, 3c
M110, Howitzer, 81, 8"	4	2T, 2t, 3c

NOTE: E - Engine  
T - Transmission  
t - Transfer  
F - Final Drive  
D - Differential  
R - Recoil  
C - Cannon Assy

87  
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## P. (U) Class V Analysis

(1) Location of LSPs		LSPs		N.T.S. OPT: 28 Sept - 19 Nov 67.		N.T.S. OPT: 28 Sept - 19 Nov 67.		N.T.S. OPT: 28 Sept - 19 Nov 67.		N.T.S. OPT: 28 Sept - 19 Nov 67.	
STOCK OF	AVG LSP	TOTAL	AVG LSP	STOCK OF	AVG LSP	STOCK OF	AVG LSP	STOCK OF	AVG LSP	STOCK OF	AVG LSP
OBJECTIVE	O/S	Q/D	Q/D	Q/D	Q/D	Q/D	Q/D	Q/D	Q/D	Q/D	Q/D
ITEM											
ITEM 12	11,789	62,124	1172	372,446	21	55,338	1044	49.71			
ITEM 22	13,572	91,170	1033	289,112	26	96,931	1029	70.26			
ITEM 33	526	32,120	606	160,037	12	34,296	636	50.75			
ITEM 43	636	6,123	115	637,600	4	6,567	124	31.00			
ITEM 53	3043	22,800	130	474,900	8	21,150	112	51.50			
ITEM 63	1849	3,330	63	14,622		2,032	53				
TOTAL S/T											
(2) Location of LSPs: Quan Loc											
ITEM 12	6536	24,640	1120	152,446	12	25,914	1178	28.04			
ITEM 22	13,635	52,620	2391	447,671	35	52,776	2399	68.54			
ITEM 33	4622	4,304	195	214,39	5	3,281	119	29.60			
ITEM 43	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			
ITEM 53	3766	5200	236	106,05	4	3,600	167	41.75			
ITEM 63	2694	5120	233	16,52	-	3,444	156				
TOTAL S/T											
TOTAL S/T											
TOTAL S/T											

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99

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## 2. (C) SERVICES

## a. (U) Maintenance:

## (1) Direct Support Workload 701st Maintenance

Battalion-

Job Orders Received: 10,015  
 Job Orders Completed: 9,554  
 Average ASL on hand: 18,300  
 Average ASL demand accommodations: 74.3%  
 Total Demands: 44,665  
 TOTAL ISSUES: 49,317

## (2) Locations Supporting Operations

<u>JOBS COMPLETED</u>	<u>DA</u>	<u>FL*</u>	<u>LK</u>	<u>CT*</u>	<u>PV</u>	<u>QL*</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Arty	35	20	55	3	52	140	313
Auto, wheel	309	50	210	1	86	150	806
Auto, track	57	20	171	6	6	27	217
Signal	2217		422	7	1033	189	4/89
Armament	575		500	181	882		
Aircraft		294					294
Other	19	395	1249	3	488	119	2273

Parts Supply Requested: 8,498  
 Received (Issued): 7,206  
 % of fill: 85%

\*These jobs were completed by contact team personnel from the location given not necessarily accomplished at the location shown in the column heading.

## b. (c) Laundry and Bath

	<u>LOCATIONS SUPPORTING OPERATION</u>			
	<u>PV</u>	<u>QL</u>	<u>LK</u>	<u>T</u>
Number of Showerheads:	0	8	8	16
Number of Washers	2	2	2	6

## c. (U) Graves Registration

	<u>LOCATIONS SUPPORTING OPERATION</u>			
	<u>PV</u>	<u>QL</u>	<u>LK</u>	<u>T</u>
Remains Processed	7	37	82	126

## d. (U) Salvage Collection

	<u>LOCATIONS SUPPORTING OPERATION</u>			
	<u>PV</u>	<u>QL</u>	<u>LK</u>	<u>T</u>
Turn-In Documents Processed	204	163	257	624

## e. (U) EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

Following is a recapitulation of Explosive Ordnance Disposal support provided by the 42nd Ord Det during the operation.

- (a) Number of Incidents - 78  
 (1) HE items destroyed:  
 U. S. - 269  
 V. C. - 40

Small Arms destroyed:  
 U. S. - 8625

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89

100

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**B. TRANSPORTATION:**

**1. Summary of Fixed Wing Aircraft**

Origin	C7A			C123			C130		
	Sort	Pax	Cargo (Lb)	Sort	Pax	Cargo (Lb)	Sort	Pax	Cargo
Di An	537	4435	1,560,000						
Ton Son Nhut	208	1244	780,000	9	0	90,000	263	0	7,643,000
Bien Hoa				7	0	70,000	90	187	5,122,000
Phuoc Vinh	126	2500		2	40	3,900	137	1288	2,559,300
Quan Loi				7	80	53,000	71	1655	1,079,800
Lai Khe	114	2272		2	2	21,500	53	1323	609,000
Loc Ninh							34	1151	594,600
Song Be							23	630	301,700
Phu Loi				15	69	155,700			
Vung Tau				7	0	75,100			
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>985</b>	<b>10,350</b>	<b>2,340,000</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>469,000</b>	<b>671</b>	<b>6,934</b>	<b>18,169,800</b>

**2. Summary of Convoy Operation**

**a. Di An to Lai Khe**

Date	No of Vehicles	No of Units Participating		Control Headquarters
		Div	Non-Div	
29 Sep	43	9	3	Deputy
30	47	7	2	Deputy
1 Oct	47	8	2	Deputy
2	65	9	2	Deputy
3	54	10	3	Deputy
4	39	7	2	Deputy
5	76	11	2	Deputy
6	88	9	2	Deputy
7	76	7	3	Deputy
8	56	7	3	Deputy
9	76	9	2	Deputy
10	71	9	2	Deputy
11	100	7	3	Deputy
12	57	4	4	Deputy
13	31	7	2	Deputy
14	33	5	2	Deputy
15	58	12	3	Deputy
16	62	4	2	Deputy
17	45	9	2	Deputy
18	62	9	3	Deputy
19	84	7	2	Deputy
20	87	6	2	Deputy
21	62	11	3	Deputy
22	69	5	2	Deputy
24	56	9	3	Deputy
25	56	9	2	Deputy
26	60	11	3	Deputy
27	57	10	3	Deputy
28	91	11	2	Deputy
29	62	10	2	Deputy
30	71	8	2	Deputy
31	78	10	2	Deputy
1 Nov	80	12	2	Deputy
2	66	9	2	Deputy
3	73	7	2	Deputy
4	52	5	0	Deputy
5	52	10	1	Deputy
6	45	10	2	Deputy
7	52	8	2	Deputy
8	29	5	2	Deputy
9	34	7	2	Deputy
10	19	7	2	Deputy

10/

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## Di An to Lai Khe Convoy Continue

11 Nov	40	6	3	Deputy
12	42	7	2	Deputy
13	64	9	2	Deputy
14	43	7	3	Deputy
15	81	11	3	Deputy
16	34	7	2	Deputy
17	79	7	2	Deputy
18	34	6	3	Deputy
19	76	3	2	Deputy

## Di An to Quan Loi

3 Nov	455	3	2	Deputy
4	390	3	2	Deputy
5	410	3	2	Deputy
6	393	3	2	Deputy
7	526	3	2	Deputy
8	526	3	2	Deputy
9	460	3	2	Deputy
10	220	2	2	Deputy
11	209	2	2	Deputy
12	133	2	2	Deputy
15	164	1	1	Deputy
16	184	1	1	Deputy
17	95	1	1	Deputy
18	120	1	1	Deputy

## 3. Support Command Convoys.

DATE	FROM - TO	S&T VEHICLES
29 Sep	DA - LK	20
30	DA - LK	8
2 Oct	DA - LK	6
3	DA - LK	11
4	DA - LK	7
5	DA - LK	13
6	DA - LK	12
7	DA - LK	8
9	DA - LK	12
11	DA - LK	17
13	DA - LK	17
15	DA - LK	19
17	DA - LK	12
19	DA - LK	17
20	DA - LK	16
21	DA - LK	18
23	DA - LK	22
24	DA - LK	9
25	DA - LK	17
26	DA - LK	6
27	DA - LK	9
28	DA - LK	10
30	DA - LK	12

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21

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## TRANSPORTATION CONT'D

DATE	FROM - TO	S&T VEHICLES
1 Nov	DA - IK	24
2 Nov	DA - IK	11
3 Nov	DA - QL	47
5 Nov	DA - QL	48
5 Nov	DA - IK	10
7 Nov	DA - IK	8
7 Nov	DA - QL	65
9 Nov	DA - IK	12
11 Nov	DA - IK	14
11 Nov	DA - QL	27
12 Nov	DA - IK	8
13 Nov	DA - IK	4
15 Nov	DA - IK	9
15 Nov	DA - QL	36
17 Nov	DA - QL	10
18 Nov	DA - IK	6
19 Nov	DA - IK	18

### III. (C) LOGISTIC L PROBLEMS

#### A. Items: Repair Parts Shortages:

The 701st Maintenance Battalion continued to experience severe repair parts shortages. Forty per cent of ASL lines were at zero balance. This situation required extensive use of maintenance personnel to expedite repair parts supply and the use of air transportation to get austere supplies to where they were most critically needed. The problem was particularly acute for: Remington Chain Saws, mine detectors, heavy engineer equipment (D7E Dozers), 105 Howitzer sight mounts and recoil mechanism components for the HLC, SP Howitzer. Use of maintenance float for replacement of these items which could not be repaired for lack of parts proved extremely valuable. Initially the extensive use of controlled substitution was necessary to prevent the deadline of critical equipment.

#### B. Items: Deadline Rate of D7E Tractors (Dozers).

DISCUSSION: During a short period eleven D7E's were deadline'd at one time. The entire heavy engineer equipment repairman capability within the battalion plus the loan of three repairmen from Saigon Support Company was required. The excessively high deadline rate is directly attributable to the lack of scheduled maintenance stand-down.

RECOMMENDATION: That a scheduled maintenance stand-down program be implemented so that the 701st and organizational elements can pool maintenance resources to keep the D7E's in a high state of maintenance.

#### C. Items: Inadequate Information:

DISCUSSION: During Operation "SHENANDOAH II" emergency requests for supplies were received many times which could not be filled immediately because of inadequate information concerning item. Generally the information omitted was; exact type of item needed, amount of item needed; where the item was to be shipped; when the item was to be shipped and who would pick up the item at destination. As a result of this inadequate information requests for supplies were delayed hours needlessly, while the needed items were in stock and readily accessible if adequate information had been received.

RECOMMENDATION: That all requests for supplies state exact non-enclosure and FSN when possible, amount, where the item is to be shipped, when the item is needed, and who will receive item at destination. This will eliminate needless delays of badly needed supplies at all levels.

21

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## D. ITEM: MORTUARY REFRIGERATORS:

**DISCUSSION:** During normal graves registration activities of Operation "SHENJIDON II", it was necessary to store human remains overnight at both the Di An Base Camp as well as at forward locations. Usually, receipt of remains of deceased personnel in forward GR REG section occurred late in the afternoon, with processing and identification completed by 2200 hours. Transportation for evacuation of remains became available the following morning. Upon arrival at Di An, the remains were processed further at the Division Collection Point and evacuated to the LHM SOI NHUT mortuary by early afternoon. As a result of this procedure, decomposition had been occurring for approximately 24 hours before the remains were placed under refrigeration.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That mortuary refrigerators, with a capacity of five cadavers be placed at Di An and at each forward GR REG facility. Refrigeration at those points would virtually halt the decomposition process throughout the chain of evacuation, thereby making identification easier and causing less grief to the family of the deceased.

## E. ITEM: INADEQUATE TRANSPORTATION:

**DISCUSSION:** During Operation "SHENJIDON II" many emergency requests were received by the Supply and Transport Battalion. In most instances the item was immediately available but no immediate means of transportation to the field location or base camp was on hand. Delivery was made by waiting until the item could be shipped to the nearest fixed wing air strip or by having the individual who was to receive the item divert a rotary wing re-supply aircraft to Di An to pick it up. In most instances the latter method was used as the unit felt the item could not wait. Therefore a re-supply aircraft which would normally work between the forward base camp and the field location was diverted to be utilized between Di An and a forward base camp or field location. A similar requirement exists when delivering ice cream to field locations, an important morale factor. This requires proper coordination by the unit trains to receive the ice cream, have the re-supply aircraft available for loading at the time of receipt for immediate delivery to the field location. When this is not properly coordinated the unit in the field receives the ice cream in a poor condition. However, when the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion has an aircraft available for delivery of ice cream to field locations the ice cream is assured of arriving in the proper condition and on a regular basis. Another requirement for an immediate responsive means of transportation exists in the Graves Registration Section of the Supply and Transport Battalion. It is always desirable to remove human remains from the forward areas as fast as possible but after proper registration and collection procedures have been followed. Expeditious evacuation of remains should not be dependent upon the availability of aircraft. Yet another requirement appears in the widely dispersed nature of the Supply and Transport Battalion operation throughout the Division area; because of this, each base camp, and many times in field locations as well, requires the commander and his staff and subordinate commanders to exercise supervision and control through continuous personal inspection of those areas. An aircraft must be available for this purpose and to provide the overall system with the flexibility and responsiveness required each day and to meet emergency situations as they arise.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That a UH1D helicopter be made available to the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion on an as required basis.

93

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## IV (C) LESSONS LEARNED:

A. Non-divisional support maintenance cannot provide adequate support as envisioned by the current maintenance support doctrine and organization. The current doctrine has provided TOE's that are designed to repair 80% of equipment within the division and evacuate 20% to non-divisional back-up support units. During Operation "SHENANDOAH II" this was not feasible. Most of the equipment had to be repaired at forward locations since evacuation could only be accomplished by air. Back-up support was only used in the electronics maintenance area and amounted to less than 3% of the maintenance battalion workload. This back-up support was required where the repair was beyond the capability of the division and was only addition to the fact that repair of equipment must be accomplished in the forward areas because of the limitations of air evacuation, another factor forces the division to repair 97% of its workload within the division maintenance battalion. Non-divisional support cannot provide the high degree of responsiveness required by a division in this type war. The average turn-around time for repair and return to units is approximately 3 days when field maintenance is accomplished within the division. The average turn-around time for equipment evacuated to back-up support units varies from 20 days to several months depending on commodity. This situation makes it imperative that the division maintenance battalion repair all equipment for which it has a repair capability. Its TOE must be modified to meet 100 per cent of the division's direct support maintenance requirements.

B. The present repair parts supply system forced the maintenance battalion to use an excessive number of personnel to expedite parts in support levels are required to expedite parts. In addition to the drain of man-power caused by parts expediting, many manhours were inefficiently used substituting parts to keep equipment operational. This doubles the time required to replace any one component, and is an additional drain on man-power during the repair parts system becomes more responding, parts expediting is absolutely essential to the readiness of divisional equipment.

C. The transportation system for supply of repair parts from the depot to the division maintenance battalion was not responsive to the needs of the division. While some non-divisional transportation was available to bring repair parts to the division, the present stockage levels in the battalion necessitated that repair parts be received in the maintenance battalion within 24 hours after they were ready for pickup at the depot. This could only be accomplished by using transportation organic to the maintenance battalion. This further reduced the man-power resources available to the battalion for the accomplishment of its primary mission.

D. The need for a land line of communications for delivery of supplies to a forward supply section was proven once again, when the road to Quan Loi was effectively utilized and air delivery was used only as an alternate delivery means for critical periods during Operation "SHENANDOAH II". On 9 November 1967, the large number of aircraft refueling at the rate of 1,000 gallons per hour at Quan Loi necessitated the immediate delivery of 100,000 gallons of JP-4 at Quan Loi. This larger than normal requirement was shipped by land LOC. If this amount had been delivered by air LOC it would have required approximately 25 aircraft (C-130) and 3 days time to deliver. However, the fuel was delivered in one day by 20 - 5,000 gallons tankers using land LOC. This demonstrated the importance of land LOC to support an operation from a forward location while using air LOC merely as an alternate means of delivery. An additional lesson learned concerning fuel was the desirability of maintaining back-up pumps, particularly JP4 pumps, for use in the event of a breakdown during the height of a massive refueling period such as that mentioned in paragraph A. Loss of a pump at such a critical time would seriously hamper the overall tactical effort.

94

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E. Experience gained during Operation "SHENNDON II" showed that the use of 500 gallon collapsible rubber bladders was the most convenient means of delivering fuel by air to a location other than an established forward supply section. This was due to the ease with which they were relocated as the tactical situation changed.

F. As a minimum, human remains pouches must be aired out once monthly, and carefully inspected at that time. Experience gained during Operation "SHENNDON II" showed that pouches rapidly became unserviceable due to heat and humidity if this practice was not followed. It was also determined that a minimum of 50 human remains pouches should be on hand at each forward supply section. This policy has become standard in the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion.

G. The small two man graves registration section in the Battalion's forward supply section's were frequently unable to handle the large number of casualties that had to be processed at one time during the operation. In order to supplement each forward supply section's assigned graves registration personnel, Graves Registration Action Teams of three men each were formed at Di An. These teams were airlifted into the forward areas where there were ten or more casualties at one time. Their presence greatly facilitated the processing and identification of remains. In keeping with this concept, remains were shipped directly from the forward location to the SON MIUT mortuary, bypassing the Di An GR REG facility. Additional Battalion Graves Registration personnel were sent to the TSN mortuary, where they met incoming remains and completed the processing time by at least one third, and frequently cut the time in half. This shortened time aided greatly in the prevention of decomposition.

H. During Operation "SHENNDON II" a requirement for 2 low bed semi-trailers became apparent. The transportation motor transport company of the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion provided the 1st Infantry Division with evacuation of salvage in the amount of an average of 15 tons per day. This salvage consisted principally of trucks, armored personnel carriers, forklift trucks, front loaders and other heavy, oversized bulky items of equipment. These 2 low bed semi-trailers are also needed to provide often required over-the-road movement of the Battalion's 20 fork-lift trucks to and from the Log Base at Di An, the forward supply section at Quan Loi and Lai Khe base camps, temporary forward supply section, and Bien Hoa Air Base for movement by aircraft.

I. During Operation "SHENNDON II" it was proven once again that the requirement to pick-up supplies in Saigon as well as the haul supplies to forward areas requires additional 1st Supply and Transport Battalion tractors and 12 ton S&T's. One solution to the problem would be to reduce the 1st S&T Bn light truck capability and increase the medium lift capability by replacing 1 light truck cargo squad with a medium truck cargo squad.

# CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

101

SHEA DOAH II

I. (C) CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION

During Operation SHEA DOAH II, units of the 1st Medical Battalion provided division level medical service from their base camps and field locations. Headquarters & Company A, located at Di An, coordinated the medical evacuation helicopters and controlled medical resupply. Company B provided medical support from Lai Khe; Company C provided support from Quan Loi and Di An; Company D supported the operation from their base camp at Phuoc Vinh.

A. GENERAL

The overall concept of the operation was direct and area support to all units involved in the operation. In addition to the above mentioned support, the following was provided.

On 4 October 1967, a physician from Company D, 1st Medical Battalion, replaced the battalion surgeon of the 1/2nd Infantry Battalion due to the latter being KIA.

On 17 October 1967, a "Go Team" from Company D, 1st Medical Battalion provided professional augmentation to the battalion aid station of the 2-28th Infantry Battalion. The "Go Team" returned to its Phuoc Vinh base camp on 18 October 1967.

On 3 November 1967, the remainder of Company C located at Di An, was moved to Quan Loi in direct support of the 1st Brigade.

On 4 November 1967, a "Go Team" from Hq & Company A, was dispatched to Song Be for support of troops in that area. The "Go Team" returned to its Di An base camp on 6 November 1967.

On 7 November 1967, a "Go Team" from Company B, was dispatched to Loc Ninh. The "Go Team" returned to its Lai Khe base camp the same evening.

B. Forward Command Post

The 1st Medical Battalion did not establish a forward command post. Operations were controlled from the battalion headquarters at Di An, and by frequent staff visits.

C. Method of Direct Support and Resupply

Medical resupply to the division was provided from the medical companies at Lai Khe, Phuoc Vinh, Quan Loi, and Division Medical Supply at Di An. Resupply was by air.

CONFIDENTIAL

96

ANNEX I

107  
CONFIDENTIAL

D. General Support and Resupply Sources

The advance platoon of the 32nd Medical Depot provided medical resupply to the division from its location at Long Binh. Patient care was provided by the 24th and 93rd Evacuation Hospitals located at Long Binh. Aeromedical evacuation was provided by the Air Ambulance Company (Prov) at Long Binh, and by the 45th Medical Detachment (Air Ambulance) Long Binh, by locating one standby "Dust Off" at both Quan Loi and Lai Khe.

E. Unit Resupply Concept

Medical resupply to infantry units of the division was by supply point distribution. Units desiring medical supplies brought their requests to the medical companies providing area support. Supplies were issued immediately.

F. Support of Non-Divisional Units - None

G. Major Item Losses - None

II. (C) EXPERIENCE DATA

A. Material and Services

1. Supply

a. Quantities of Supplies Consumed:

Class II & IV	<u>Air Loc</u>	<u>Land Loc</u>	<u>Total</u>
Medical Supplies	6500	0	6500

b. Support to G-5 Activities: N/A

c. Class I Analysis: N/A

d. Class III Analysis: N/A

e. Class II & IV Analysis: No problems encountered.

f. Class V Analysis: N/A

2. Services

a. Maintenance: Maintenance support was provided by Company C, 701st Maintenance Battalion with no problems.

97  
CONFIDENTIAL

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b. Medical:

LOCATIONS SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

<u>PATIENTS TREATED</u>	<u>DI AN</u>	<u>LAI KHE</u>	<u>PHUOC VINH</u>	<u>QUAN LOI</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
IRHA	6	209	41	174	430
KRHA	10	79	7	37	133

B. TRANSPORTATION

1. Fixed Wing - None

2. Rotary Wing - All medical personnel and medical supplies were transported by "Dust Off" R/W aircraft.

3. Convoy Operations - Twenty-four vehicles from Company C, 1st Medical Battalion, located at Di An, were transported via convoy to Quan Loi on 3 November 1967.

4. Support Command Convoys - None

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109

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
Annex A (C) (Schematic of Area Operations and Logistical Unit Development)  
Operation SHENANDOAH II.



"C" Forward



"D" Company



"B" Company



Hq & "A" Company  
"C" Company (-)

ANNEX A to  
ANNEX I

99

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Annex B (C) (Summary of Units Supported by Location)  
Operation SHENANDOAH II




Task Force Dixie



1st Bde



3rd Bde  
Div Fwd  
Div Arty Fwd



2nd Bde  
Support Command

In addition to units listed at various locations, all units of the division were supported by the 1st Medical Battalion either fully or limited.


ANNEX B to  
ANNEX I

CONFIDENTIAL

III

CONFIDENTIAL

Annex C (U) (Schematic of Transportation Routes--Land and Air)  
Operation SHENANDOAH II



LEGEND

AIR - - - -  
LAND - - - -

ANNEX C to  
ANNEX I

101

CONFIDENTIAL

113

## CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS  
121ST SIGNAL BATTALION  
1st Inf Div APO 96345

3 December 1967

..VDB-SI-3

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation Shenandoah II (U)

TO: COMMANDING GENERAL  
1st Infantry Division  
ATTN: AVDB-TT  
APO 96345

1. (U) Name and Type of Operation:

"Shenandoah II", a search and destroy/road clearing operation in War Zone "C".

2. (U) Dates of Operation:

29 September 1967 to 19 November 1967.

3. (U) Location:

War Zone C vicinity.

4. (U) Command Headquarters:

121st Signal Battalion, 1st Infantry Division.

5. (C) Unit Commanders:

LTC Francis J. Sheriff	Battalion Commander
CPT Harvey J. Reynolds	CO, Company A
CPT Peter P. Batrow	CO, Company B
CPT James A. Olivo	CO, Company C
1LT William K. Lain	Plt Ldr, 1st Pwd Sig Plt
1LT William H. Brown	Plt Ldr, 2d Pwd Sig Plt
1LT Kenneth W. Kowacky	Plt Ldr, 3d Pwd Sig Plt

6. (U) Intelligence: No enemy electronic warfare was noted during Operation "Shenandoah II".

7. (U) Mission: Provide radio relay, AM/FM radio, and secure on line teletype to all advance elements of the Division. Provide the three Infantry Brigades with radio relay links into the Division Communications Systems.

8. (C) Concept of Operation: Operation "Shenandoah II" was a search and destroy/road clearing operation to destroy or capture VC/NVA forces and militarily significant installations in the Lai Khe - Quan Loi area.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

102

ANNEX J

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-31-3  
SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation Shenandoah II (U)

a. Company A continued mission to support Division Main at Di An Base Camp and was tasked to provide radio relay, AM, FM radios and secure teletype for Danger Forward at Lai Khe. Danger Main signal center, Di An, was discontinued on 18 October 1967.

b. Company B continued to support Division Artillery at Phu Loi and provide a radio relay link into the Division Communication System for each of the three Brigades.

c. Company C was tasked to continue to support the Division Support Command/Division Rear complex at Di An Base Camp. The company also continued to provide FM retransmission facilities in support of Division operations.

## 9. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Company A supported Division Main and Division Forward, with the following major items of equipment:

Equipment	Quantity	Purpose
AN/MRC-69	8 ea	Provide 120 radio relay channels for Division Main and 72 radio relay channels for Division Forward.
AN/GRC-26	2 ea	Provide AM R/T in Net 1 for Division Main and Division Forward.
SB-611	1 ea	Provide matching and test facilities for radio relay circuits at Danger Forward.
SB-675	1 ea	Provide matching and test facilities for radio relay circuits at Danger Main.
AN/MRC-121	1 ea	Provide FM communication for Division FM nets.
AN/MSC-29	1 ea	Provide secure teletype for Division Forward Comm.
AN/MRC-112	1 ea	Provide 4 radio relay channels to interconnect Pragoon into the Division Comm System.
AN/RTC-1	2 ea	Provide common user telephone service for Division Main and Forward.
AN/MRC-34 1/2	2 ea	Interconnect divisional elements into the Division Comm System. (Loc Minh and Song Be)

b. Company B was given the mission of providing support for Division Artillery, 1st, 2d and 3d Bdes. The company displaced the following personnel and equipment:

(1) 1st Platoon: Supported 1st Bde at their base camp at Phuoc Vinh and Bde Forward at Cassion III and Quan Loi. Major items of equipment:

Equipment	Quantity	Purpose
AN/MRC-34 1/2	1	Provide radio relay link into the Div Comm System from Bde Fwd at Cassion III.
AN/MRC-69	1	Provide radio relay link into Div Comm System from Quan Loi.
AN/MRC-17	1	Provide secure teletype for Bde Fwd.

115

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-SL-3

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation Shenandoah II (U)

(2) 2d Platoon: Supported 2d Bde at their base camp at Lai An and Bde Forward via Hoa Lai (2). Major items of equipment utilized were:

Equipment	Quantity	Purpose
AN/MRC-342	1	Provide radio relay link into the Div Comm System from Bde Fwd.
AN/MGC-17	1	Provide secure teletype for Bde Fwd.
AN/GRC-46	1	Provide RATT station for Bde Fwd in Div Net #1.

(3) 3d Platoon: Supported 3d Bde at their base camp at Lai Khe.

c. Company C continued to support Division Support Command/Division Rear. Major items of equipment utilized were.

Equipment	Quantity	Purpose
AN/MRC-69	3	Provide radio relay link into the Div Comm Systems.
AN/MGC-17	1	Provide secure teletype for Support Comd/Div Rear.
AN/MTC-3	1	Provide common user telephone service for Support Comd/Div Rear.
AN/GRC-26	1	Provide RATT station for Div Snt Comd/Div Rear.

#### 10. (C) Results:

a. The battalion provided simultaneous communications for twelve different elements of the Division.

- (1) Division Main
- (2) Division Forward
- (3) Division Artillery
- (4) Division Support Command/Division Rear
- (5) 1st Bde Rear
- (6) 1st Bde Forward
- (7) 2d Bde Rear
- (8) 2d Bde Forward
- (9) 3d Bde
- (10) 1st Cav TF
- (11) 2nd Sinh TF
- (12) Song Be TF

b. Telephone circuits provided:

(1) Sole user circuits at:

(a) Division Main

9

104

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

116

AVDB-SI-3

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation Shennandoah II (u)

(b) Division Forward	43
(c) Division Artillery	8
(d) Division Fmt Comd/Div Rear	2
(e) 1st Bde Rear	6
(f) 1st Bde Fwd	6
(g) 2d Bde Rear	11
(h) 2d Bde Fwd	6
(i) 3d Bde	3
(j) 1/4 Cav TF	1
(k) Loc Ninh TF	1
(l) Song Bo TF	2

11. (U) Administrative Matters: No major administrative problems were encountered during the operation.

12. (C) Commanders Analysis: During Operation Shennandoah II, the Battalion experienced no unusual communications problems. Sufficient equipment was available to support the Division throughout the entire operation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

3 Incls

- 1 - Radio Relay Diagram
- 2 - Telephone Traffic Diagram
- 3 - HF Radio Diagram


*[Signature]*  
E. EL C. WEEKS  
CPT, SigC  
Adjutant

105

CONFIDENTIAL








Incl 2  
ANNEX J

TELEPHONE TRAFFIC DIAGRAM

119



Incl 3 to  
ANNEX J

HF RADIO DIAGRAM

121

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G5  
APO 96345

AVDB-CA

9 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SHENANDOAH I.

TO: ACofS, G3

The Combat Operation After Action Report for the G5 area of responsibility for Operation SHENANDOAH II is as follows:

1. Date of Operation: 29 September 1967 - 19 November 1967.

2. General: The G5 staff section performed and coordinated the civil affairs and psychological warfare operations elaborated below in support of Operation SHENANDOAH II. The Division was assisted in these efforts by elements of the 246th Psyop Company and the 5th Aerial Commando Squadron. Within the Division, the 1st Engineer Battalion and the 1st Brigade S3 section played key roles in achieving the results elaborated below. It is significant to point out that while the preponderance of Psyop assets of the Big Red One were being utilized in an experimental Chieu Hoi Campaign in southern Binh Duong Province, in coordination with the 25th Infantry Division, U.S. Province Advisors, and CVN personnel, the Division was still capable of providing extensive Psyop support to SHENANDOAH II.

3. Psychological Operations:

During Operation SHENANDOAH II, the Big Red One conducted the greater amount of its psychological warfare operations against the 9th VC Division, which included the 271, 272 and 273rd VC Regiments, as well as elements of the 141 and 165 A NVA Regiments. Operations consisted of leaflet drops, loudspeaker appeals, face-to-face communication, and the introduction of a Chieu Hoi message which was screen painted on cloth. This latter innovation was implemented at the suggestion of COMUSMACV. A total of 600 cloth Chieu Hoi appeals were dropped in Northern Binh Duong Province. Although it is difficult to pinpoint success or failure of a specific psyops mission due to the nature of this form of warfare, it should be noted that no VC/NVA utilized the cloth to attract an aircraft to assist him to rally.

In addition, 7,850,000 standard leaflets were dropped in support of combat operations. These included standard Chieu Hoi appeals, safe conduct passes and themes calculated to lower NVA morale (these themes included: lack of medicine, homesickness, increased air and artillery missions, the inevitable defeat). In addition, special "quick-reaction" leaflets exploiting the battlefield successes of the Big Red One were distributed throughout SHENANDOAH II.

One leaflet of particular interest contained a letter by MG Hay addressed to the commander of the 9th VC Division, in which, the Commanding General of the Big Red One reminded the VC command of their terrible losses incurred at Loc Ninh and challenged them to again commit their forces in a similar manner. 200,000 copies of this leaflet were dropped on the suspected location of the 9th VC Division Headquarters.

Leaflets were augmented by extensive use of aerial loudspeaker broadcasts, which, for the most part, were utilized on a "quick-reaction" basis. A total of 89 hours of aerial broadcasts were used against specific hostile units.

Face to face communication was effected through the use of a special team of "Hoi Chanh" operating with the division which circulated in the battlefield area among the civilian population. This team proved particularly effective when it was used among the refugees and civilian populace immediately after the Loc Ninh Battle.

ANNEX K

109

AVDB-CA


SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation SHENANDOAH II,  
9 Dec 67, Cont-

4. Civic Action/Civil Affairs

Over 50 tons of rice and 800 lbs of salt were captured during this operation. This was evacuated to the G5 warehouse and subsequently redistributed for civic action projects.

The focus of civil affairs action during the operation was in the Loc Ninh-An Loc area. When the VC attacked the subsector compound on 29 October 67, a stream of refugees began moving south towards An Loc. The refugee crisis reached its peak on 3 November 67 at An Loc when approximately 3500 refugees arrived in that area. Of these, approximately 2700 were completely dependent on government support while the others were taken in by relatives and friends. In addition, food shortages resulted when An Loc was cut off from many of the neighboring communities in the area. In some cases, food had been confiscated by the VC.

The greater number of the refugees were concentrated in 4 locations: the Catholic school, the Buddhist temple, and the old and new market place. Various types of food and other assistance were provided by the 1st Infantry Division upon request by province authorities while the refugees were concentrated at An Loc. On 5 November 67 the refugees began moving back to their homes with the assistance of U.S. province officials who coordinated a Caribou airlift.

  
FRANCIS G. GEROY JR  
Major, GS  
ACofS, G5

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST BRIGADE, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96345

AVR-SP-7

8 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (MACV/BCS/J3/321)

THRU: Commanding General  
1st Infantry Division  
APO San Francisco 96345

TO: Commanding General  
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
ATTN: J321  
APO San Francisco 96345

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OPERATION: Operation SHENANDOWH II; search and destroy.
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 290000H Sep 1967 to 192400H Nov 1967.

3. (U) CHRONOLOGY: Control and command headquarters for the operation was 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, Task ORGANIZATION was as shown in OPORD 22-67 (OPERATION SHENANDOWH II). The operation was conducted with the northern limit as LOC KHEM, the southern limit as LOC KHEM; the eastern limit as LOC KHEM; and western limit was the 29th Inf Div area of operations. The plan envisioned by the commander was a one phase operation. That phase was to search and destroy the 271st VC Regiment and its field positions along Highway 13. Initially the 1/2 Inf moved from field location along Highway 13 cross country to establish WDF 177454. 1/28 Inf would air assault into LZ 4542 (17094594). 1/16 Inf would clear and secure Highway 13 in sector. 1/4 Cav (1) would clear and secure Highway 13 in sector, provide convoy escort, and secure FSB's CALSON II and CALSON III.

a. Reporting Officer: Colonel George E. Newman

b. Task Organization:

- (1) 1st Bde, Col George E. Newman
- (2) 1st Bn 2d Inf, LTC Joseph R. Stauffer  
LTC Mortimer L. O'Connor
- (3) 1st Bn, 16th Inf, LTC Calvert F. Benedict
- (4) 1st Bn, 18th Inf, LTC Richard E. Cavazos
- (5) 1st Bn, 26th Inf, LTC Arthur D. Steigel  
LTC Floyd G. Stephenson
- (6) 1st Bn, 28th Inf, LTC James F. Murphy  
LTC James F. Cochran
- (7) 2d Bn, 28th Inf, LTC Terry Allen Jr.  
Maj Louis C. Menetrey
- (8) 1st Sqd, 4th Cav, LTC John A. Seigle
- (9) 2d Bn, 12th Inf, 25th Inf Div, LTC Raphael D. Tice
- (10) 1st Bn, 5th Arty, LTC Joseph V. Britler
- (11) 6th Bn, 15th Arty, LTC Frank E. Scris

4. (U) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence Prior to Operation. There had been numerous reported VC unit sightings in the Brigade AO just prior to the operation. An evaluation of all available intelligence indicated that the 165th NVA Regiment (estimated strength: 1700); the 271st VC Regiment (estimated strength: 1600); the PHU LOI Battalion (estimated strength: 450); C64 DNU TIEG District Company (estimated strength: 80); and C45 CUC. TIANH District Platoon (estimated strength: 30), were probably located in the Brigade AO. This estimate was based on an evaluation of agent reports, bloodhound hot-spots, and returns, Visual Reconnaissance, and other reports from sources of high reliability. The most serious threat to the Brigade was believed to have been the 165th NVA Regiment, the 271st VC Regiment, and the unlocated elements of the 7th NVA Division. These units could be expected to receive combat support from the 69th Artillery Regiment and possibly the 84A Artillery Regiment, and logistical support from the 83rd Group (Rear Service).

ANNEX L

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Group 4

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (HMCV/RCS/J3/321) (CONT'D)

It was estimated that reinforcements would most likely come from the 101st NVA Regiment and the 273rd VC Regiment, both of which could possibly reinforce within 24-48 hours.

b. Enemy Situation During Operation. Evidence accumulated during the early part of the operation confirmed the presence of the Headquarters, 271st VC Regiment in the LONG NGUYEN base area, and established a high probability that the preponderance of its subordinate elements were also located in the same general area. On 2 October 1967 the first POW was captured by the 1-2d Inf. Results of the interrogation of this POW indicated that the PHU LOI Battalion II was based in the southeastern part of the brigade AO. The strength of this unit was determined to have been 300 men, the majority of whom had infiltrated into South Vietnam from North Vietnam. No contact was ever made with the PHU LOI Battalion II during the operation. Enemy documents captured by the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, as a result of enemy contacts on 11 October 1967, confirmed that the 1st and 2d Battalions, 271st VC Regiment were located in the Brigade AO. On 12 October 1967, the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry captured a document which was determined to have been a letter from the Rear Services Office of the 9th VC Division to Headquarters, Group 83 (Rear Services). This letter indicated that since Group 81 (Rear Services) was unable to provide logistical support to the 271st VC Regiment, the regiment was moved into base areas within the LONG NGUYEN Secret Zone in order to receive support from Group 83 (Rear Services). The document also stated that as a result of a lack of food, the physical condition of the 271st VC Regiment had deteriorated. At the time of the capture of this document, only the presence of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 271st VC Regiment in the brigade AO had been verified. However, the contents of this captured document indicated that the entire regiment was most likely located in the area. The move of the 271st VC Regiment to the LONG NGUYEN area also indicated that there were sufficient supplies already stored in this area to support the regiment. The presence of the 271st VC Regiment on the Brigade AO was again confirmed on 27 October 1967, when a POW captured by the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry was determined to have been from the 2d Battalion 271st VC Regiment. This POW stated that prior to 17 October 1967, a 20 man Recon Platoon from the PHU LOI Regiment (probably PHU LOI Battalion II) was attached to the 2d Battalion, 271st VC Regiment to assist in gathering information on US troop movements. During the operation around the LOC NINH - AN LOC area, positive identification was made of the enemy units with whom major contacts were made. The identification of enemy units was greatly facilitated by the capture of 12 POW's and many enemy documents. It was determined that the 273rd and 272nd VC Regiments supported by rocket and AA artillery units participated in the attack on LOC NINH on 29 October and in the other battles which followed. Additionally, evidence indicated that individual filler and possibly small units from the 141st and 165th NVA Regiments assisted the 272nd and 273rd regiments respectively. There was also evidence that the attack was originally planned as a divisional attack by all three regiments of the 9th VC Division, but because of the heavy losses inflicted upon the 271st VC Regiment in the LONG NGUYEN area, a late decision was made to reinforce the 9th VC Division with fillers from two regiments of the 7th NVA Division (141st and 165th).

c. Terrain and Weather. The Brigade AO encompassed all types of terrain common to the III Corps Tactical Zone. The area included all types of vegetation, including rubber plantations, rice paddy areas, and jungle. Observation ranged from poor in the jungles to excellent along roads and across rice paddies and clearings. The heavy vegetation in many areas afforded excellent concealment to units during Search and Destroy operations. During the period of this operation, the Brigade AO was in the Autumn transition season between the southwest and northeast monsoons. There were several days and nights of scattered heavy precipitation which hampered air operations and aerial reconnaissance. Additionally, on several days, early morning fog, which restricted visibility to less than 1 mile, delayed early morning air operations. With the exceptions of these occasional days of restricted weather conditions, the weather had no adverse effects on the Brigade operations.

d. Fortifications. A large number of VC fortifications were located and destroyed by both ground and air actions during this operation. Among these were KQs bunkers, 198 fighting positions, 61 foxholes, 96 prone shelters, 27 tunnels and over 3,600 meters of trench line. Many of the base camps located were newly constructed and extended over large distances. Some bunkers had overhead cover constructed of heavy logs and covered with mounds of dirt. The majority of the fortifications found were located in the thick jungle areas away from the main roads. A large majority of the fortifications located were destroyed by air strikes.

125

AVDB-SP-T

8 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (MACV/RCS/J3/321) (CONT'D)

Those destroyed by ground forces were destroyed by demolitions. Every effort was made to destroy or render unusable all fortifications found in the Brigade AO.

e. Civil Affairs. During the initial phases of OPERATION SHENANDOAH II there were very few civilians in the AO. Not until the action in the LOC NINH vicinity did the civilian populace enter the picture. The prolonged fighting in LOC NINH and the surrounding areas resulted in over 5,000 refugees moving out of the area to the South. The vast majority of these personnel were placed in temporary facilities at AN LOC. Close cooperation between COMUSMACV advisor personnel, Province Officials, and 1st Infantry Division representatives resulted in adequate care and handling of these personnel. Refugees appeared to greatly appreciate GVN and US efforts to help them, and most of them blamed VC/NVA forces for the existing situation. In the meantime Brigade elements conducted a MEDCAP in LOC NINH. The local District Chief said that it was the best thing to happen to the town since the battle began, and it seemed to instill confidence in the remaining villagers. After the fighting ended down the river refugees began to leave AN LOC. All but a few moved back to their homes in the LOC NINH vicinity, while the remainder moved South, apparently to the Saigon vicinity. At the present time the civilian population in this area, while remaining more or less neutral, is extremely critical of GVN forces, and if forced to choose between the VC or the GVN it is questionable whom they would choose. On the other hand, for the most part they seem quite receptive to US forces, and seem to feel that we are trying to help them. Vietnamese Information Service and ARVN psychological operations personnel are in the process of trying to project a better GVN image to the people, however they have a difficult task facing them.

5. (C) MISSION: 1st Bde, commences OPERATION SHENANDOAH II 290600H Sep to search out and destroy the 271st Viet Cong Regiment and other guerilla forces in assigned sector, conducts security operation at PHUOC VINH, and continues over-watch of SF/CIDG operation within Bde TAOI.

6. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: Bde assumes OPCON of forces deployed along Highway 13 between LAI KHE and CHON THANH. 1-2 Inf conducts search and destroy Ops to the West in AO Mike. 1-16 Inf clears and secures Highway 13 in sector. 1-26 Inf secures PHUOC VINH. 1-28 Inf Air Assaults into LZ APPLE (XT698594) and conducts search and destroy Ops to the Southeast within AO PAT. 1-4 Cav (-) clears and secures Highway 13 in sector, provides convoy escort and secures FSPB's CAISSON II and CAISSON III. Two tactical air strikes, a 28 minute artillery preparation and a 2 minute gunship preparation precedes the assault landing.

7. (C) EXECUTION: OPERATION SHENANDOAH II was initiated on 290800 Sep, when the 1-2 Inf moved cross country from field location to establish NDP XT7454.

29 Sep (1) 1/2 Inf: The Bn (-) moved by foot West from their field location and established an NDP vic XT736340. C/1-2 Inf moved cross country from field location along Highway 13 and married up with the Bn (-) at the new NDP.

(2) 1/28 Inf: The Bn (-) moved by R/H from PHUOC VINH to CHON THANH and then by foot vic XT708585 and established an NDP. Change in operation due to weather.

(3) 1/16 Inf: The Bn (-) cleared and secured Highway 13 between LAI KHE and BAU BANG. After closing the road, the Bn moved by foot to LAI KHE and became OPCON 3d Bde upon closure.

(4) A/2-2 Inf (Mech): The Co became OPCON 1st Bde 0700H. The company provided security at FSPB's CAISSON II and III, cleared and secured Highway 13 in sector and provided convoy escort as required under control of 1-4 Cav (-).

(5) 1-4 Cav (-): The squadron (-) became OPCON 1st Bde at 0700H, provided security at FSPB's CAISSON II and III, cleared and secured Highway 13 in sector, and provided convoy escort.

(6) 1/26 Inf: The Bn provided security for PHUOC VINH.

(7) 1/5 Arty: The Bn provided support for the Bde Ops.

H3-



SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (MACV/RCS/J3/321) (CONT'D)

30 Sep

- (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and secured NDP.
- (2) 1/28 Inf (-): The Bn conducted a search and destroy operations and secured NDP.
- (3) 1-4 Cav (-) + A/2-2 Inf (Mech): The Squadron (-) with attached Co of 2-2 Inf (Mech) continued security mission FSPB's CAISSON II and III and conducted limited search and destroy operation West of CAISSON III.
- (4) 1/18 Inf (-): The Bn moved N/W to PHUOC VINH and became OPCON 1st Bde upon closure.
- (5) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support Bde operations.
- (6) 1st Bde CP: The 1st Bde moved by N/W to FSPB CAISSON III and established a forward CP.

1 Oct

- (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and secured NDP. At 1040H, Co B had 2 claymore mines detonated against them resulting in 2 (two) US slightly wounded. Return fire was placed into the area of contact with unknown results.
- (2) 1/28 Inf (-): The Bn continued search and destroy operations and secured NDP.
- (3) 1-4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) with attached Co from 2/2 Inf (Mech) continued road operations between Check Point 89 and Dragon Bridge (KT765-729). Two anti-tank mines were located.
- (4) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support Bde operations.

2 Oct

- (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The Bde (-) moved by foot to a new NDP vic XT7155-30 and conducted local search and destroy patrols. At 0955 vic XT735531, Co C fired A/W at movement. At 1105, Co B found 2 VC (1 KHA, 1 WHA) in the vic Co C fired at movement. At the same location, 2 AK-47 were found. The wounded VC was evacuated to Lai KHE.
- (2) 1/28 Inf (-): The Bn (-) moved by foot to a new NDP vic XT72-158 and conducted local search and destroy patrols.
- (3) 1-4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-), plus Co A/2-2 Inf (Mech), continued to secure FSPB's CAISSON II and III and conducted local security patrols.
- (4) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

3 Oct

- (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and secured NDP.
- (2) 1/28 Inf (-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and secured NDP.
- (3) 1-4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-), plus Co A/2-2 Inf (Mech), continued local patrolling operations and continued security of FSPB's CAISSON II and III.
- (4) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

4 Oct

- (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted security operations vic NDP and conducted search and destroy operation to the West of the NDP. At 0730, the Recon platoon made contact with an undetermined size enemy force vic XT712537. Co C was moved into a supporting position and also became heavily engaged. Contact was broken at 1100H. A/S, artillery, and LFT's were placed into area of contact to LDF. US forces sustained 4 KHA and 26 WHA. Enemy losses were 12 KHA and 3 WHA.
- (2) 1/28 Inf: The Bn (-) conducted security operations vic NDP and conducted search and destroy to the Northwest. During the day's operation the Bn located a fresh base camp vic XT720577. Air was placed on the base camp with unknown results.
- (3) 1-4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-), plus Co A/2-2 Inf (Mech), conducted security operations vic FSPB's CAISSON II and III and local patrolling.
- (4) 1/18 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted an airborne move from PHUOC VINH to CHON THANH. From CHON THANH the Bn executed an assault landing into an LZ vic XT835532. No contact was made by the Bn, however during LZ operation, 11 VC were killed as a result of gunship activity and 19 VC killed by artillery.
- (5) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

5 Oct

- (1) 1/2 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operations in sector. At 1007H vic XT713543 the Recon platoon executed an ambush killing 2 VC. Contact was broken at 1030H with no friendly casualties.
- (2) 1/18 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and security of NDP. At 1125H vic XT683545 Co C located and destroyed a base camp. The base camp contained 28 bunkers; trench lines; 2 wells; and tunnels. At 1500H vic XT694593, Co C made contact with a VC squad size element resulting in one (1) US KIA; VC losses unknown.

1141-



127

CONFIDENTIAL

3 December 1967

A/DB-SP-T

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (MACV/AS/J3/321) (CONT'D)

(3) 1/28 Inf(-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and security of NDA. At 1135H vic XT720575 the Recon platoon made contact with a VC squad size element. Arty supported the contact which resulted in 3 (three) VC KIA. No US losses were reported.

(4) 1-4 Cav(-): The Squadron(-) continued R&D at CAISSON II and III. At 1330H C/2-28 Inf became OPCON to the squadron. At 1330H C/2-28 Inf moved by R/A to a secured LZ vic XT732540. Btry A, 1/5 Arty and Btry A 2-33 were lifted by R/A from CAISSON IV and III respectively to LZ vic XT732540 (CAISSON V).

6 Oct: (1) 1/2 Inf(-): The Bn(-) conducted search and destroy operations to the North of their RDE, with 2 (two) company size elements.

(2) 1/18 Inf(-): The Bn(-) conducted search and destroy operations North and South of the RDE. At 1436H, 5 (five) 4.2 inch mortar rounds were received in the Southern sector of the RDE. There were no casualties. Counter mortar fire and air strikes were directed into vic XT655630 with unknown results. At 1859H a Co B ambush patrol made contact with a platoon size VC force within 250 meters of an RDE. The patrol withdrew to the RDE. Results of contact were 2 KIA and 1 KIA. At this time Co B's portion of the perimeter came under mortar attack. Co C and Co D ambush patrols were returned to RDE. Co C ambush patrol made contact returning to the perimeter. At 2130H Co C (Northern portion of RDE) received close range VC fire. Artillery was adjusted. At 2200H Co D (Southern portion of the perimeter) began receiving small arms and mortar fire. Consequently a heavy ground attack was launched against Co D. After close in fire fighting, finally repulsed the enemy. All contact was over at 2345H. Results of contact were 3 US KIA and 4 US KIA. VC losses were 50 AM and a large number of weapons.

(3) 1/28 Inf(-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operations with 2 companies patrolling South of the RDE. At 1010H Co D made contact with 1 (one) VC vic XT722376 resulting in no US casualties and unknown enemy losses. At 1240H, Co D located 2 VC in bunkers vic XT712540. An air strike was directed on these coordinates resulting in 1 bunker and 6 (eight) military structures destroyed.

(4) 1/4 Cav(-): The Squadron(-) continued security operations at CAISSON III and V and conducted local search and destroy operations in sector.

(5) 1-5 Arty(-): The Bn(-) continued to support 1st Bde operations.

7 Oct  
VENH.

(1) 1/2 Inf(-): The Bn moved from their field locations to PHUOC

(2) 1/23 Inf(-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and secured RDE.

(3) 1/18 Inf(-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and security of RDE. At 1000H vic XT652538 Co C located and destroyed 25 prone shelters. At 1014H vic XT690541 Co C received S/A and A/A fire. Fire was returned, Co C moved back and adjusted Arty fires. There were negative US casualties and unknown VC casualties. At 1015 vic XT694552, Co D received heavy S/A fire. Fire was returned and Arty adjusted on located contact. The results of contact were unknown VC losses and no active US losses.

(4) 2/28 Inf(-): The Bn conducted a R/A move to CHON THINH and A/A into field location vic XT697590.

(5) 1/4 Cav(-): The Squadron(-) conducted security of F&B's CAISSON III and V, local patrolling in sector and secured CHON THINH airstrip for 2/28 In.

(6) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

8 Oct

(1) 1/18 Inf(-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operations plus RDE security.

(2) 1/28 Inf(-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operations plus RDE security.

(3) 1/4 Cav(-): The Squadron(-) conducted security of F&B's CAISSON III and V and local patrolling in sector.

(4) 2/28 Inf(-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operations plus RDE security.

(5) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

145-

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (MACV/AR 33/321) (CONT'D)

9 Oct (1) 1/10 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operations plus NDP security. At 2115H vic XT096545 Co B shot 2 VC out of trees. At that time, Co B began receiving small arms and A/W fire. As Co B withdrew, VC forces maneuvered to the front and flanks. Air and artillery was employed against VC elements. A VC attack formed on Co B left (west) flank, LFT were employed against the mounting attack. The VC made human wave assaults against Co B left flank. Co D was in position and fought off the VC at ranges down to within ten meters. Heavy air and artillery barrages were placed on the area. Result of contact were 22 VC KIA and numerous weapons. An estimated 40 VC were killed by air and artillery.

(2) 1/23 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and security of NDP.

(3) 2/28 Inf (-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and security of NDP. At 1225H vic XT065515 Companies B and D received heavy S/A and A/W fire. Arty and A/S were placed in the area of contact. Results of the contact were 4 VC KIA, 6 US KIA and one ARVN guide KIA.

(4) 1/4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) conducted security of FSB's CAISSON III and V, conducted local patrolling and conducted Reconn to the East along Highway #302.

(5) 1/5 Arty: The Battalion continued to support 1st Bde operations.

10 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf: The Bn conducted A/W into LZ vic XT055509 and secured NDP.

(2) 1/13 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy in sector and secured NDP. At 1045H vic XT096542 the Recon Platoon located and dug up three graves containing 3 VC. These bodies were believed to be the bodies of 3 VC killed in the previous night attack on Bn NDP. At 1130H Co D received heavy A/W fire. Tac Air and A/T were placed in the area of contact. Result of the contact were 1 (one) US KIA and unknown VC losses.

(3) 1/28 Inf: The Bn conducted a combat extraction from NDP/FZ vic 707587 to PHUOC VINH.

(4) 2/28 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operations in sector and secured NDP. At 0725, 2 CHICOM claymores were fired into NDP. The Recon Platoon's ambush patrol was near the claymores at the time of firing but suffered no cas. At 1305 and 1432 vic XT065559 Co A located 50 lbs of rice and fish, 12 bunkers, bloody clothing, 100-20 calories, 2 CHICOM grenades, 2 (two) 40mm rockets and fresh trails leading out of the area of the find. All items of equipment were returned to Bn NDP.

(5) 1/4 Cav: The Squadron (-) conducted security of FSB's, CAISSON III and V, conducted local patrolling in sector, and route Recon along Hwy #13 and #302. At 1234H vic XT731520, Co A 6/27 Inf located and destroyed 4 cans of oil and 4 fighting positions.

(6) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

11 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and NDP security. At 0700H vic XT028511, C Co located 3 fresh VC bodies. At 0803 vic XT641512, Co C located and destroyed 6 T-shaped bunkers with overhead cover. At 1125H vic XT644508, Co D located and destroyed 3 bunkers. At 1630H vic XT644500, Co D located and destroyed 5 large bunkers, messing area, a 105 booby trap, a CBU booby trap, 1 tunnel, and 1 water well.

(2) 1/18 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operation and NDP security. At 1008H vic XT700852, Co B and Co D received heavy S/A and A/W fire from ground and tree locations. The companies returned S/A and A/W in the area of contact. Arty and A/S were also placed in the area of contact. Results of the contact were 2 VC KIA, 1 US KIA and 1 US KIA. Both companies reported VC were NVA. At 1420H vic XT700551 Co B and Co D located 1 VC body and 1 AK-47. At 1530H vic XT700555 Co B and Co D received S/A fire. Fire was returned by the companies S/A, A/W and the Arty. Result of contact was neg. At 1457H vic XT699552, Co D received S/A fire. Arty and A/S were placed in the area of contact. Result of the contact was 1 US KIA and neg VC losses.

(3) 2/28 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and NDP security. At 1130H vic XT635554, Co B and Co D located a large base camp. The items located and destroyed in the base camp were 3 tables, 10 bunkers, and poncho hooches. At 1505H vic XT664553 Co B and Co D located and destroyed one military structure and 3 water containers. At 1605H vic XT661555 Co B and Co D located and destroyed 20 bunkers, 3 large bundles of clothing and 1 large medical area. Medical area had been used within 48 hours. During the search of the Base Camp, 2 VC were taken under fire by Co D. Result of the contact was 1 AK-47 recovered.

(4) 1/4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) conducted local patrolling in sector and security of FSB's CAISSON III and CAISSON V.

(5) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

CONFIDENTIAL 114

SUBJECT: Combat after the report (MACV/ACS/J3/321) CONT'D)

12 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf: The bn conducted search and destroy operations to the East of NDI. At 1120H vic AT024508 the Recon platoon located and took under fire 2 VC. Results of contact were neg US losses and neg VC losses. At 1320H vic AT037502 Co D located and destroyed 4 bunkers, 1 military structure, 25 ft long and 5 ft wide, 2 "I" shaped military structures, and 1 tunnel underneath. At 1425 vic AT037502 Co D located and returned to their NDI 100 rounds of AK-47 and 51bs of rice.

(2) 1/18 Inf: The bn conducted search and destroy operations and NDI security. At 1000H vic AT705540 Co D located and destroyed 30 prone shelters believed dug the night before, and 4 VC bodies. At 1415H vic AT98555 the bn (-) located and destroyed 1 command bunker, 30 ft wide, 8 ft long. The command bunker had 3 small security holes dug around it. At 1532H vic AT091555 the Recon platoon located and destroyed 7 prone shelter and 3 spider holes.

(3) 2/23 Inf: The bn conducted search and destroy operation and NDI security. At 0910H vic AT000550 Co D located and destroyed a trench line and shelter which was large enough to house 25 VC. At 1050H vic AT604554 located and destroyed 50 living type bunkers. At 1105H vic AT000553 Co D located and destroyed 1 military structure containing medical supplies. The medical supplies were returned to the bn NDI. At 1217H vic AT068552 Co D made contact with an unknown size VC sniper element. S/A fire was returned in addition to arty fires and A/S in area of contact. Result of the contact were neg US losses and neg VC losses. At 1400 vic AT070549, Co D received incoming small arms fire. Fire was returned by S/A and arty was placed in the area of contact. Result of the contact were VC losses unk, 1 AK-47, and US losses neg. At 1458H vic AT072549 Co D received S/A fire. Fires were returned with S/A and arty. Result of the contact were US losses neg and VC losses unk.

(4) 1/4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) conducted FSB's security at CAISSON III and V, and conducted local patrolling operations in sector.

(5) 1/5 Arty: The bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

13 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf: The bn conducted search and destroy operations and NDI security. At 1040H vic AT040499 Co B located and destroyed or returned to the bn NDI, documents, 5 lbs of fish and rice, 1 bunker 14 ft long, 2-2 man holes, 1 tunnel, 5 chickens, 2 pigs, 4 bunks, and 1 military structure. At 1455H vic AT755520, Co A located 5 cans of C-rations. At 1500H vic AT620508, Co A located and returned to the bn NDI 350 rounds of 7.65 ammo and playing cards. At 2000H vic AT027512 Co C's ambush patrol was triggered. 2 VC were seen moving Southwest, 12 claymores were blown S/A were fired and mortar fire was placed in the area of contact. Results of the contact 1 VC body count, 1 AK-47, documents, and neg US losses.

(2) 1/28 Inf: The bn conducted a H/A relief in place, secured NDI, and conducted local security patrolling. At 1456H vic AT094537 Co B located and destroyed 5 foxholes, 2 ft x 2 ft, and 1 large command bunker.

(3) 2/23 Inf: The bn conducted search and destroy operations, and NDI security. At 1500H vic AT001551 Co C located 1 body (VC) in a hole. At 1528H vic AT021551, Co D located 1 VC body in a hole.

(4) 1/4 Cav: The Squadron (-) conducted security operations at FSB's CAISSON III and V, conducted local patrolling in sector, and secured CHON Thinh airstrip. At 1210H vic AT775553 Co C patrol located and destroyed 1 under water bridge. At 1518H vic AT735530, Co D local patrol located and destroyed 1-105 round and five (5) gal cans of oil.

(5) 1/5 Arty: The bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

14 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf: The bn conducted search and destroy operations to the Northeast and NDI security.

(2) 1/28 Inf: The bn conducted search and destroy operation and NDI security. At 1215H vic AT087533 Co D made contact with an unknown size VC element. Arty, mortars, and A/S were employed against the enemy. Result of the contact were unknown VC losses and 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA.

(3) 2/28 Inf: The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation plus NDI security.

(4) 1/4 Cav: The Squadron (-) conducted security operation at FSB's CAISSON III and CAISSON V and conducted local patrolling in sector.

(5) 1/5 Arty: The bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

15 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The bn moved by foot to new NDI vic AT642526 at 1752. At 1140H vic AT037518, Co B located and destroyed or returned to NDI 1 military structure 40' x 10', 1 bag of rice, various documents, entrenching tools and dry rack. At 1356H vic AT041525, Co B engaged 3 VC, wounding 1 who later died. Wounded VC had in possession 1 AK-47. At 1621H local security elements vic new NDI located a large quantity of rice which was moved by R/W to LAI KHE.

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (1-04/MS/J3/321) (CONT'D)

15 Oct (2) 1/28 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted security of the rd and search and destroy operation in sector. At 1030H vic AT095555, Co A made contact with an unknown size VC force. Small arms and arty fire were placed in the area of contact. Results of contact 2 VC KIA and 1 US KIA.

(3) 2/23 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operations in sector and NDF security. At 1428H, vic AT083578, Co B located, destroyed or returned to NDF a base camp containing 1 bunker, 3 packs, 1 M16 round, 24 blasting caps, assorted documents, 7 uniforms, and 2 bottles of pills.

(4) 1/4 Cav (-) + 1/2 Inf + A/2-2: The Squadron (-) plus attached Inf companies conducted security Ops vic CAISSON III and CAISSON V.

(5) 1/5 Arty: The bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

16 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation and NDF security. At 1525H vic AT043523, Co B located and destroyed a mound of loose, unpolished rice. The cache was 12' x 12' x 4'. At 1555H vic AT042523, Co B located and destroyed a rice cache 12' x 12' x 4'.

(2) 1/28 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation and NDF security.

(3) 2/28 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation and NDF security. At 1219H, vic AT099570 Co D made contact with an unknown size enemy force. Arty and A/S were placed in the area of contact. Result of contact was 1 US KIA and unknown VC losses. At 1245H, vic AT099570 Co D clover leafed the area of contact and was taken under fire again. Arty and A/S were placed in the area of contact. Results of contact were 1 US KIA and 9 US KIA VC losses, 17 KIA and 4 KIA (probable).

(4) 1-4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) plus attachments conducted security operation at FORD's at CAISSON III and CAISSON V.

(5) 2-2 Inf (Mech): The bn became COM 1st Bde at 1603H. The bn conducted security operations FORD's LORRAINE II and conducted local patrolling in sector.

17 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operations and NDF security.

(2) 1/28 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation and NDF security.

(3) 2/23 Inf: The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation plus NDF security. At 0600 the bn departed the rd with Co A in the lead, followed by CP group, and Co B. At 0950H Co A point element located a trail running Southeast - Northwest at vic AT030570 covered with freshly made foot prints. Heavy movement was reported by the Co A point element. Contact was made at 1015H by Co A at vic AT030570. At 1020, Co C received sniper fire from the trees. At this point a heavy fight began to develop. Close artillery support was called in by respective artillery FO's. At 1030 heavy casualties were reported being received by the command group. At 1035 the command group came under heavy fire from S/A, A/H, claymores, M79's, and M16's. The bn Cntr, Bn S-2, Bn SGN, both ATO's and Company Commanders of both Co A and Co B were casualties. As the contact continued Co A continued to pull back for close air support. At 1100 the first A/S was placed in and at 1120H the second A/S was placed in with contact breaking. At 1135H contact was again made by Co's A and B at 1145H sniper fire was being received in the NDF. At 1200H the Brigade Commander assumed command of the Bn (-) with the assistant Division Commander assuming command of the 1st Bde. At 1211H Co B 1/16 was put on strip alert, at LAI KHE. At 1325H Co C securing CAISSON V (AT305540) was inserted into Bn NDF to reinforce, Co B moved south from NDF to secure the casualty evacuation point. Sporadic enemy fire continued throughout the afternoon. At 1515H the Recon platoon located 30-40 wounded or dead US soldiers from both companies and the command group. The Bde S-3 was among the KIA at the casualty evacuation point. At 1545H Co D 1/16 was moved from LAI KHE to the 2/23 NDF as additional reinforcements. At 1615H dustoff aircraft, LFT, and 1st A/H Bn Co's aircraft, received ground fire causing 2 KIA including an CO. At approximately 1930H evacuation of KIA was terminated, and all elements closed NDF at 2000H. The following day the remainder of the US KIA were evacuated. The bn (-) was then extracted to LAI KHE. The 1/16 Inf secured the NDF during and after the 2/23 Inf extraction. Results of the meeting engagement were 52 US KIA, 2 US KIA, 72 US KIA. VC casualties were 103 KIA (DC) and 61 VC KIA (possible).

(4) 2/2 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted FSI 3 security at LORRAINE II and conducted local patrolling in sector. At 1503, vic AT075435, Co C drew sniper fire. Arty and A/S were placed in the area of contact. Result of contact were US losses 1 KIA, VC losses were unknown.

131

Subject: Combat after action report (LTCV/20/32/321) (CONT'D)

**17 Oct** (5) 1/4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) with attached Inf companies conducted security of FSB's CAISSON III and CAISSON V and local patrolling.  
(6) 1/5 Arty: The bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

**18 Oct** (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted a combat extraction from field positions to HUNG VINH by R/A.  
(2) 1/16 Inf (-): The bn (-) inserted into field positions occupied by 2/28 Inf. Relief was completed at 0915H. The bn (-) conducted local security patrolling in sector.  
(3) 1/28 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation and NDI security.

(4) 2/2 Inf (-) (Mech): The bn (-) conducted security operations at FSB LORCAINE II and local patrolling in sector.  
(5) 2/28 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted casualty evacuation and extracted from field positions after conducting a relief in place with 1-16 Inf. At 1432H Bn closed L.I KHE and became OICOM 3d Bde.  
(6) 1/4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) plus attached Infantry companies conducted security operations via CAISSON III and CAISSON V and local patrolling in sector.

(7) 1/5 Arty: The bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

**19 Oct** (1) 1/16 Inf (-): The bn conducted local search and destroy operations and NDI security. At 1500H, via NDF, Co D made contact with unknown size VC unit. Arty and mortars were placed in the area of contact. Result of the contact was 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA. VC losses unknown.

(2) 1/28 Inf: The bn conducted a combat extraction from NDI to CHON THANH by 1125. After completion a B-52 strike was placed near NDF. Upon completion of B-52 strike the bn was reinserted into NDI. The bn then conducted NDI security and local patrolling activities.

(3) 2/2 Inf (Mech) (-): The bn conducted search and destroy operation and FSB security at LORCAINE II.

(4) 1/4 Cav: The Squadron (-) plus attached Infantry companies conducted FSB security at CAISSON III and CAISSON V and local patrolling operation in sector.

(5) 1/5 Arty: The bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

**20 Oct** (1) 1/16 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation and NDI security. At 0950H, at AT686576, 5 VC bodies were located and buried.

(2) 1/28 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation and NDI security.

(3) 2/2 Inf (Mech) (-): The bn (-) conducted security for FSB at LORCAINE II and local patrolling in sector.

(4) 1/4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) plus attached Infantry companies conducted security operation at FSB's CAISSON III and CAISSON V.

(5) 1/5 Arty: The bn continued to support 1st Bde operation.

**21 Oct** (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The bn conducted a R/A move from HUNG VINH to CHON THANH commencing at 1052H and closed at 1159H. From CHON THANH, the bn R/A by R/A to field positions via 634503.

(2) 1/16 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted a combat extraction from field position and moved to joint NDI with 1/28 Inf via AT692550 closing at 1635H.

(3) 1/28 Inf: The bn (-) moved to new joint FDF via AT692550 closing at 1330H and secured the LZ for 1/16 insertion.

(4) 2/2 Inf (Mech) (-): The bn (-) conducted security operation and local patrolling via FSB LORCAINE II. At 1300, 2 AIC rounds were received in the NDI resulting in 1 AIC slightly damaged. Results were neg US casualties and unknown VC losses. At 1537H Co C received NDF fire from South side of NDI resulting in 1 US WIA.

(5) 1/4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) with attached Inf companies conducted security and patrolling operation via CAISSON III and CAISSON V.

(6) 1/5 Arty: The bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

**22 Oct** (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation and NDI security.

(2) 1/16 Inf (-) + 1/28 Inf (-): The bn's conducted search and destroy operations and NDI security from joint NDI. At 0945H via AT95553 Co B 1/16 located a tunnel complex and observed a VC running into bunker. A grenade was thrown into the bunker resulting in 1 VC KIA. Documents were found on VC's body and returned to NDF. At 1052H same vicinity Co B 1/16 located and destroyed 6 AT mines.

CONFIDENTIAL  
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SUBJECT: Combat after action report (LTC/AS/33/321) (Cont'd)

22 Oct (3) 2/2 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted security and patrolling operation via LOANH TX. At 1014H via AT62472 Co B A/C hit an mine with a grenade and no casualties. At 1210H via AT624725 Co B A/C hit an AT mine resulting in 3 US ML and slight damage to the vehicle.

(4) 1/4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) plus attached Infantry companies conducted security operations via FSB's CAISSON III and CAISSON V.

(5) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

23 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operation plus MDI security.

(2) 1/16 Inf (-) and 1/28 Inf (-): The Bn's conducted search and destroy operation plus MDI security. The 1/28 Inf located and destroyed a salt cache, 250-100 lb bags of salt at XT679520.

(3) 2/2 Inf (Mech) (-): The Bn (-) reverted to 3d Bde of COM at 0700H.

(4) 1/4 Cav (-): The Cav (-) with attached Infantry companies conducted security at FSB CAISSON III and CAISSON V.

(5) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operation.

24 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): Bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation plus MDI security. At 0930H, via XT628519, the Bn (-) located and destroyed a rice cache of unpolished rice 12' x 12' x 4'. At 1000H, the Bn (-) located and destroyed a 13 1/2 ton salt cache via XT628516.

(2) 1/16 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation and security. At 1101H, via XT710544, Co A located and destroyed 34-60mm mortar rns.

(3) 1/28 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation plus MDI security. At 0925H via XT632531, the Bn (-) located 600lbs of salt in a cache, which was destroyed. At 1130H, in same vic the Bn (-) located a cache of ordnance. Included in the find were 78 AG's, 24-120mm mortar rounds, 5-120mm rockets and 2-120mm rocket warheads. All items were evacuated. Also located in the same vic were 21-60mm mortar rounds and 25-60mm mortar rounds.

(4) 1/4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) plus attached Infantry companies conducted security operation via FSB's CAISSON III and CAISSON V.

(5) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operation.

25 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted search and destroy operations plus MDI security. At 1244H via XT631512, the Recon Platoon took 1 VC under fire with S/A, A/A and arty fire with unknown results. At 1425H, via XT635522, Co A located and destroyed 10 tons of unpolished rice.

(2) 1/16 Inf (-): The Bn moved by foot to new MDI via XT654430.

(3) 1/28 Inf: The Bn moved by foot to new MDI via XT654430.

(4) 1/4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) with attached Infantry companies conducted security and local patrolling operations at FSB's CAISSON III and CAISSON V. At 0830, via XT792531, Co A 2/2 Inf A/C hit an AT mine resulting in slight damage to A/C and 2 AG's. Size of the mine was from 30-50 lb TNT.

(5) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

26 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted search and destroy operations plus MDI security. At 1145H via XT627523, Co B located a recently used base camp. Located in the base camp were assorted documents, a billfold with pictures, 7 bunkers, fresh VC body in a grave, and a mess hall. At 1250H, Co B, via XT628528, located destroyed 11 bicycles and 3 pairs of black pajamas. At 1407H via XT672-527, Co B located and destroyed 2 AG's and evacuated 1 AG and clowning rod.

(2) 1/16 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation plus MDI security.

(3) 1/28 Inf (-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operation plus MDI security. At 1350H via XT635522, the Bn (-) located 3 rice caches totaling 70 tons. Later in the same location the Bn located 3 additional caches.

(4) 1/4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) conducted security and local patrolling via CAISSON III and CAISSON V.

(5) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

27 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The Bn (-) continued search and destroy operation plus MDI security. At 1100H, via XT638515, Co A located a classroom with an NVA flag, assorted documents, and a blackboard with tactical markings on it. All items were evacuated. At 1219H via XT638579, Co D located and destroyed 1100 lbs of rice.

(2) 1/16 Inf (-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operation plus MDI security.

CONFIDENTIAL



133

AVDB-31-T

CONFIDENTIAL

8 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat after Action Report (RACV/RCW/33/321) (FID)

27 Oct At 0910H, vic XT093566, 1 VC was captured by Co D and returned to the MR. The VC had 2 hand grenades. At 0935H, vic XT094570, Co A located and destroyed 8-M-16 magazines with ammo, 400 M47 rounds, and 49 grenades.

(3) 1/28 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted search and destroy operations. The Bn (-) returned to the rice cache that was found by the unit 26 Oct. The Bn (-) extracted an estimated 14 tons of rice.

(4) 1/4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) with attached Inf companies conducted security and local patrolling operation vic FSB's CAISSON III and CAISSON V.

(5) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to conduct support for 1st Bde operations.

28 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted a combat extraction from field position commencing at 0905H and closing THUC VINH at 1100H.

(2) 1/10 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation plus MR security.

(3) 1/28 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation plus MR security and rice extraction. The Bn (-) extracted 30 tons of rice and 2 tons of salt in CM47's to LAL KHE.

(4) 1/4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) plus attached Inf companies conducted security and patrolling at FSB's CAISSON III and CAISSON V.

(5) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

29 Oct (1) 1/16 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted a combat extraction from field location to LAL KHE and reverted to OICOM 3d Bde upon closure.

(2) 1/28 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted a combat extraction from field positions to LAL KHE reverting to 3d Bde upon closure.

(3) 1/4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) plus attached Inf companies conducted security and patrolling operation at FSB's CAISSON III and CAISSON V.

30 Oct (1) 1st Bde (FID) CI displaced from field location to MUK LOI. At 1300H the 1st Bde assumed OICOM of the 3d Bde TAOI and all units (FID) to the 3d Bde via LOC NINH.

(2) 1/18 Inf: The Bn became OICOM 1st Bde at 1800H and continued MR security.

(3) 1/26 Inf: The Bn became OICOM 1st Bde at 1800H and continued FSB security.

(4) 2/28 Inf: The Bn became OICOM 1st Bde at 1800H and continued MR security.

(5) 1/4 Cav: The Squadron (-) became OICOM 3d Bde at 1800H.

(6) 6/15 Arty: The Bn became OICOM 1st Bde at 1800H and assumed direct support mission of the Bde operations.

31 Oct (1) 1/18 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operation plus MR security at XU707090, the Bn located 3 VC bodies and 1 AK47 plus 1 B-41 rocket launcher.

(2) 1/26 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operations plus FSB security at CAISSON VI. At 1510H Co C moved to and secured FSB CAISSON VII by R/W via MR LOC, relieving B 2/28 Inf of the security responsibility for the FSB.

(3) 1/28 Inf: The Bn executed an assault landing into an LZ via XU70072, and established and MR. At 1440H via XU756081, 5 Co patrol made contact with 10 VC, R/W fire was received and the patrol returned fire. The patrol observed 3 VC falling. Eight VC were dressed in black pajamas and 2 wore khaki uniforms. All were carrying heavy packs. Results of contact were no US losses and unknown VC losses. At 1700H via AT705084 the Recon platoon fired on 1 VC with negative results.

(5) 2/28 Inf: The Bn conducted security and patrolling operations via MR LAL. Co B moved by R/W from FSB CAISSON IV to now via LOC NINH, and conducted security operations at the FSB south end of LOC NINH air strip. At 0445H the unit reported incoming rocket, mortar and small arms fire. Contact was broken at 0630H. Results of contact were 1 US KIA and 6 US MIA and unknown VC losses.

(6) 6/15 Arty: The Bn conducted support for the 1st Bde operations.

1 NOV (1) 1/12 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operations East, South, West of MR and MR security. Co B was lifted by R/W to secure FSB CAISSON VII at 1556H.

CONFIDENTIAL

-21-

Subject: Combat after action report (HAW/ACS/53/321) (CONT'D)

1.00Y (2) 1/26 Inf: The on conducted security and patrolling operations at Ford's Caission VI and Caission VII. At 0105, the on (-) received between 175-200 mortar rounds, a LFT, Spooky, arty, and Blaw were used by the on to counter the mortar attack. US losses were 1 man.

(3) 1/26 Inf (-): The on conducted search and destroy operations and air security. At 0703, via AU755077, Co A ambushed patrol near contact with an unknown size VC element. The on lost 5 VC KIA, US losses were 3 slightly wounded. LFT, arty and airstrikes were employed against the area of contact. At 0840H via AU755078, Co A located and destroyed a circular trench 3 ft deep, 4 holes, 5 ft deep, 20 spider holes, and bloody bandages. At 0910H via AU755080 Co A located and destroyed 6 holes 4' x 4' x 6' and 35 to 50 ft of claymore wire. At 0945 via AU755085 Co A located and destroyed 1 ChiCom grenade. At 1245H via AU760075, 1 VC walked into OF in the air. The VC was taken under fire with no results. At 1400H via AU760090, on (-) made contact with an unknown size enemy force. 2 A/S were fired and 5 to 6 grenades were thrown by the VC. The on (-) returned fire with LFT, arty, and airstrike in area of contact. The point element lost 2 VC killed in contact. No friendly cas were reported.

(4) 2/26 Inf: The on (-) conducted security and patrolling operations at Luch Lu. Co A & C conducted security and limited patrolling via Ford located at the southern end of LOC Hill airstrip.

(5) 6/15 Arty: The on continued to support 1st ACo operations.

2.00Y (1) 1/18 Inf (-): The on (-) conduct search and destroy operation plus air security. At 0030H the on (-) received a mortar attack with from 30 to 55 mortar rounds falling in the area. A LFT, FAC & Spooky, and airstrip supported the on (-) defense. At 0100H the on (-) received heavy S/A and A/S fire from locations around the on. At 0205H the heavy S/A and A/S fire had tapered to scattered A/S fire about the on. At 0215H, the on (-) received heavy S/A and A/S fire from the north and northeast. At 0220H, the on (-) received incoming A/G's. At 0237H, heavy S/A and A/S ceased along with the A/G fire. At 0255, the heavy S/A, A/S and A/G's again were placed on the on (-) on. At 0320H, A/S and A/G's ceased firing with scattered S/A fire about the on. At 0415H, 50 to 100 rounds of mortar fire fell in the on (-) on. At 0425H, the on (-) reported heavy ground attack from the south, the ground attack ended at 0445H. US losses were 1 KIA and 6 WIA. At 0340H, Co A sweep around on and reported 4 wounded VC KIA's. VC's were dusted off for medical aid and further interrogation. At 1200H, via 699090, Co A made contact with an on VC platoon plus size element. Arty, A/S and LFT were placed into the area of contact with unknown results. No US losses. At 1300H via AU702106, Co B captured 2 VC, the VC were carrying mortar equipment. VC losses of equipment for the day were 2 flame throwers, 3 A/G's, 2 L/G ChiComs, 10 AK-47's, 2 ChiCom carbines type 50, 2 rounds of 841, 13 rounds of 440, 1 set of earphones, 1 sighting device, and VC KHA-203. At 1405H, via AU702106 Co A located 3 graves, 2 graves had 2 bodies each and 1 grave contained 1 body.

(2) 1/26 Inf (-): The on (-) conducted an air assault into LZ via AU699105 and secured Ford. At 1010H via AU714149 Co A made contact with 4 VC 500 meters east of MFD location. Arty, A/S, and LFT were placed in the area of contact with unknown results.

(3) 1/26 Inf (-): The on (-) conducted search and destroy operations and secured on. At 0745H, 20 VC moved up on the on, arty, mortars and A/S were placed on their location with no results. At 1021H via AU733095, the Recon platoon located and destroyed 3 bomb litterers and a company size perimeter of on. At 1300H, via 752094 the Recon platoon was fired on by 4 VC. Fires were returned with arty, LFT and S/A in the area of contact with no results.

(4) 2/12 Inf 25 Inf Div: The on conducted an A/S into LZ via AU785135 and secured on and became on 1st ACo.

(5) 2/26 Inf: The on conducted security and patrolling operations at Luch Lu. Co A and Co C conducted security and limited patrolling via Ford located at the southern end of LOC Hill airstrip. At 0050H, via Fd B Co B and Co C received 15 to 20 mortar rounds. No friendly casualties reported. At 0121H via Ford, Co A and Co C received S/A fire. Spooky, LFT and FAC were placed in area of contact. Contact resulted in one US WIA.

(6) 6/15 Arty: The on continued to support 1st ACo operations.

3.00Y (1) 1/18 Inf (-): The on (-) conducted search and destroy operations plus air security. Co A conducted security of Ford via A/G. At 1045H via AU699105 Co B located and returned to the on one wounded VC. At 1045H via AU702099 the on (-) located 5 VC bodies, 1 AK-47, also for AK-47, and 1 flame thrower. At 1150H via AU702092, the on (-) located 15 VC bodies.

CONFIDENTIAL



135

AVR-01-T

CONFIDENTIAL

8 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat after action report (MACV/USJ3/321) (LANT'D)

3 Nov

(2) 1/26 Inf: The bn (-) conducted security of FSB via AU713143 and conducted local patrolling within sector. At 1145H via AU715153 the bn (-) located and destroyed 17 bunkers, size 6' x 4' x 4'.

(3) 1/28 Inf (-): The bn conducted search and destroy operations plus MR security. At 0715H via AU752070, Co B ambush patrol triggered an ambush, one VC body was found after the contact. At 0910H via AU770090 the Recon platoon received fire from a unknown size VC force. Arty and mortars were fired in the area and a subsequent search of the area revealed one VC KIA and one AK-47. At 1005H via AU750090 the Recon platoon located 3 VC bodies. At 1335 via AU780102 the bn (-) made contact with an unknown size VC element. Heavy M/1 fire was placed on the bn (-) by the VC element. Arty, M/1 and mortars were used in support of the contact, which resulted in 1 US KIA, and unknown VC casualties.

(4) 2/12 Inf/25th Inf Div: The Bn (-) conducted search and destroy operations plus MR security. At 0222H via 01.00, the bn received 40 to 50 mortar rounds, M/1, F/C, and M/1 were placed in the air for the support of the bn's contact. At 0230H the bn received a ground attack from the northeast, east, and northwest. At 0245H the attack lightened. At 0455H contact was broken. US losses were 3 KIA and 34 MIA. VC losses were 40 KIA and 5 MIA. At 1005H the VC attacked the bn, M/1, Arty and M/1 were placed near the area of contact. No US losses and no VC losses were reported. At 1435H via 780140, Co A located human remains and flesh, est 1 VC body.

(5) 2/28 Inf: The bn conducted security and patrolling operations at 01.00. Two companies, Co A and Co C conducted security and limited patrolling operations via FSB location on the southern end of 100 MIA airstrip, no incident.

(6) 6/15 Arty: The bn continued to support 1st A&E operations.

4 Nov

(1) 1/16 Inf: The bn conducted local search and destroy operations plus MR security. At 1010H via AU095095 the Recon platoon located 3 bodies and 1 GIACH grenade. At 1040H via AU099106, the bn (-) located five fuse caps for 60mm and 12 fresh graves with 12 fresh bodies. At 1112H via AU722113, the bn (-) located and destroyed a bn size trench line with over hand cover. At 1200H, via AU715114, the bn (-) located and destroyed 5 command bunkers.

(2) 1/26 Inf: The bn conducted FSB security via AU713143 and patrolling operations within bn sector. At 1035H, via AU723164, the bn (-) made contact with 4-5 VC. M/1, Arty and mortars were placed into the area of contact with unknown results. At 1310H, via AU712154, the bn (-) located and destroyed ten bunkers, 2 MG positions and one 8' x 8' x 4' command bunker.

(3) 1/28 Inf: The bn conducted search and destroy operation plus MR security. At 1120H, via AU722113, the bn (-) made contact with an unknown size VC element. The VC element had at least 2 AK-47's, Arty, mortars, and M/1 were placed in the area of contact. Contact was broken at 1113H. US losses were 1 KIA and 2 MIA. VC losses were 1 KIA. At 1500H, via AU755078, a Co C patrol located and destroyed 6 spider holes.

(4) 2/12 Inf: The bn conducted search and destroy operations plus MR security. At 1005H, via AU000141, Co B patrol located and destroyed a booby trapped military structure. At 1400H, via AU781135, the bn (-) located five VC bodies in fresh graves, 18-60mm mortar rounds, medical supplies, 60mm mortar sight, 2 AK-47's, 1 canister for M2, 1 crossbow and 2 plastic gas masks. At 1415H, via AU780137, the bn (-) located 1 VC body. At 1430H, via AU781116, the bn (-) found 1 VC body, 6-60mm mortar rounds, and 4 GIACH grenades. At 1455H, via AU782135, the bn (-) located one VC body. At 1501H, via AU755078 the bn (-) located one VC body inside a hole 20 meters from 01.00.

(5) 2/28 Inf: The bn conducted search and destroy operations plus MR security without incident.

(6) 6/15 Arty: The bn continued to support 1st A&E operations.

5 Nov

(1) 1/18 Inf: The bn conducted search and destroy operations and MR security. At 1210H via AU704056 the bn located and destroyed 9-32mm mortar rounds, 1 base plate, 2 GIACH grenades, web gear, 200 rounds of AK-47 ammo, 2 AK-47, clips and three VC bodies. At 1420H, via AU700092, the bn (-) located and destroyed 13 foxholes, 6 bunkers, and one 32mm mortar round.

(2) 1/26 Inf: The bn conducted security for FSB via AU713143 and security patrolling within bn sector without incident.

(3) 1/28 Inf: The bn conducted search and destroy operation plus MR security. No contact reported.

(4) 2/12 Inf: The bn continued to conduct search and destroy operations and MR security. At 0945H via AU779137 the bn located seven VC bodies, four 60mm mortar rounds, and 1 GIACH grenade.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDD-SI-T

CONFIDENTIAL

8 December 1967/36

SUBJECT: Combat after action report (HMCV/HCS/J3/321) (CONT'D)

5 Nov (4) At 1055H vic XU775137, the bn (-) located and destroyed seven bunkers and 200 rounds of AK-47 ammo. At 1220H vic XU767154 the bn (-) located and destroyed 30 foxholes with overhead cover. At 1500H vic XU773142 the bn (-) located and destroyed 60 (one) man foxholes, 50 rounds of AK-47 ammo, and 4 CHICOM grenades.

(5) 2/20 Inf: The bn continued security and patrolling operations vic FUB located near the southern end of LOC MTH airstrip. At 1500H vic XU738083 the bn (-) located and destroyed 3 VC bodies, one COM mortar sight, 17-60mm mortar rounds, and 1000 ft of claymore wire.

(6) C/15 arty: The bn conducted support for 1st Bde operations.

6 Nov (1) 1/18 Inf: The bn conducted search and destroy operations and MDr security. At 1020H vic XU695090 the bn (-) located and returned to the LDI 50 empty 50 cal canisters. At 1025H vic XU69074 the bn (-) located and destroyed 1 mortar charge and 23 mortar round containers. At 1210H vic XU68081, the bn (-) located and destroyed 150 bunkers. At this location 2 M6 rounds were also located. At 1225H vic XU68033 the bn (-) located one telephone, one tool set, 1 canteen, 1 sack of medical supplies, 12 gas masks, 1 saw, 14 canteens, 5 hammocks, 14 packs, 100 rounds of 12.7 ammo, 6 ponchos, 20 shovels, 14 individual bags of rice, and a bag of documents. The bn (-) located and destroyed 7 anti-aircraft positions and 7 bunkers.

(2) 1/20 Inf: The bn conducted an M/A into LZ and secured MDr vic XU804162. At the LZ the bn located and destroyed 50-12mm rounds, one anti-aircraft position and 15 pieces of web gear (picks and belts).

(3) 1/23 Inf: The bn conducted search and destroy operation plus MDr security. At 1000H vic XU73102 the bn (-) located and destroyed 1 sleeping position, 9 bunkers 4x3x9 ft, 2 anti-aircraft positions, one flashlight, and a pile of 50 cal brass (est 2000). At 1400H vic XU754076, bn located and destroyed 30 holes est to be 3 days old.

(4) 2/12 Inf: The bn conducted search and destroy operations plus MDr security. At 0920H, vic XU792137 the bn (-) located and destroyed 10 VC positions, one right foot (human), and bits of human remains, est 1 body. At 1050H vic XU812143 the bn located 3 booby trapped bamboo piles. At 1625H vic MDT the unit received 20-40mm mortar round. Fire was returned with counter mortar fire. Arty, spiky, M/S and LFT were placed in the area that mortar rounds came from. US losses were 13 MIA.

(5) 2/23 Inf: The bn conducted security and local patrolling operation vic QUAN LOI. Two companies Co B and Co C conducted security and local patrolling vic airstrip at the southern end of LOC MTH. At 1035H vic XU09609, Co A patrol had a grenade thrown on them. US losses were 1 MIA, VC losses were unknown.

(6) C/15 arty: The bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

7 Nov (1) 1/18 Inf: The bn conducted a combat extraction from field locations to QUAN LOI and upon closing, assumed base camp security mission.

(2) 1/20 Inf: The bn conducted search and destroy operations plus MDr (vic XU617125) security. The patrol route ran initially due east, mostly through a rubber plantation. At 0950H, vic XU24125 Co C's point element received sniper fire from one VC in a tree. Fire was returned and the VC (wearing black pajamas) ran into a village a few hundred meters east. The bn (-) pursued the VC into the village where a tunnel was discovered with negative findings. People from the village (especially children) were sparse and apparently hidden. Only a few showed themselves in the area. The bn (-) continued on its patrol route, and again started to receive sniper fire from 3 to 4 VC. At this time the patrol route was altered to a NW direction. Approximately 10 min after the bn (-) turn was made a full scale engagement was initiated by the VC who were deployed in the standard "U" shape formation. The initial contact began when the command group was hit directly with an unknown number of M6-2 and R G-40 rounds. Then, the main targets became all commanders and radio operators. These reasons plus the southern flanks constituted most of the casualties. The command group suffered 100% casualties on the initial contact. Because of the turn in the patrol route the bn (-) ran into the northern side of the VC's tactical formation. The VC then maneuvered elements around to the west to flank and eventually completely encircle the bn (-). Also at this time a group of 30-40 VC on the southern leg maneuvered and also tried to encircle the bn (-). Both elements were surprised by the trail company Co D and held in place. When artillery and air support arrived the VC became disorganized and began to withdraw to the SE. Co C point platoon had passed through the area of contact but fought through and rejoined the main element. Snipers were high in many rubber trees in the killing zone.

CONFIDENTIAL

137

AVDU-Sr-T

CONFIDENTIAL

3 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (in CV/ACO/J3/321) (CONT'D)

7 Nov These VC were tied or strapped to the trees. Also, a small element of VC maneuvered from the SE and made their way between the command group and Co D. Only one heavy machinegun (30 Cal) was used, from the SE. Co A was sent in relief. The estimated strength of the VC force was a Bn (+) with both local VC and elements of the 273d NVN. The force was accompanied by laborers of both men and women. The VC were armed with RIG-2's, RIG-40's, AK 50's, AK47's, assorted carbines, claymores, and many grenades. They were dressed in assorted clothing with some having belt buckles with embossed stars. The whole engagement was well planned, rehearsed, and executed. The VC Min (LC) was 66. Weapons captured were 1 AK-50, 1 AK-47, 1 RIG-2, 1 C-100M grenade, and 1 wallet with documents. US casualties were 10 US KIA (1 Vietnamese interrogator KIA) and 22 US MIA. The 4n (-) and Co A closed in at approximately 2115h.

(3) 1/20 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operation to the west and south plus RDR security. At 1045h via AU732005 the 4n (-) located and destroyed 5 foxholes.

(4) 2/12 Inf: The 4n conducted a combat extraction from field location to QUANG LOI without incident.

(5) 2/26 Inf: The 4n conducted security and local patrolling operation via QUANG LOI. Two companies, Co B and Co C conducted security and patrolling operations for FSB at the southern end of LOC NINH airstrip.

(6) 6/15 Arty: The 4n continued to support 1st Bde operations.

8 Nov (1) 1/18 Inf: The 4n conducted security and local patrolling operation at QUANG LOI. Company B moved by R/A from QUANG LOI to CAISSON VII and relieved Co D 2/33 Inf of security responsibilities. Company B became OICOM 3d Bde upon closure.

(2) 1/26 Inf: The 4n moved from field location to new field position along Hwy 13 reverting to OICOM 3d Bde upon closure.

(3) 1/28 Inf: The 4n continued search and destroy operation and provided RDR security.

(4) 2/23 Inf: The 4n (-) moved by R/A to CAISSON VI and became OICOM 3d Bde upon closure. Companies B and C conducted security and patrolling operation at the FSB at the southern end of LOC NINH airstrip without incident.

(5) 1/16 Inf (-): The Bn (-) relieved 1/26 Inf in place and became OICOM 1st Bde upon closure of LBI.

(6) 6/15 Arty: The 4n continued to support 1st Bde operations.

9 Nov (1) 1/18 Inf: The 4n conducted security and local patrolling operation at QUANG LOI without incident.

(2) 1/26 Inf: The Bn (-) conducted air assault into LZ via XU303-109, conducted a search and destroy operation returned to same LZ and extracted without incident.

(3) 1/28 Inf: The 4n conducted search and destroy operations in addition to RDR security. At 0640h via AU751039 the 4ncom platoon located 2 graves with bodies about 3 days old.

(4) 2/28 Inf (-): Companies B and C conducted security and local patrolling operation via FSB without incident.

(5) 6/15 Arty: The 4n continued to support 1st Bde operations.

10 Nov (1) 1/18 Inf: The 4n conducted security and local patrolling operations via QUANG LOI.

(2) 1/16 Inf: The Bn moved from field location at LOC NINH to FSB CAISSON VII and assumed security of FSB.

(3) 1/23 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operations plus RDR security.

(4) 2/23 Inf: The 4n (-) conducted security for FSB at LOC NINH and conducted local patrolling.

(5) 6/15 Arty: The 4n continued to support 1st Bde operations.

11 Nov (1) 1/16 Inf: The 4n conducted security operations via CAISSON VII.

(2) 1/18 Inf: The 4n conducted security and patrolling operations QUANG LOI.

(3) 1/28 Inf: The 4n conducted combat extraction from field location to THUOC VIENH.

(4) 2/23 Inf: The Bn (-) conducted security of FSB's via CAISSON VI and southern end of LOC NINH airstrip. Local patrolling operations were conducted in each location without incident.

(5) 6/15 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

-125-

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (MACV/RCS/J3/321) (CONT'D)

- 12 Nov (1) 1/16 Inf: The Bn conducted FSB security at CAISSON VII and Bn (-) patrolled within the Bn sector. No contact was reported.  
 (2) 1/18 Inf: The Bn conducted security and patrolling operations via QUAN LOI.  
 (3) 1/28 Inf: The Bn was given the mission as Div RRF at 1200H, continued security and patrolling operations at THUOC VINH.  
 (4) 2/28 Inf: The Bn conducted security and patrolling operations for CAISSON VI and FSB at the southern end of LOC NINH airstrip.  
 (5) 6/15 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

- 13 Nov (1) 1/16 Inf: The Bn conducted security, search and destroy operations via FSB CAISSON VII.  
 (2) 1/18 Inf: The Bn conducted security and local patrolling operations via QUAN LOI.  
 (3) 1/28 Inf: The Bn remained Div RRF in THUOC VINH.  
 (4) 2/28 Inf: The Bn conduct security and local patrolling for two FSB CAISSON VI and FSB at the southern end of LOC NINH airstrip.  
 (5) 6/15 Arty: The Bn continued to 1st Bde operations.

- 14 Nov (1) 1/16 Inf: The Bn conducted security of FSB CAISSON VII and conducted an A/A into LZ via AT740918. At 1103H Bn (-), via AT630914 made contact with 15-20 VC. LFT, Arty and A/S were placed in the area of contact. US losses were none as were VC losses.  
 (2) 1/18 Inf: The Bn conducted security operations via QUAN LOI and local patrolling within sector.  
 (3) 2/28 Inf: The Bn conducted security operation for two FSB at CAISSON VII and LOC NINH. Local patrolling was also conducted via each FSB.  
 (4) 6/15 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

- 15 Nov (1) 1/16 Inf: The Bn conducted security for FSB CAISSON VII and conducted an A/A into LZ via AT677001 at 1155H the Bn (-) received S/A fire from the village via AT701835, Arty, LFT, and A/S were placed in the area of contact. Results of contact were 2 US KIA, 2 US MIA, and unknown VC losses.  
 (2) 1/18 Inf: The Bn conducted security operations via QUAN LOI and local patrolling in sector.  
 (3) 2/28 Inf: The Bn conducted security operations for two FSB at CAISSON VI and LOC NINH. Local security patrol was also conducted in via each FSB.  
 (4) 6/15 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

- 16 Nov (1) 1/16 Inf: The Bn (-) moved from an LOC to QUAN LOI by A/A. Company C remained as FSB security at an LOC.  
 (2) 1/18 Inf: The Bn continued to conduct security operations via QUAN LOI and conducted local patrols.  
 (3) 2/28 Inf: The Bn conduct security for FSB's at LOC NINH and CAISSON VI. Company B moved from LOC NINH to LAI KHE. Company C conducted local patrolling and security operations at FSB at LOC NINH.  
 (4) 6/15 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

- 17 Nov (1) 1/16 Inf: The Bn (-) prepared for future operations, Company C provided security and local patrolling operations for FSB CAISSON VII.  
 (2) 1/18 Inf: The Bn conducted security and patrolling operation at QUAN LOI.  
 (3) 2/28 Inf: The Bn (-) conducted security and patrolling operation for FSB's CAISSON VI and LOC NINH. Company D conducted search and destroy operations west of LOC NINH.  
 (4) 6/15 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

- 18 Nov (1) 1/16 Inf: The Bn conducted a relief in place relieving 2/28 Inf (-) at CAISSON VI. With the relief, the Bn assumed control of CAISSON VI FSB and Bn security.  
 (2) 1/18 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operations plus base camp security at QUAN LOI.  
 (3) 2/28 Inf: The Bn (-) moved from its field location to LAI KHE by A/A commencing at 0700H. Company D continued security and patrolling operation at LOC NINH.  
 (4) 6/15 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

139

AVUB-Si-T

CONFIDENTIAL

8 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (MACV/ACB/J3/321) (CONT'D)

- 19 May (1) 1/10 Inf: The bn continued PS in CAISON VI security operations and provided road security as needed, and provided laterite security.  
 (2) 1/20 Inf: The bn moved by A/W to UAN LOI and assume UAN LOI security upon closure.  
 (3) 1/15 Arty: The bn continued to support 1st ADE operations.  
 (4) OPERATION SHAM/NUAN II terminated 192400H November 1967.

8. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery: 1/5 Arty and 6/15 Arty provided Arty support for the 1st ADE and controlled fires of the following units: 1/5 Arty: A 1/5, B 6/15, C 2/33, A 8/6, 6/15 Arty, A 6/15, C 1/7, A 2/33, C 2/13, B 2/33, B 1/84, A 6/27. Ammo expenditures were as follows:

(1)	1/5 arty:	105mm	155mm
	(a) A 1/5	14,600	
	(b) B 6/15	12,875	
	(c) A 2/33	12,831	
	(d) C 2/33	7,503	
	(e) A 8/6		13,753
	TOTALS	40,014	13,753

(2)	6/15 arty:	HE	AP	ILLUM
	A 6/15	14,276	400	761
	C 1/7	24	64	274
	A 2/33	5,847	0	53
	C 2/13	3,214	30	0
	A 2/33	7,831	114	18
	B 1/84	850	106	10
	A 6/27 (175)	682	0	0
	(B)	168	0	0
	TOTAL	33,134	794	1,063

(3) Total ammo expenditure for 1/5 Arty and 6/15 Arty

	HE	AP	ILLUM
1/5 Arty	31,707		
6/15 Arty	33,134	794	1,063
	94,901	794	1,063

b. Air Force: AF flew 374 pre-planned missions, 240 immediate missions, and 29 diverter flights for a total of 603 strikes accounting for 1306 sorties. A total of 91 ak-spots were flown for units in the field. The result of the strikes were 43 VC Km (.C), 151 VC Km (.oss), 230 bunkers destroyed, 59 military structures destroyed, 149 fighting position, and 1700 meters of trench line destroyed.

9. (C) RESULTS:

a. Enemy Losses:

- (1) Personnel:  
 KIA (body count): 703  
 KIA (possible): 193  
 POW: 15

b. Equipment:

- (1) Weapons:  
 122mm Rocket Motor 5  
 M16-7 Launcher 4  
 CHICOM RP, 7.62mm 8  
 M16 25  
 CHICOM Rifle, M16, M16A1 3  
 M16-2 Launcher 11  
 (2) 9mm CHICOM Pistol 1  
 Flame Throwers 3  
 M16 1  
 (2) Ammunition:  
 122mm Rocket 24  
 122mm Rocket warhead 2  
 100mm Mortar 21  
 100mm Mortar 103  
 105mm Artillery 1  
 72mm Recoilless Rifle 15  
 M16-2 53  
 M16-7 132

CONFIDENTIAL



SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (MACV/HCS/J3/321) (CONT'D)

7.62mm	308
9mm	354
30 cal	100
M4-47	850
82mm mortar	65
12.7mm	106
5.56mm	320
(3) Ammunition (miscellaneous)	
Fuse (boxes)	24
Det Cord (boxes)	4
Fuse Plug	14
M.G. Booster	2
82mm Mortar Charge	10
Fuses, 82mm Mortar	12
Satchel Charge	1
(4) Fortifications	
Bunkers	1,005
Fighting Positions	196
Funji Pits	11
Spider Holes	16
Foxholes	61
Front Shelters	96
Tunnels	27
Walls	4
Military Structures	169
Trench	3,000m
(5) Rice and Salt	
Rice	149,001 lbs
Salt	87,300 lbs
(6) Mines and Grenades	
Mines	38
Grenades	145
(7) CS Gns	
Liquid	100 gal
Powder	125 lbs
(8) Vehicles	28
(9) Miscellaneous Medical Supplies	
Gauze	20 lbs
SP. sponges	1,000
Medicine Vials (filled)	1,000
Alcohol (filled)	2 qts
Tetracycline	12
Circular Discs	1,400
Pill Containers (filled)	2
Assorted Medicines	unk amount
(10) Miscellaneous Clothing Supplies	
Conchos	18
Bandols	10,002 ft
Belt	3
Black IJ Suits	21
Jungle Boots	1 pr
Patigue Shirts	1
(11) Miscellaneous Items of Equipment and Supplies	
None	

## 10. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

## a. Administrative Matters:

## (1) Supply:

(a) Class I: A and C rations were adequate during this operation. Command emphasis was placed on increasing amount of juices and beverages base for use by combat element. The delivery time of potable ice was not compatible with food preparation and resupply to forward elements by aircraft. Many times ice would arrive late in the afternoon hours after the last resupply convoy had left the log base, and resupply aircraft had completed all resupply missions. A morning delivery time would have been more suitable.

b. Class II and IV: Most of resupply was normal; cloths, donut and slinging equipment were in short supply.

c. Class III: No problems encountered.

d. Class V: More lighting should be placed on the ammo resupply for helicopter fire teams. At the 101, work order has been submitted.

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Methods of Resupply: Rotary wing was the primary method during this operation. Fixed wing was used to resupply the base areas and rotary wing was used to the forward locations.

(3) Maintenance:

(1) 701st Maint, provided excellent support throughout the operation.

(2) Direct support and attached units, often did not bring their FLL to the field. This results in unnecessary and off-times unreasonable demands on the supporting elements.

(4) Medical: Medical reaction from C and D Co's 1st Med Bn were prompt and adequate. Two problems in this field are still prevalent.

(1) Initial request for dustoff often arrives with a priority of urgent, although in many cases the nature of the wound is really very minor. Medically trained personnel, if available, should determine the priority of a dusted off aircraft.

(2) "Slick" aircraft often bent a dustoff aircraft to the scene of a pick-up. In most cases the dustoff is never more than 10 minutes behind and the result of a wounded man being moved by untrained personnel and being deprived of emergency medical treatment available aboard dustoff aircraft could be fatal.

(5) Communications:

(1) Communications are adequate during the operation, although the 1st Bn CP experienced considerable radio interference with FM voice, this did not hinder the operation.

f. General Comments: During this operation, the 1st Bn at one time had OPCON of over 70% of the Division units without having the benefit of the logistical support of the 1st Log Command. The 1st Div S&T Bn did an outstanding job but was sorely taxed.

11. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

a. The 1st Bn applies a well known but little used technique of "the false insertion into a likely LZ". The LZ was prepared as any normal LZ, however the lift ships were not filled with troops.

b. The 1st Bn moved battalions from one NDF to another numerous times with few problems.

12. (C) CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Conclusions: The mission to search out and destroy the 701st NVA Regiment was accomplished within the first three weeks of the operation. An extensive area of terrain was aggressively searched despite several meeting engagements. This aggressive action during OPERATION SIKHANG-ON II disrupted and ended VC/NVA operations in the area covered by OFB SHAN-POON II.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) Ambush patrols require special coordination in areas where contact with a large enemy force is anticipated. If an ambush patrol engages the enemy and sustains casualties, or if a man gets separated from his patrol, the delay encountered getting all personnel back to the NDF often prevents effective use of air and artillery support. If a contact occurs between an ambush site and the NDF, withdrawing the ambush patrol into the NDF through the enemy positions becomes most difficult. If the ambush is allowed to remain in position, it limits the areas for employment of air and artillery support. Ambush patrols should be kept relatively close to NDF when known enemy forces are in an area, should not be sent further than 500 meters from an NDF and must be so sited that they can be withdrawn quickly and with little adverse effect on NDF defensive fires.

(2) Intensive B&I fires 100 to 1000 meters in front of the NDF keeps the VC harassing actions to a minimum at night.

(3) Defensive fires must be fired prior to 1800 hours to prevent delaying ambush patrols and aid in better control of the adjustment of fire.

(4) During a ground attack on night defensive positions, 81mm mortars may be employed most effectively at short range with zero charge.

(5) White Phosphorous rounds used for marking targets for air strikes close to friendly troops, are much more effective than white smoke grenades. White phosphorous burns longer, rises faster through a jungle canopy for a FAC to see, and is more easily identified by ground troops if the mark is too close to them.



AVDB-AT-T

**CONFIDENTIAL**

8 December 1967 <sup>142</sup>

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (MACV/ACG/J3/321) (CONT'D)

(c) A method of instantaneous "on-off" reconnaissance by fire is necessary for each company unit in jungle operations. Such a system will enable a commander to determine if return fire is being received. If precise controls are not used it is nearly impossible to determine enemy fire from friendly fires, unless the company is receiving casualties.

13. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: H.  
OPERATION SHENANDOAH II followed the planning schedule as envisioned by the Division Commander. The 1st Division engaged five NVA Regts. Two of the Regts engaged by the 1st were rendered combat ineffective (271st and 273rd NVA Regts). Heavy casualties were inflicted upon the 272nd, 105th and 212th NVA Regts. The mission of finding and destroying the enemy was successfully accomplished.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*Michael D. Mahler*  
MICHAEL D. MAHLER  
Major, Armor  
Adjutant

Group 4  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR: 5200.10 Applies

130

**CONFIDENTIAL**

143

- CONFIDENTIAL -

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE AND LAI KHE BASE  
1st Infantry Division  
APO 96345

AVDB-WB-C

7 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report

THRU: Commanding General  
1st Infantry Division  
APO 96345

TO: Commander  
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
ATTN: J321  
APO 96243

1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation SHENANDOAH II; search and destroy.
2. DATES OF OPERATION: 300700 September 1967 to 30 October 1967.
3. GENERAL: Command Headquarters 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Shenandoah North; and 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division Shenandoah South. 1st Inf Div OPORD 19-67 (Opn SHENANDOAH II) (U); 3d Brigade, 1st Inf Div OPORD 21-67 (Opn SHENANDOAH II) (U).

The 3d Brigade plan was to employ one mechanized infantry battalion (-) with engineer elements to clear and accomplish limited repairs on Rte 240 from Ben Cat (XT751330) to vic XT653494 commencing on 30 September 1967; employ one infantry battalion (-) to secure FSB LORRAINE I (XT706433) on 1 Oct 67, and employ both infantry battalions in search and destroy operations in assigned AO's; and to destroy VC/NVA units and installations within the operational area, commencing on 1 Oct 67.

a. Reporting Officer: Colonel Frank E. Blazey

b. Task Organization:

Headquarters, 3d Brigade, Colonel Frank E. Blazey, CO  
1-16 Infantry: LTC Calvert P. Benedict, CO  
1-26 Infantry: LTC Arthur D. Stigall  
2-2 Inf (Mech): LTC Maj Henry Davison, CO  
2-26 Infantry: LTC Terry Del. Allen - Maj Louis Monotroy, CO  
2-33 Artillery: LTC Arthur D. Wells, CO

4. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence prior to the operations: The area of interest covers approximately 1254 sq km and is bounded by the following coordinates: XT5032 - XT5070 XT6370 - XT6332. Prominent terrain features are the Song Saigon, which forms an arc N-S along the western border of the area, and the Thi Tinh stream, which together with smaller streams feeding it, dominates the central portion of the area. A very large part of the area is covered by plantations, the largest being the Michelin which is located in the west. There are sizeable riceland strips along the Song Saigon, the Thi Tinh, and other streams. The area is generally flat with relief under 60M. Aside from the cultivated land mentioned, the area is covered mainly with secondary forests and a few patches of bamboo. The main roads in the area are QL/13, a primary road running N-S along the eastern edge, and Routes 239 and 240, both secondary roads. Together these three roads connect the main population centers -

(1)

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX M

131

# CONFIDENTIAL

144

Ben Cat, Lai Ahe, Chon Thanh, and the Michelin Plantation. There are numerous VC installations throughout the area.

b. There have recently been numerous reported VC unit sightings in the area of interest. An evaluation of material on hand shows the followings

## VC Units Probably in the Area

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Est. Strength</u>
165 NVA Regt	1700
271 VC Regt	1600
Phu Loi Bn	450
C64 Dau Tieng Dist Co	80
C45 Chon Thanh Dist Plat	30

## VC Units Possibly in the Area

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Est. Strength</u>
Elements 101 NVA Regt	1600 (Regt)

(1) The units listed as probably in the area of interest are those whose operational areas are believed to include the area of interest and whose present locations based on OB holdings fall within the area.

(2) Units listed as possible in the area are known to operate at times within the area and have recently been reported to be in the area, but are currently placed outside the area by OB holdings.

c. The most serious threats to Division operations in the area are the 165th NVA Regt, the 271st VC Regt, and unlocated elements of the 7th NV. Division. These units could receive combat support from the 69th Arty Regt and possibly the 84 Arty Regt; they could receive logistical support from the 53d Rear Services Group.

d. Reinforcements would most likely come from the 101st NVA Regt and the 273d VC Regt, both of which could possibly reinforce within 24-48 hours. Further support could come from the Phu Loi Bn and the Local Forces companies located within the area. Guerrilla activity in the form of minings, sniper fire, booby-traps and other such tactics could be expected throughout the area.

e. During the operation there was one significant contact made with the enemy on 30 October by 1-18 Infantry at Loc Ninh. A total of 96 VC KIA (BC) and 72 VC KIA (POSS). On 31 October continuing operations in the Loc Ninh area came under OPCON of 1st Bdo, 1st Inf Div. Along Hwy 240 in the Long Nguyen Secret Zone there were numerous small harassing attacks, as usual one to five VC would remain near a base camp or supply area in an effort to delay advancing forces. Many rice caches were located (15 in all) with the larger ones found by B 2-28 Infantry 3 October at XT701-461, D 1-16 Infantry 11 October at XT684461, and A 1-16 Infantry 16 October at XT697-465. A large base camp/supply area was discovered 24 October by 1-26 Infantry at XT649457. The base camp was over 200M wide and estimated to be capable of holding a company size force or larger. On 25 October B 2-2 Infantry located a mine factory at XT668442 which contained over 200 hand grenades, 300 rds of assorted small arms, several claymore mines, and miscellaneous equipment. The area around this site had been heavily booby trapped with hand grenades. In addition the VC conducted an unexpected daylight mortar attack on 29 October at 1405 hours against FSB LORNAINE I XT705442. Approximately 40-50 rounds of 60mm mortar was received but all rounds landed over 100M short of the FSB with no friendly casualties.

f. Weather throughout the operation was hot and humid with scattered rain showers or thunder storms in the late afternoon and early evening. At no time, however, did the weather hamper ground operations.

5. MISSION: 3d Brigade clears Route 240 and jungle area 100 meters to flanks of road from Ben Cat (XT742331) to vic XT653494 commencing on 30 Sept 67. Locos

# CONFIDENTIAL

145

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and destroys VC/NVA units and installations in AO Shenandoah II South commencing 1 Oct 67, secures FSPB LORRAINE I, 1 Oct 67.

#### 6. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Manoeuvre: 3d Brigade employs 2-2 Infantry (Mech) (-) with C/1 Engr Bn to clear and accomplish limited repairs of Rte 240 from Pen Cat (XT742331) to vic XT653494; conducts airmobile assault into LZ Goliath (XT701444) with 1-16 Inf moving SE to secure FSPB LORRAINE I (XT712431); and conducts airmobile assault with 2-26 Inf into LZ David (XT713464).

b. Fire Support: Artillery fire support will be as follows:  
DS 3d Brigade

- (1) A Btry (105), 2-33 Arty
- (2) B Btry (105), 2-33 Arty
- (3) C Btry (105), 2-33 Arty
- (4) D Btry (4.2), 2-33 Arty
- CS 3d Brigade
- (5) C Btry (155), R-6 Arty
- (6) D Btry (6"), R-6 Arty

#### 7. EXECUTION:

30 September 1967 - The 3d Brigade initiated operation SHENANDOAH II. 2-2 Inf (Mech) (-) plus elements of the 1st Engr Bn moved to vic XT725356 and commenced S&D, jungle clearing, and road repair ops. There was no significant enemy contact during the initial stages of the operation.

1 October 1967 - 2-2 Inf (Mech) Bn (-) and elements of 1st Engr Bn conducted S & D, jungle clearing and road repair along Rte 240 vic XT725355. During the day elements of the 1st Engr Bn located and destroyed at XT721370, XT720369, and XT721371 1 each mine. At 1270 hrs B 1st Engr vic XT736355 located and destroyed a booby-trapped 105 rd. Engr's cleared 160 acres. 1-16 Inf Bn conducted A/A vic XT701444 and established FSPB LORRAINE I (XT710932).

2 October 1967 - 2-26 Inf Bn conducted an air assault vic XT715485. At 1235 hrs vic XT710481 B Co located 5 ton of unpolished rice. Airstrikes vic XT710481 and XT676432 destroyed 6 bunkers. At 0805 hrs vic XT718393 a mine plow hit a mine causing no damage or casualties. At 0645 hrs 1-16 Inf Co A vic XT713449 located and destroyed 50 spider holes, 1 bunker and 2 huts. At 1156 hrs vic XT692437 1-16 Inf Co D located an active base camp. LFT and arty supported, results were 2 US WMA and 19 VC suspects. 70 acres were cleared.

3 October 1967 - At 0645 hrs vic XT718344 1st Engr's destroyed 1 booby-trapped 105mm rd and 1 CBU. At 1225 hrs 1-16 Inf Co A vic XT735466 destroyed 2 bunkers. At 1315 hrs 1-16 Inf Co C destroyed 3 bunkers, cooking utensils, 20 lbs of sugar, 4 booby-trapped CBUs and 1 CS and 1 smoke grenade vic XT727433. At 1150 hrs an A/D vic XT669414 received 1 rd S/A fire. Arty, fired into areas resulting in 1 VC KIA (DC), 5 structures destroyed and 4 water buffalo killed. At 1845 hrs, 1-16 Inf recon vic XT704445 made contact with 4 VC. Results were 1 VC KIA (DC) and no US casualties. The VC KIA had a complete set of web gear, 3 AK47 magazines, and 300 rds of ammo. Airstrikes vic XT664415, XT673474, XT682440, and XT664469 destroyed 12 bunkers and 3 fighting positions. 20 acres were cleared.

4 October 1967 - 2-26 Inf Bn conducted S & D ops and then was extracted to LZ Rhe and assumed the Division RRF mission. At 0830 hrs 1st Engr Co C vic XT716395 destroyed 1 AP mine. At 0900 hrs 1-16 Inf Co A vic XT704445 found 1 tunnel, 1 AK47, and a waterproof bag of food. 95 acres were cleared.

188

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

146

5 October 1967 - At 0815 hrs, 1 Chieu Hoi turned himself into 3d Bde CI Team. At 1730 hrs vic XT692455 an AO rec'd ground fire. Arty fired resulting in 1 VC KIA (EC) and 1 secondary explosion. At 1124 hrs 1st Engr Co C destroyed 2 CBU's and 105mm dud. At 0835 hrs 1-16 Inf Co C moved to new NDF vic XT690437. At 1205 hrs 1-16 Inf Co C vic XT690437 rec'd 12 M79 rds and 100 rds S/A fired, LFT, Arty and 2 airstrikes supported. At 1430 hrs 1-16 Inf Co C vic XT693443 destroyed 1 hut and 500 lbs rice. 100 acres were cleared.

6 October 1967 - At 0853 hrs 2-2 Inf (Mech) A Co vic XT707435 hit a mine causing 6 WHA. At 0905 hrs, 2-2 Inf (Mech) B Co vic XT737363 took 3 VC under fire. Search of area resulted in 7 huts, 6 bunkers, 1 trip flare, 1 chicken grenade and 5 CBU's destroyed. At 1655 hrs 2-2 Inf (Mech) C Co vic XT712402 destroyed 1 AT mine. At 0804 hrs 1-16 Inf C Co vic XT683432 rec'd 50 rds S/A fire. At 0942 hrs, 1-16 Inf D Co vic XT699418 found 1 M14 rifle and destroyed 350 lbs of rice. At 2045 hrs, 1-16 Inf C vic XT740454 rec'd 20 rds S/A fire resulting in 1 US WHA.

7 October 1967 - At 0855 hrs 2-2 Inf (Mech) B Co vic XT730358 destroyed 5 bunkers, 4 booby-trapped CBU's and evacuated 1 M16 rifle. 1-16 Inf En (-) conducted S & D ops and established new NDF vic XT681484.

8 October 1967 - At 1215 hrs a rallier with a Russian rifle turned himself into 3d Bde MF's. At 0840 hrs 2-2 Inf (Mech) vic XT713399 had 2 AFO's hit mines causing 2 WHA. At 1015 hrs XT716395 2-2 Inf (Mech) B Co destroyed 3 bunkers. At 1358 hrs, 2-2 Inf (Mech) B Co vic XT737350 detained 4 suspects. At 0750 hrs, 1-16 Inf found 1 Chinese carbine and 6 rds of ammo. At 1400 hrs, 1-16 Inf C Co destroyed 1 hut and 1500 lbs of rice, 50 acres were cleared.

9 October 1967 - At 1730 hrs 2-2 Inf (Mech) vic XT713428 destroyed 2 AT mines. At 1330 hrs 1st Engr destroyed 1 foxhole and 1 Chinese claymore. 75 acres were cleared.

10 October 1967 - At 1000 hrs 2-2 Inf (Mech) B Co vic XT697463 destroyed 1 booby-trapped 105 rd. At 1623 hrs, 2-2 Inf (Mech) B Co vic XT695445 destroyed 1 AT mine. At 1050 hrs 2-2 Inf (Mech) B Co vic XT728416 destroyed 1 bunker and found 1 homemade rifle. At 0740 hrs 2-2 Inf (Mech) B Co vic XT703446 destroyed 1 155 rd. At 0850 hrs, 2-2 B Co vic XT699459 destroyed 2 CBU's. At 0815 hrs 1-16 Inf A Co vic XT677406 rec'd 4-5 rds sniper fire. Arty supported. At 0930 hrs 1-16 A Co vic XT670485 was hit by 2 claymores causing 2 US WHA. Arty and mortars supported. At 1300 hrs, 1-16 Inf Recon vic XT670481 rec'd sniper fire causing 1 US WHA. Arty supported.

11 October 1967 - At 1047 hrs 2-2 Inf (Mech) B Co vic XT702419 destroyed 1 bunker containing 9 desks. At 1155 hrs vic XT669479 an AFO was hit by a command detonated claymore causing 4 WHA. At 1640 hrs vic XT687428 Recon destroyed 25 bunkers & 4 chickens, 4 women and 15 children were held for interrogation.

12 October 1967 - At 0847 hrs vic XT704634, 2-2 Inf (Mech) C Co destroyed 1 booby-trapped grenade. At 0900 hrs B Co vic XT709447 destroyed 1 booby-trapped CBU. At 0730 hrs, Recon vic XT685428 destroyed 12 military structures, 1 wall, 1 chicken grenade, 2 ox carts, 1 bicycle, and 1 meat grinder. At 1227 hrs, Co C 1st Engr vic XT711403 destroyed 7 CBU's. At 2135 hrs vic XT712512 2-2 Inf (Mech) B Co made contact with 6 VC. Small arms and automatic weapons, claymores and a LFT supported. Contact broken at 2203 hrs with no US Cas, and VC Cas unknown. At 0915 hrs, 1-16 Inf D Co fired at 6 VC. Arty & LFT supported, results unknown. At 0953 hrs 1-16 Inf C Co vic XT665491 destroyed 6 booby-trapped grenades. At 1230 hrs vic XT675480 1-16 Inf outpost rec'd S/A fire. Outpost fired S/A & claymores and arty supported. Results were unknown. At 1530 hrs vic XT665487, 1-16 Inf Co C destroyed 9 bunkers, 6 Chinese claymores & 24 grenades. At 1735 hrs, 1-16 Inf found vic XT643946 3 military structures. Which a LFT destroyed. 75 acres were cleared.

13 October 1967 - Airstrikes vic XT685395, XT640483, XT668471 and XT667472 destroyed a total of 23 bunkers. At 1130 hrs vic XT703417, 2-2 Inf (Mech) C Co destroyed 3 bunkers, 5 lbs of food, cooking utensils, & 1 bicycle. At 1152 hrs, 2-2 Inf (Mech) Co D vic XT687452 rec'd sniper fire causing 1 WHA. Fire was returned, results unknown. At 1405 hrs vic XT685453 2-2 Inf (Mech) Co B destroyed 5 bicycles. At 1455 hrs vic XT695414 2-2 Inf (Mech) Co C destroyed 2 huts & 200 lbs of rice. At 1230 hrs vic XT677487 a 5 ton truck from 1st Engr En hit a mine causing 2 WHA. At 0704 hrs 1-16

CONFIDENTIAL

134

147

CONFIDENTIAL

Inf C Co conducted an A/A into LZ via XT653462. At 1010 hrs via XT657469 C Co rec'd S/A and claymore fire, resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 WHA. Fire was returned with S/A and A/W and arty and LFT supported, contact broken at 1045 hrs. At 1125 hrs C Co moved back into area and rec'd fire again resulting in 4 KIA and 2 WHA. Fire was returned and T/C air, arty and LFT supported. Contact broken at 1325 hrs. At 1523 hrs C Co again moved back into the area and rec'd fire again. T/C air and arty supported; contact broken at 1700 hrs. At 1613 hrs, 1-16 Inf D Co moved E/W from LORRAINE II to LZ via XT653466 and established an NMF with C Co. At 1645 hrs Co A moved from Lai Kho to LORRAINE II.

14 October 1967 - Airstrikes via XT664474, XT653470 and XT640463 destroyed a total of 11 bunkers. At 1040 hrs via XT684777 an APC from C Co 2-2 Inf (Mech) hit an anti-personnel mine causing 2 WHA. 1-16 Inf D Co moved from field positions to Lai Kho.

15 October 1967 - Airstrikes via XT650465 and XT656465 destroyed a total of 7 bunkers. At 0920 hrs via XT712403 2-2 Inf (Mech) C Co destroyed 3 APC mines. At 1450 hrs via XT684394 C Co destroyed 1 ox cart, 1 hut, 200 lbs of rice, and 5 GBU's. At 1602 hrs via XT683399, 2-2 Inf (Mech) C Co rec'd 10 rds S/A fire. Fire was returned and results are unknown. 65 acres were cleared.

16 October 1967 - At 1050 hrs via XT773363 Co B 2-2 Inf (Mech) destroyed a 20 lb shape charge. At 0955 hrs, Co A 1-16 Inf destroyed 1 hut, and 2 tons of rice. 1-16 Inf extracted from field location to Lai Kho and became Division R&F.

17 October 1967 - Co D 1-16 Inf moved from Lai Kho to reinforce 2-26 Inf via XT685586. 1-26 Inf Co B conducted an A/A via XT689940. At 0938 hrs B Co destroyed 2 punji pits via XT613940. At 0950 hrs, 1-16 Inf Co D destroyed 4 spider holes and 1 bunker via XU157063. At 1135 hrs via XU146095, 1-16 Co D rec'd A/W fire resulting in 1 WHA.

18 October 1967 - The 3d Bde continues ops at Lai Kho, Quan Loi and Song Do. 1-26 Inf continued security, patrolling and S & D ops at Quan Loi without incident. 1-18 Inf continued security patrolling and S & D ops at Song Do without incident. 2-26 Inf conducted training and ops at Lai Kho without incident.

19 October 1967 - 1-18 Inf continued security, patrolling and S & D ops at Song Do without incident. 1-26 Inf Co B destroyed via XT621930 12 huts and found 2 VC bodies. 2-26 Inf conducted ops at Lai Kho without incident.

20 October 1967 - 1-26 Inf continued security, patrolling, and S & D ops at Quan Loi. At 0425 hrs via XT798997 Co C ambushed a French hospital. One individual with an ID card was detained. 1-18 Inf continued security, patrolling and S & D ops at Song Do without incident. 2-26 Inf conducted training and ops at Lai Kho without incident.

21 October 1967 - At 1741 hrs Tong Lo Chon received approximately 30 mortar rds. arty & 2 LFT's supported. At 2000 hrs again received mortars and also S/A fire. arty and LFT supported. At 2045 hrs via XT784175 VC detonated an M device against an RF outpost. Results 1 US WHA. At 1110 hrs 1-18 Inf Co D received 2 sniper rds. fire was returned with unknown results.

22 October 1967 - 1-26 Inf continued security, patrolling and S & D ops at Quan Loi without incident. B Co 1-26 Inf moved from Quan Loi to Lai Kho. 1-18 Inf continued security, patrolling and S & D ops at Song Do without incident. 2-26 Inf conducted ops at Lai Kho without incident. Co C 2-26 Inf moved from Lai Kho to Quan Loi.

23 October 1967 - The Shenandoah operational area was divided between the 1st Bde and the 3d Bde. The 3d Bde assumed responsibility for Shenandoah II S. Airstrikes via XT701649 destroyed 2 bunkers. 2-2 Inf (Mech) destroyed 8 anti-personnel mines. 1-26 Inf moved by R/W from Quan Loi to Chon Thanh and conducted an A/A via XT653462. B Co moved by R/W from Lai Kho to LORRAINE I (XT713442). 2-26 Inf Bn moved by F/W from Lai Kho to Quan Loi. D Co 2-16 Inf became OPCCN 3d Bde at 1124 hrs and assumed security of a portion of Lai Kho perimeter.

CONFIDENTIAL

135

148

CONFIDENTIAL

24 October 1967 - Airstrikes via XT653460, XT750458 and XT650458 destroyed 22 bunkers and 1 hut. At 1224 hrs via XT649458 a Co 1-26 Inf received sniper fire. Fire was returned and TAC air, arty and LFT supported. Results were 1 KIA and 2 WIA. At 1420 hrs a Co received 2 claymores with negative casualties. TAC air and arty supported.

25 October 1967 - Airstrikes via XT647150, XT651458, XT641467 and XT642449 destroyed a total of 28 bunkers. At 1045 hrs D Co 2-2 Inf (Mech) via XT669492 found 100 booby-trapped grenades, 2 claymores, 300 rds 7.62mm and 2 pigs. At 1526 hrs via XT648458 Co C 1-26 Inf destroyed 3000 lbs of rice, 4 75mm rds, 1 claymore, 4 RFG rds, 1200 lbs sugar, 15 lbs salt, 15 canteens, 8 cooking pots & 35 sets OD fatigues. They evacuated 2 night light sets, 1 magazine for Russian rifle, 3 lbs documents, 8 gas masks, 1 compass case, 1 mortar carrying case and 1 mortar aiming stake.

26 October 1967 - 1-10 Inf continued security patrolling and S & D ops at Song Bo. At 1045 hrs D Co 1-18 Inf via XU121047 received 2 rds sniper fire. Fire was returned and area was checked with negative results. 1-26 Inf a Co via XT650462 found and destroyed 6 bunkers with overhead cover. At 1520 hrs D 1-26 via XT652469 found and destroyed 4 bunker with overhead cover. At 1400 hrs via XT657499 an MG from 2-2 Inf (Mech) hit a small AT mine causing no damage or casualties. 2-20 Inf conducted operations at Quan Loi. At 1150 hrs a Co via XT657099 found 1 booby-trapped claymore. EOD team destroyed.

27 October 1967 - At 0155 hrs Lai Kho base camp came under mortar attack. Lai Kho received 12 82mm mortar rds causing 1 KIA and 11 WIA. Countermortar commenced at 0156 and a LFT and a Spooky supported. Airstrikes via XT645455, XT627464, and XT709468 destroyed a total of 28 bunkers and 7 fighting positions. At 1045 hrs via XT663401 Co D 2-2 Inf (Mech) located and destroyed 4 chicon grenades. At 1335 hrs, via XT664454 D Co 2-2 Inf (Mech) received S/A and rifle grenades from 3-4 VC causing 2 WIA. Fire was returned and airstrikes, arty, and a LFT supported. At 1311 hrs via XT650457 C Co 1-26 Inf located and destroyed 5 RFG rds. At 1132 hrs via XT665456 D Co 1-26 Inf located and destroyed 2 huts, 3 bunkers and 2 bicycles. At 0040 hrs 1-18 Inf began receiving incoming 60 mm and 82 mm mortar rds. Contact broke 0100 hrs and a total of 85 rds were received causing no casualties.

28 October 1967 - At 1008 hrs, 1-10 Inf conducted a F/W move from Song Bo to Lai Kho closing at 1810 hrs. At 1116 hrs, 1-26 Inf Bn (-) began I/W movement from field positions to Phuoc Vinh and became OFCON 1st Bde. At 1217 hrs, via XT692466 2-2 Inf (Mech) Recon found and destroyed 1 AT mine. At 1229 hrs D Co 2-2 Inf (Mech) via XT705403 received a burst of A/W fire causing 2 WIA. Fire was returned with 50 Cal and a LFT was employed.

29 October 1967 - 1-18 Inf at 0634 hrs the Bn moved from Lai Kho to Quan Loi and at 0950 hrs conducted an A/A via XU696096 in reaction to VC attack on Loc Ninh. At 1208 hrs Bn via XU695095 made contact with a VC company. Contact was broke at 1302 hrs. US casualties were 1 KIA and 9 WIA. VC casualties were 12 VC KIA (BC) and 10 VC KIA (FOSS). 1 lb of documents, 4 chicon rifles, 2 RFG-2 launchers, 2 AK47's, 1 US BAR, 3 US carbines were captured. 1-20 Inf B & C Co's moved to XT730080 and set up a FSPB with A/6-16 & C/1-7 arty. At 1800 hrs via XT714154 D/1-4 Coy LFT engaged 4 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA (FOSS). 1-26 Inf (-) moved from Phuoc Vinh to Quan Loi and B Co moved from LOU LINE I to Quan Loi. Bn became OFCON 3d Bde. 1-20 Inf Bn moved from Phuoc Vinh to Quan Loi. 2-2 Inf (Mech) closed FSPB LOU LINE I & II and moved to Lai Kho. 2-16 Inf B Co moved from Lai Kho to Di An and became OFCON 2d Ldo.

30 October 1967 - At 0437 hrs via XU697103 an LF from 1-18 Inf employed an ambush. Search of area resulted in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 litter. At 0940 hrs via XU709103 D/1-18 Inf found 1 VC KIA, 1 RFG & 2 litters. At 1010 hrs via XU701109 D found 2 M-1 rifles and 1 Bangalore torpedo. At 1230 hrs via XT655094 C/1-18 Inf made contact with a VC company. Co A and 1 CIDG Co moved to reinforce. 7 airstrikes, arty and LFT's supported, contact was broken at 1555 hrs. US casualties were 4 KIA and 5 WIA. VC losses were 96 KIA (BC) and 72 KIA (FOSS). Items captured were 15 AK47's, 5 types line, 3 30 cal BAR, 1 chicon type 56 carbine, 2 US 30 cal carbines, 4 M41 rocket launchers, 12 RFG rds, 780 7.62 rds, 3 anti-tank grenades, 35 hand grenades, claymore and 4 bill folds containing documents. At 1700 hrs 1st Bde

CONFIDENTIAL



149

## CONFIDENTIAL

assumed OPCON of their TAOI and OPCON of Quan Loi, Dixie North and Lot Minh areas. At this time SHENANDOAH II ended for the 3d Brigade.

8. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery: The operation was supported by the 2-33 Artillery Battalion in direct support consisting of the following units: C/2-33 Arty; A/2-33 Arty, B/2-33 Arty; 1 plt/D/2-33 Arty; D/1-5 Arty; C/7-9 Arty; C/8-6 Arty; B/C-6 Arty; A/B-6 Arty (GSR). Artillery fires were placed on all LZ's during the operation. Artillery fires were extensively used in support of ground forces. A total of 25,903 105mm rds; 13,972 155 mm rds, 6,970 8" rds and 13,340 4.2" rds were fired.

b. Air Force: The Air Force provided aerial observation and reconnaissance throughout the operation. Air Force ordnance was used in preparation of LZ's and in support of ground forces. A total of 217 close air support sorties were flown in conjunction with the operation.

9. RESULTS:a. Personnel Losses:

- (1) US Losses: 14 KHA, 32 WHA
- (2) VC Losses: 92 KIA (DC), 72 KIA (POSS), 30 detainees, 1 Chieu Moi.

b. Equipment Losses:

- (1) US Losses: 2 AFC's damaged
- (2) VC Losses:

(a) Weapons:

- 7 Anti Tank Mines
- 26 CBU's
- 3 105 mm rd's
- 1 155 mm rd
- 340 grenades
- 10 AP mines
- 3 anti-tank grenades
- 16 AK47's
- 1 CS grenade
- 1 M-14
- 1 M-16
- 1 Homeade rifle
- 3 30 cal LAR's
- 2 Chinese (56) carbines
- 2 US 30 cal carbines
- 4 D-41 rocket launchers
- 20 Claymores
- 5 Type 56 LMG

(b) Ammunition:

- 1000 Rds 7.62mm
- 300 Rds AK47
- 75 Rds 5.56 (M-16)
- 24 RPG Rds

(c) Equipment:

- 5 Ox carts
- 9 bicycles
- 1 wall
- 9 Desks
- 1 Meat Grinder
- 1 Set Webb Gear
- 1 Trip Flare
- 1 Smoke Grenade
- 15 Canteens

CONFIDENTIAL

137

CONFIDENTIAL

150

- 1 Box Det Cord
- 3 AK47's magazines
- 8 Cooking Pots
- 2 Night Lite Sots
- 8 Gas Masks
- 1 Compass Case
- 1 Mortar Case
- 1 Mortar Mining Stake

(d) Rations:

- 21,550 lbs Rice Evacuated
- 73,715 lbs Rice Destroyed
- 1,220 lbs Sugar
- 12 Chickens
- 5 lbs Miscellaneous Food
- 3 Pigs
- 15 lbs Salt

(e) Fortifications:

- 4 Fighting Positions
- 50 Military Structures
- 54 Spider Holes
- 166 Bunkers

(f) Miscellaneous:

- 4 Water Buffalo
- 2 Punji Pits
- 4 Billfolds
- 35 Sots of Fatigues
- 3 lbs of Documents

c. There was 981 acres of jungle cleared during the operation.

10. ADMINISTRATIVE:

a. Supply: Resupply was conducted by air. No supply problems were encountered.

b. Maintenance: Rome plows required a great deal of extra maintenance. Recurring problems were hydraulic lines and radiator punctures and the fact that the radiators needed to be blown out daily with an air compressor.

c. Treatment of Casualties; Evacuation and Hospitalization: No unusual problems were encountered with medical evacuation or treatment of the wounded.

d. Transportation: No major transportation problems were encountered during the operation.

11. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: Rome plows use a picture frame method of cutting. A large rectangle path is cut first then each succeeding rectangle gets smaller until the entire rectangle has been cut. Rome plows can clear 4 times as much as a regular dozer due to the fact the Rome plows actually cuts trees down instead of knocking them over.

12. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

a. Indications point to the fact that the over-all operation succeeded in temporarily disrupting the operations of the 83d Rear Services group, especially in the area of food supplies considering that 48 tons of rice were captured or destroyed.

b. The rice paddy areas along the Song Saigon, Thi Tinh stream and the smaller streams feeding it continued to be cultivated and harvested, by suspected VC. Although few personnel were sighted in the area, indications of this activity were continually present. A request for crop destruction of the rice in the Song Saigon - Thi Tinh River area was approved. Crop destruction of a large percentage of the rice in the area was accomplished in mid - November. However this area continues to be a lucrative VC rice supply source.

CONFIDENTIAL

(8)

138

151

CONFIDENTIAL

c. It is strongly recommended that every avenue be investigated for the future crop destruction/CS contamination of this main VC rice supply source and that consideration be given to conducting S & D operations along the foliage bordering these areas.

d. The rice ploy effort, though difficult in some areas due to the marshy nature of the terrain, succeeded in pushing the jungle back from route 240 approximately 100 meters in both directions over 90% of its length in the Iron Brigade AO as well as considerably improving FSPB's Lorraine I and Lorraine II. As a bonus to this effort, two additional unmanned FSPB locations were prepared for future operations via XT 674 449 and XT 666 049.

e. The contact involving Company B 1-16 Inf on 13 October 1967 reemphasized the value of maintaining a local RUF capable of deploying immediately. The ability of Company D 1-16 Inf to rapidly deploy in to the vicinity of the PZ to secure it for the withdrawal of Company C was a key factor to their security. They were on the ground in less than one hour after the order was given for their employment.

f. It was well established by both 1-16 Inf and 1-26 Inf elements which encountered base camps that VC bunker construction renders them safe from anything except a direct hit by an air-delivered delay fuse bomb or 155 mm artillery or larger with a delay fuse. Any other type support, ie, less than 155 mm artillery or LFT is ineffective. The only sure method of destruction of a complete base camp is with shaped charges set by troops on the ground.

g. Evacuation of rice from an enemy base camp storage area located in triple canopy jungle is difficult. Three primary methods were used by the Iron Brigade for extraction of VC rice during Operation Shennandoah II.

(1) If a vehicle could reach the storage area it moved the rice to a pickup zone for evacuation by R/W aircraft.

(2) If the trees in the area were of medium height or shorter a sling extension was used to reach through the trees and remove the rice by sling load.

(3) If neither of the above could be effected, an LZ was cut into which a R/W aircraft could descend to pick up the rice. A sling extension was used in the interests of aircraft safety. If LZ cutting required more than one day, heavy M and I fires were placed in the area overnight to preclude enemy evacuation of the rice.

Frank E. Blazey  
FRANK E. BLAZEY  
Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding

DOWNGRADED IN 3YR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

(9)

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139

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152

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140

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